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AWARENESS IN AGEING 
 
by Cassandra Richardson 
 
Deficits in awareness are found in diseases of ageing, and with acute and traumatic brain 
injury. Despite investigations of awareness in ageing patient populations, little is known 
about any potential effects of normal ageing on awareness. The Hierarchies of Processing 
model (Stuss, Picton & Alexander, 2001) provided a theoretical framework for an 
investigation of different types of awareness in healthy ageing. Four empirical studies are 
reported in this thesis. 
 
  An investigation of sensory processing using ERP components found that older adults had 
reduced attentional capture of auditory stimuli and allocated less attention to processing 
target stimuli. However, behavioural performance was equivalent across groups, indicating 
that the underlying differences found in sensory processing did not significantly impact on 
functioning. Age-related differences were also found in ERP components associated with 
performance monitoring: error detection; error processing; and, in reaction times. 
However, again, behavioural performance was similar, and indicated that older adults were 
able to compensate for underlying brain changes. In the third study, there were no age 
differences in any of the measures of awareness specifically focusing on current 
functioning and abilities, which suggested that awareness of abilities, did not alter as a 
function of healthy ageing. The final exploratory study found that the different levels of 
awareness were related, and, that the pattern of relationships was similar for younger and 
older adults.  
 
  Normal healthy ageing was associated with subtle differences in some processes 
underlying different types of awareness, but without any functional impairment. It was 
concluded that older adults may adapt to underlying brain and cognitive changes occurring 
during later life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   3 
Chapter 2:  Neural and Cognitive Development Across the Lifespan. 
 
2.1. Gross Neuroanatomy of the Brain  40 
2.2. The Cortex  41 
2.3. Brain Connectivity  41 
2.4. Overview of the Human Brain across the Lifespan  42 
2.5. Overview of Cognitive Development over the Lifespan, and its relation to  
Brain Development  47 
2.5.1. Studies based on Structural Brain Imaging  48 
2.5.2. Studies based on Functional Brain Imaging  53 
2.5.3. Summary of the Effects of Ageing on Brain and Cognition  55 
2.6. Awareness and Ageing  56 
2.6.1. Metamemory and Ageing  57 
2.6.1.1. Feeling-of-Knowing and Ageing  57 
2.6.1.2. Judgements-of-Learning and Ageing  58 
2.6.1.3. Memory Monitoring and Ageing  59 
2.6.1.4. Metamemory Beliefs and Ageing  60 
2.6.2. Hierarchies of Processing Model and Ageing  63 
 
Chapter 3: Recruitment & Overview of Methodology. 
 
3.1. Recruitment of Participants  71 
3.1.1. Participants  71 
3.2. Rates of Attrition  73 
3.3. Further Information about the Recruitment of Older Adults  73 
3.4. Cognitive Screening in Older Adult Research  75 
3.5. Issues of Acceptability  76 
3.6. Neuropsychological Measures of General Intellectual Function, 
Memory, Affect and Awareness of Performance  77 
3.6.1. Neuropsychological Measures  77 
3.6.2. Measures of Affect  78 
3.6.3. Measures of Awareness  80 
3.7. Introduction to Event-Related Potentials  82 
3.7.1. Neural Generators of the Electroencephalogram  83   4 
3.7.2. The Electroencephalogram  84 
3.7.3. Event-Related Potentials  85 
3.7.4. EEG acquisition and ERP processing in the current study  87 
3.7.5. Overview of Event-Related Potential Paradigms Used in the  
Present Thesis  88 
3.8. Procedure  89 
3.9. Statistical Analyses  91 
 
 
Chapter 4: Sensory Awareness and Novelty Processing. 
 
4.1. Introduction  92 
4.1.1. Overview of Cognitive and Neuroscience Approaches to  
Attention  92 
4.1.2. Event Related Potential Correlates of Auditory Sensory  
Processing  95 
4.1.2.1. Functional Neuroanatomy of Auditory Sensory and  
Novelty Processing  97 
4.1.2.2. Habituation to Novelty  99 
4.1.3. Event-Related Potential Correlates of Sensory Processing in  
Normal Ageing  101 
4.1.3.1. Standard Two-Tone Auditory Oddball Task  102 
4.1.3.2. Novelty Auditory Oddball Task  104 
4.1.4. Aims of the Study  108 
4.2. Method  109 
4.2.1. Participants  109 
4.2.2. Measures  109 
4.3. ERP Acquisition and Processing  110 
4.4. Habituation Analysis  111 
4.5. Statistical Analysis  111 
4.6. Results  112 
4.6.1. Behavioural Responses  112 
4.6.2. ERP Components  112 
4.6.2.1. Lateral N1 Component  112   5 
4.6.2.2. Central N1 Component  113 
4.6.2.2.1. Amplitude  113 
4.6.2.2.2. Latency  113 
4.6.2.3. P3 Component  115 
4.6.2.3.1. Amplitude  115 
4.6.2.3.2. Latency  116 
4.6.3. Habituation to Novel Stimuli  119 
4.6.4. Planned comparisons between level of anxiety and N1 and P3  
components  121 
4.7. Discussion  124 
4.7.1. Summary  131 
 
 
Chapter 5: Performance Monitoring. 
 
5.1. Introduction  133 
5.1.1. The Error Related Negativity  133 
5.1.2. The Correct Response Negativity  134 
5.1.3. The Error Positivity  135 
5.1.4. Experimental Manipulations of Response Monitoring Components  136 
5.1.5. Associations between ERN/Pe, Remedial Actions and  
Measures of Awareness  138 
5.1.6. Performance Monitoring Components and Ageing  140 
5.1.7. Aims of the Study  142 
5.2. Method  144 
5.2.1. Participants  144 
5.2.2. Measures  145 
5.2.3. ERP Acquisition and Processing  146 
5.2.3.1. Woody Filter  147 
5.2.4. Statistical Analysis  148 
5.3. Results  149 
5.3.1. Behavioural Responses  149 
5.3.2. Stimulus-locked components  153 
5.3.2.1. P3b Component  153   6 
5.3.2.2. SW Component  153 
5.3.2.3 Correct Trial Analyses: Investigation of Pre-Response  
Conflict  155 
5.3.2.3.1. N2 Component.  155 
5.3.2.3.2. P3b Component  156 
5.3.2.3.3. N4 Component  156 
5.3.2.3.4. SW Component  156 
5.3.2.3.5. Summary  158 
5.3.3. Response-locked components  159 
5.3.3.1. CRN-ERN Components  159 
5.3.3.2. Pe  159 
5.3.4. Postdiction Accuracy  162 
5.3.5. Association between ERN/Pe, measures of affect, remedial  
actions and perceived accuracy  163 
5.3.6. Woody filtered response-locked components  168 
5.3.6.1. CRN-ERN Components  168 
5.3.6.2. Pe Component  168 
5.3.6.3. Direct Comparison between Conventional Averaging  
and the Woody Filter  168 
5.3.7. Summary of Results  173 
5.4. Discussion  173 
5.4.1. Summary  186 
 
 
Chapter 6: Awareness Assessed by Measures of Metamemory and Self-Report of 
Functioning. 
 
6.1. Introduction  188 
6.1.1. Assessment of Metamemory in Ageing  188 
6.1.2. Confounding factors  192 
6.1.3. Clinical Approaches to Assessing Awareness of Functioning  193 
6.1.4. Aims of the Study  194 
6.2. Method  196 
6.2.1. Participants  196   7 
6.2.2. Measures  197 
6.2.2.1. Cognitive Measures  197 
6.2.2.2. Affective Measures  197 
6.2.2.3. Self-Report Measures of Awareness  198 
6.2.3. Procedure  199 
6.2.4. Statistical Analysis  200 
6.3. Results  200 
6.3.1. Measures of Cognition and Affect  200 
6.3.2. Measures of Awareness  202 
6.3.2.1. Influence of mood and self esteem  203 
6.3.3. Correlations  204 
6.3.4. Patterns of Discrepancy Scores on Awareness of Functioning  206 
6.4. Discussion  208 
6.4.1. Summary  213 
 
 
Chapter 7: A Multidimensional Assessment of the Hierarchies of Processing Model 
(Stuss et al., 2001). 
 
7.1. Introduction  215 
7.1.1. Aims of the Study  218 
7.2. Method  219 
7.2.1. Participants  219 
7.2.2. Variables Included in Analyses  220 
7.2.3. Statistical Analyses  221 
7.3. Results  222 
7.3.1. Comparison between Level 2 - Sensorimotor Awareness and    
Level 3 - Consistent Consciousness  222 
7.3.2. Comparison between Level 3 - Consistent Consciousness and  
Level 4 – Self-Awareness  223 
7.4. Discussion  230 
7.4.1. Summary  237 
 
   8 
Chapter 8: Conclusion. 
 
8.1. Age-related differences in Sensorimotor Awareness, Consistent  
Consciousness and Self-Awareness  240 
8.1.1. Sensorimotor Awareness (Level 2: HoP Model)  240 
8.1.2. Consistent Consciousness (Level 3: HoP Model)  242 
8.1.3. Self-Awareness (Level 4: HoP Model)  244 
8.2. Multi-method Assessment of the Hierarchies of Processing Model  246 
8.3. Limitations of the Study  248 
8.3.1. Lack of Formal Assessment of Level 1 of the HoP Model  248 
8.3.2. Operationalisation of Awareness Levels in the HoP Model  249 
8.3.3. Power of the Study  249 
8.4. General Conclusions  250 
8.5. Implications for Diseases of Ageing  252 
8.6. Awareness  254 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1      Sponsorship Letter from the University of Southampton  256 
Appendix 2      Participant Invitation Letter  257 
Appendix 3      Participant Information Sheet  258 
Appendix 4      Script for the Procedure  261 
Appendix 5      Investigation of Habituation of the ERN  295 
Appendix 6   Investigation of the Effect of Older Age on Response-locked 
Components  297 
 
 
References  299 
 
   9 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1. A Cognitive Model of Anosognosia of Memory Impairment    
(adapted from Agnew & Morris, 1998)  31 
Figure 1.2. Model of Awareness. Adapted from Toglia and Kirk (2000)  34 
Figure 2.1. Schematic of grey matter changes over the lifespan  44 
Figure 2.2. Schematic of white matter changes over the lifespan  45 
Figure. 2.3. The Hierarchies of Processing Model  
(adapted from Stuss et al., 2001)  65 
Figure 3.1. The Frequency Bands of the EEG  85 
Figure 3.2. Example of a stimulus-locked waveform from the younger adult  
group recorded from Cz: Compatible condition (solid line) and incompatible  
condition (dashed line) elicited by the 4-CRT  86 
Figure 3.3. The montage of the lead placement following the International  
10-20 system  88 
Figure 4.1. Grand average waveforms for target and novel stimuli at frontal  
and parietal regions in younger and older adults  117 
Figure 4.2. Target P3 Amplitude: Stimulus by Group Differences  118 
Figure 4.3. Target P3 Amplitude: Location by Group Differences  119 
Figure 4.4. Topographical maps of the effect of habituation on scalp  
distribution of electrical activity for younger and older adults  122 
Figure 5.1. Stimulus-locked waveforms provided by an older adult averaged 
by the Woody filter process (left) and the conventional process (right)  148 
Figure 5.2. Stimulus-locked waveforms recorded from Cz: Compatible  
condition (solid line) and incompatible condition (dashed line) group  
grand averages  154 
Figure 5.3. Stimulus-locked waveforms recorded from Cz: Compatible  
condition (solid line) and incompatible condition (dashed line) group  
grand averages.   156 
Figure 5.4. Response-locked waveforms recorded from electrode FCz:  
Compatible condition (top figures) and incompatible condition  
(bottom figures) group grand averages  160 
 
   11 
components  154 
Table 5.6. ANOVA models for the latencies of the stimulus-locked components  155 
Table 5.7. Mean (standard deviation) peak amplitudes and latencies of correct  
trial stimulus-locked components for younger and older adults  157 
Table 5.8. ANOVA models for amplitude of the correct trial stimulus-locked 
components  157 
Table 5.9. ANOVA models for the latency of the correct trial stimulus-locked 
components  158 
Table 5.10. Peak amplitudes and latencies of response-locked components for  
younger and older adults  160 
Table 5.11. Results for the amplitude of the response-locked components:  
CRN-ERN complex and the Pe  160 
Table 5.12. Results for the latencies of the response-locked components:  
CRN-ERN complex and the Pe  160 
Table 5.13. Correct performance and postdiction discrepancy over time for  
younger and older adults  163 
Table 5.14. ANOVA models for the perceived accuracy analyses  163 
Table 5.15. Pearson product-moment correlations between the ERN, Pe,  
Anxiety and Depression in younger (below the line) and older adults  
(above the line)  165 
Table 5.16. Correlations between the ERN, Pe and PANAS scales for  
younger (below the line) and older adults (above the line)  166 
Table 5.17. Correlations between components of error detection, error  
processing and remedial actions in younger (below the line) and older  
adults (above the line)  167 
Table 5.18. Peak amplitudes and latencies of Woody filtered response-locked 
components for younger and older adults  169 
Table 5.19. ANOVA models for the amplitude of the Woody filtered  
response-locked components  170 
Table 5.20. ANOVA models for the latency of the Woody filtered  
response-locked components  170 
Table 5.21. Peak amplitudes of response-locked components from the  
Woody filtered process and from the conventional averaging process for  
younger and older adults  171   14 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
My thanks go firstly to all of my participants, for their time and their support of my 
studies. This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother, Edna Mary Richardson, an 
inspirational lady who gave me the strength to persevere, and who sadly never saw the 
completion of this thesis. 
 
I would like to thank my academic supervisors Dr. Alexandra Hogan and Dr. Romola 
Bucks for their continuous support and tutelage. They never let me settle for second best 
and their friendship and guidance has made this process one that I have thoroughly 
enjoyed. I would also like to thank Professor Clive Holmes, Dr. Torsten Baldeweg, 
Professor Fenella Kirkham and Luke Phillips for their support, help and advice. My thanks 
go also to Sandra Horn, who believed in me, before I believed in myself.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank Ruth, David, my mum and my dad for their love and support, 
and for which I will be eternally grateful. I also offer my thanks to those who provided me 
with sanctuary and sustenance; Patti, Sam, Simon, Anne and Tom. All of whom played a 
huge part in keeping me sane and kept me going through the tough times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   15 
 
Overview of Thesis. 
 
 
Awareness can be affected by diseases of ageing (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease: AD; Clare, 
2004a, and Parkinson’s disease: PD; Leritz, Loftis, Crucian, Friedman & Bowers, 2004), 
but, despite development in our understanding of awareness as a psychological concept 
(Chapter 1), the degree of change in awareness with normal ageing is not established. This 
calls into question the extent to which pathology constrains awareness over and above any 
normal age-related changes. Indeed, irrespective of pathology, ageing has been shown to 
be a time of significant neurological and cognitive change (Chapter 2). Impairments in 
awareness may, thus, be one result of the normal ageing process. Moreover, evidence from 
the metacognitive literature has indicated that different processes involved in awareness 
are differentially affected by age. 
 
The empirical studies presented herein were designed to address two main issues. Firstly, 
the extent to which our understanding of awareness might be improved by the application 
of cognitive neuroscience techniques. Secondly, the degree to which awareness changes 
with age. Thus, traditional theory and modern neuroscience approaches are combined to 
offer a perspective on the investigation of awareness in normal ageing. The third chapter 
describes, in detail, the method employed to this end. Traditional neuropsychological 
techniques were applied, but also extended, to allow greater understanding of the 
underlying brain mechanisms involved in awareness. The aim was to replicate and extend 
understanding of different types of awareness in a younger and older sample.  
 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were introduced as a newer approach to investigating 
sensory awareness and performance monitoring. ERPs associated with the processing of 
basic sound or visual stimuli (stimulus-locked) reflect the moment at which attention is 
captured (Chapter 4). More complex cognitive functions are reflected in response-locked 
components, for example, the error-related negativity, elicited by a choice-response 
paradigm (Chapter 5). The third study (Chapter 6) utilised traditional metacognitive and 
clinical approaches to the study of awareness. The relationships between the traditional and 
neuroscientific measures of awareness were subsequently explored (Chapter 7). The final 
chapter discussed the utility of this approach, the contribution of the present data to 
existing models, and the possible implications of the findings for clinical populations.    16 
 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction. 
 
If the fact of subjectivity runs counter to a certain definition of ‘science’,  
then it is the definition and not the fact which we will have to abandon. 
Searle (1991, p. 25). 
 
1.1. Introduction. 
 
Awareness is a complex and multidimensional construct, inextricably linked with 
consciousness. Whilst the aim of this thesis is not to investigate consciousness per se, any 
discussion of awareness should consider consciousness. It is not proposed that 
consciousness and awareness are synonymous, even inter-changeable terms, but rather that 
the development of these concepts has a shared history. Indeed, the concepts of 
consciousness and awareness have long been a focus for discussion by philosophers, 
theorists and psychologists (e.g. Chalmers, 1996; Damasio, 1999; Dennett, 1993; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Searle, 1991, 2000; Tulving, 1985; Zeman, 2001, 2006). Consequently, a 
number of psychological, neuropsychological and neurological theories and models exist, 
some of which will be reviewed in this chapter. The conceptualisation of levels of 
awareness found in some neurological models of consciousness is particularly influential 
(e.g. Prigatano & Johnson, 2003; Stuss, Picton & Alexander, 2001). The basic tenet is that 
there are different types of awareness, and that these types are hierarchically organised, 
and dependent on the functioning and inter-connectivity of neural assemblies in the brain. 
The development of brain imaging technology has facilitated investigation of candidate 
neural correlates of consciousness and awareness (e.g. Damasio, 1999; Frith, Perry & 
Lumer, 1999; Koch & Crick, 2000). The neuroscience community is thus moving towards 
empirical examination of the ancient and long-debated concepts of consciousness and 
awareness, where previously these concepts were considered too nebulous for scientific 
enquiry. An unavoidable challenge is first to operationalise awareness for objective study. 
As suggested by Searle (1991), rather than avoiding subjective concepts, a re-examination 
of definitions may indicate a way in which to facilitate modern neuroscience enquiry. The 
approach of this chapter is to offer an historical perspective into the evolution of the   20 
Hume (1711-1776, cited in Warburton, 2006) was influenced by Locke to the extent that 
he believed that the contents of the mind were derived from experience with the external 
world. He relied on observation and introspection to support his conceptualisations, 
bringing philosophical views under scientific assessment. Hume expanded on Locke’s 
conceptualisation of ideas, in that he employed the term perceptions to incorporate the 
contents of experience, and separated perceptions into impressions and ideas. Impressions 
were sensory experiences, whereas ideas were copies of impressions and comprised the 
content of memories. Hume suggested a number of relationships between ideas that 
underlay thinking; resemblance, contiguity (timing), and cause and effect. Hume posited 
that his conceptualisation of perceptions and the relationships between ideas accounted for 
the conscious mind (Warburton, 2006). Although Hume did not directly address the 
concept of consciousness, conscious experience can be viewed as the incorporation of 
incoming sensory experience and the relationships between ideas. More importantly for the 
present discussion, Hume and Locke offer another reason for believing that the subjective 
mind is related to the body. If a process must undergo development, then the process is 
more consistent with the human body than with an ethereal, unchanging soul. 
 
 
1.2.4. Levels of Consciousness. 
 
In the nineteenth century, the conceptualisation of levels of consciousness was a focus for 
the emerging field of psychology. Indeed, Nietzsche (1844-1900, cited in Warburton, 
2006) described an extra-moral stage of human evolution, promoting the recognition of 
unconscious rather than conscious motivations for human behaviour (Warburton, 2006). 
Nietzsche’s focus on unconscious drives was particularly influential on Freud’s thinking 
(Warburton, 2006). One of the prominent features of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory was 
the role of unconscious processes in motivating behaviour (Freud, 1946, cited in 
Warburton, 2006). Freud (1856-1939, cited in Warburton, 2006) proposed that the 
personality was composed of the Id, Ego and Superego and that a balance between the 
three constructs was necessary for mental health. Freud was concerned with the 
unconscious mind, as he believed that negative experiences were repressed, which led to 
anxiety and conflict. In his view, defence mechanisms were the unconscious strategies 
employed by the Ego to relieve this anxiety and conflict (Freud, 1946, cited in Warburton, 
2006). Freud employed hypnosis, free association and dream interpretation as methods for   24 
1.3.2. Social Psychological Theories of Self-Awareness. 
 
The relationship between self-awareness and self-knowledge has been extensively debated 
within the social psychology literature. This may be partly due to the assumption that the 
relationship is complex and difficult to investigate empirically. A review by Silvia and 
Gendolla (2001) explored the moderating role of self-focused attention on self-awareness 
and argued that the process of introspection may function to alter the view of the self. In 
other words, requesting that a person considers their self-awareness can fundamentally 
change the process under observation. In essence, the person may become more self-aware. 
The role and consequences of self-focused attention underpins each of the main social 
psychological theories of self-awareness (see Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). Some theories are 
considered in greater detail below due to their important contribution to our understanding 
of self-awareness. 
 
Before the self-awareness theories can be considered, however, it is necessary to 
understand the definitions of self-awareness on which they are based. The consensus of 
opinion appears to be behind the definition of self-awareness presented by Duval and 
Wicklund (1972): “when attention is directed inward and the individual’s consciousness is 
focused on himself” (p. 2). This is where the consensus ends as there are two approaches to 
the actual study of self-awareness based on a distinction between situational self-awareness 
and dispositional self-awareness, otherwise termed self-consciousness. Although both 
research traditions view self-awareness as an independent variable, the situational literature 
manipulates self-awareness by assigning participants into either a control condition or to a 
condition that elicits ‘high’ self-awareness, for example, through the use of mirrors, video 
cameras or reminders of the self (e.g. Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Macrae, Bodenhausen & 
Milne, 1998). In contrast, the dispositional literature focuses on individual differences in 
self-consciousness, which is typically measured by self-report of self-symbolic thoughts. A 
median split on the Private Self-Consciousness subscale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 
1975) is commonly employed to create high and low self-consciousness groups (e.g. Hull, 
Sloane, Meteyer & Matthews, 2002). 
 
The objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001) 
posited two types of self-awareness: ‘objective self-awareness’ which arises from self-
focused attention, and ‘subjective self-awareness’ which occurs through the experience of   25 
activity. The theory states that when attention is focused in on the self (self-focused 
attention), objective self-awareness may be elicited. This can lead to a comparison between 
the self, defined as knowledge held about the individual, and a standard defined as “a 
mental representation of correct behaviour, attitudes, and traits” (Duval & Wicklund, 1972, 
p. 3). Any discrepancy found between the self and standards from this self-evaluation 
could lead to negative affect, which could in turn motivate the person to reduce the 
discrepancy, either by modifying their standards or by avoiding introspection. Since the 
original theory was published, research has focused on elucidating those processes 
potentially involved in reducing any discrepancy, for example, attributions involved in 
explaining the discrepancy (Silvia & Duval, 2001).  
 
Two later theories of self-awareness also have the concept of an automatic internal 
comparison with a standard as a central tenet of self-regulation and behaviour (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981; Gibbon, 1990). These later theories however, differ in their 
conceptualisation of standards. Carver and Scheier’s (1981) model incorporated the view 
that self-focused attention could be towards either public or private aspects of the self; the 
external environment or the internal. Additionally, they proposed that mental 
representations of standards were hierarchically arranged. There are two critical points: 
firstly, if the standard chosen during the evaluative process does not correspond with 
behaviour in the current evaluation this can lead to dissonance; secondly, lower level 
standards can be accessed leading to the self-regulation of behaviour (Carver & Scheier, 
1981). Gibbon (1990) also presented a multi-level model suggesting that at the experiential 
level, attention is focused on arousal and bodily sensations; at the behavioural level, a 
consideration of standards regarding correct behaviours occurs; and at the evaluative level, 
there is a comparison with the ‘ideal’ self. In summary, the automatic, internal focusing of 
attention was considered to provide accurate information necessary for self-regulation of 
behaviour. 
 
Failure of self-focused attention and self-regulatory processes (processes that facilitate 
regulation of behaviour) have been linked with psychopathology (e.g. Ingram, 1990; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Intense self-focus can elicit hyper-sensitivity to 
psychopathological symptoms which, in turn, may interact with other processes such as 
catastrophic thoughts and rumination, which can compound the problem. Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg (1987) presented a ‘self-awareness theory’ of reactive depression, proposing   26 
that self-focused attention exacerbated negative affect and a perception of negative 
outcomes, which in turn created a “depressive self-focusing style” (Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987, p. 127), a style of focusing attention to depressive symptomatology. 
Similarly, Ingram (1990) proposed that this relationship between self-focused attention and 
self-focusing style was central to the majority of psychopathological conditions (e.g. 
depression, anxiety, alcohol abuse, vulnerability and schizophrenia). Again, a limitation of 
these theories is the difficulty in testing them, in this case from an ethical perspective. It 
may be problematic and unethical to manipulate a depressive self-focusing style, and in 
separating illness symptomatology from a self-focusing style.  
 
In contrast to the theories of self-awareness that are based on self-focused attention, Hull 
and Levy (1979) proposed that self-awareness involves the automatic encoding of self-
relevant information from the environment. This refers to the sensitivity of self-relevant 
environmental cues. The point of this theory is that any information that is processed as 
self-relevant may influence behaviour, regardless of the applicability of the information to 
the participant. More recently, in support of Hull and Levy’s (1979) earlier theory, Hull, 
Slone, Meteyer and Matthews (2002) used implicit and subliminal primes to investigate 
self-consciousness and its relationship to behaviour. Hull et al. (2002) employed a median 
split on the Private Self-Consciousness subscale and found that high, private self-
consciousness (high awareness of internal, self-symbolic thoughts) was associated with 
behaviours influenced by the primes presented, e.g. walking more slowly after presentation 
to an elderly prime (elderly stereotype: Studies 1a and 1b), and increased blood pressure to 
an angry prime (Study 4). These results suggest that individuals high in private self-
consciousness have greater sensitivity to environmental cues that may be processed as self-
referent. One challenge for the Hull and Levy (1979) theory, in particular, is in accounting 
for behavioural consistency. That is, the degree to which an individual may maintain ‘high’ 
self-awareness, for example, the extent to which this is a trait rather than is state, is not 
known. 
 
In summary, the social psychological theories have defined self-awareness as either 
situational or dispositional. In other words, self-awareness either arises from self-focused 
attention or is a personality characteristic. Whilst investigators have focused on the 
relationships between self-awareness and the self-regulation of behaviour, none address   27 
possible developmental influences on self-awareness or the influence of experience on the 
development and maintenance of standards.  
 
1.3.3. Psychological Models of Awareness.  
 
Cavanaugh (1989) presented a theoretical framework accounting for different perspectives 
of awareness in memory, drawing heavily from the metamemory literature. The model 
incorporates several variables identified as important to memory functioning namely; 
experience, task demands, knowledge, personality, beliefs, and motivation. Three types of 
awareness are distinguished: (i) systemic awareness, defined as knowledge and beliefs 
about memory functioning; (ii) epistemic awareness, which represents the ability to 
evaluate the knowledge base; and, (iii) on-line awareness, which refers to the monitoring 
of processing during memory tasks. Each type of awareness may be tested using different 
methodologies. Systemic awareness can be assessed with metamemory questionnaires, 
epistemic awareness with feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgements, and on-line awareness 
with processes of recollection. The model predicted pathways between systemic awareness 
and the knowledge base, knowledge evaluation and epistemic awareness, and executive 
processing and on-line awareness. However, the different types of awareness are not 
connected. A search of the available literature did not find any studies empirically 
assessing this model. Memory monitoring studies have, nevertheless employed FOK 
judgements and predictions across trials (e.g. Bieman-Copland & Charness, 1994; Perrotin, 
Isingrini, Souchay, Clarys & Taconnat, 2005; Souchay & Isingrini, 2004; Souchay, 
Isingrini & Espagnet, 2000) and, it can be argued that these processes also represent on-
line awareness. Although Cavanaugh’s (1989) model does not account for the dynamic 
relationship between awareness and memory functioning, it does provide testable 
hypotheses about awareness and its underlying processes. For example, investigating 
relationships between knowledge evaluation and FOK judgements may contribute to an 
assessment of epistemic awareness.  
 
The relationship between awareness and memory is also a central tenet of one of the most 
influential psychological models of awareness. Tulving (1985) introduced the concept that 
different types of awareness corresponded with retrieval from different types of memory. 
In his seminal paper, Tulving (1985) linked semantic memory with noetic (knowing) 
awareness, and episodic memory with autonoetic (self-knowing) awareness. Tulving   31 
and consciousness via implicit memory, the mismatch may be encoded into implicit 
memory; this implicit knowledge of impaired functioning may be exhibited behaviourally 
(e.g. by avoiding tasks relying on the impaired function). Executive anosognosia refers to 
the perception of an error, but due to a failure of the Cm, a comparison with the PKB does 
not occur; a mismatch signal is not created and, therefore, there is no output from the 
comparator mechanism such that there is no communication about a deficit into memory. 
Primary anosognosia is global unawareness of impaired cognitive functioning due to a 
deficit in the Conscious Awareness System, despite communication of impairments from 
the Cm and the PKB. However, negative affect may be experienced due to the link between 
implicit memory and consciousness. The model has only recently been directly tested (see 
Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Graham, Kunik, Doody & Snow, 2005), with limited support being 
found for mnemonic anosognosia; in that the revision of the PKB does appear to be 
affected with AD. However, Ansell and Bucks (2006) found that older adults were able to 
update their memory predictions, indicating that this type of awareness deficit was specific 
to AD. 
 
Figure 1.1. A Cognitive Model of Anosognosia of Memory Impairment (adapted from 
Agnew & Morris, 1998). 
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Clare (2004b) presented a biopsychosocial model of awareness in AD in her review and 
included neurological, neuropsychological, psychiatric and psychosocial perspectives. 
Clare (2004b) proposed that the self was “the unifying context for experience over time” 
(p. 169), a cognitive schema, and socially constructed, with age, personality, coping styles, 
norms and experience influencing the self. The model described biological, psychological 
and social dimensions of awareness, each of which included factors to be considered when 
examining an individual’s level of awareness. For example, the biological dimension 
included: domain-specific unawareness; executive unawareness; mnemonic, executive and 
primary anosognosia; damaged and/or disconnected Conscious Awareness System; and, 
general metacognitive deficit. The model posited that the biological and social dimensions 
influenced psychological aspects of awareness, with each of the dimensions interacting 
with different aspects of the self. For example, Clare (2004b) argued that AD threatened 
the sense of self, and combined with personality, coping styles and beliefs would influence 
the psychological dimension of awareness, which included the concept of denial. A 
dynamic interaction was posited between the social self and the social dimension of 
awareness, which included interactions with significant others, and opportunities for 
participation in activities and social roles. The model has integrated a wide range of 
concepts from diverse literatures and whilst comprehensive, has not been empirically 
assessed, probably due its complexity. Although the model was developed from existing 
literature, it does not offer testable hypotheses about awareness; rather it suggests possible 
relationships between different dimensions of awareness in AD.  
 
 
1.3.4.1.2. Neuropsychological Models of Awareness in Brain Injury. 
 
Deficits in awareness alongside neuropsychological deficits are found in other neurological 
conditions (e.g. acquired and traumatic brain injury), lending validity to the close 
association between awareness and brain functioning. Whilst the previous 
neuropsychological models may be applied to multiple neurological conditions, they have 
been specifically developed from the literature regarding deficits in awareness in AD. 
There has been little comparison of deficits in awareness in differing patient populations 
(however, see Eslinger et al., 2005, for a comparison of awareness deficits in different 
types of dementia). Crosson et al. (1989) presented the Pyramid Model of Awareness, 
which was developed to account for deficits in awareness found in individuals with brain   33 
injury. The model describes three levels of awareness hierarchically arranged, with higher 
levels being dependent on lower levels. Specific deficits in awareness were outlined for 
each of the levels. Intellectual awareness at the bottom level, represents the awareness that 
there is impairment in some domain. Emergent awareness, at the middle level, is awareness 
that the impairment is a problem. At the top level, anticipatory awareness is the 
understanding that the impairment is causing the problem.  
 
Little support has been found for the Pyramid Model of Awareness. For example, Abreu, et 
al. (2001) compared patients’ predicted and actual performance as assessed by clinicians, 
on basic activities of daily living (ADL), meal planning and money management. 
Questions regarding their prediction (intellectual level), performance (emergent level) and 
assessment of performance effects on independent living (anticipatory level) were 
employed. The study found significant differences between the patients’ different 
assessments and their actual performance for each of the tasks, with the exception of 
performance of basic ADL and their assessment of their actual performance. Two groups 
were created on the basis of their response to a question regarding their awareness of 
changes in abilities. Crosson et al. (1989) predicted in the Pyramid Model of Awareness 
that aware patients would have greater accuracy in their assessments. However, the groups 
(aware/unaware) in the Abreu et al. (2001) study were not significantly different on the 
discrepancy between the patients’ predictions and the clinicians’ ratings of performance. 
Both unaware and aware patients significantly overestimated their abilities.  
 
Toglia and Kirk (2000) argued against the hierarchical structure of the Pyramid Model of 
Awareness and expanded the model to incorporate the dynamic relationships between 
awareness and performance (see Figure 1.2). The model separates metacognitive 
knowledge and on-line awareness, with the former relating to general knowledge existing 
prior to task engagement, whilst the latter is situational and activates with task 
performance. The Domain of Concern influenced the Depth of Awareness concept, as well 
as prior knowledge of task performance and associated strategies. Depth of Awareness 
influenced self knowledge and beliefs (intellectual awareness). The model proposed a 
dynamic interaction between prior knowledge and self knowledge. These constructs, in 
turn, interact with situational, on-line awareness, which was linked to anticipatory 
awareness (the understanding that the impairment is causing the problem), task experience, 
monitoring of cognitive state (emergent awareness) and self-evaluation. On-line awareness   36 
processing that does not lend itself to empirical testing. The value of Stuss et al. model, 
however, is in the separation of different types of awareness, and the description of the 
processes involved in each type of awareness, which can be more easily tested, and the 
association of these components with functional neuroanatomy.  
 
The lowest level of the Hierarchies of Processing model (HoP; Stuss et al., 2001) is 
Arousal and relates to from coma to waking state. The second level, Sensorimotor 
Awareness results from the processing of sensory information in the posterior regions of 
the brain. The final two levels of the model involve processing within the frontal lobes. 
Consistent Consciousness, at the third level, relies on executive functioning and the ability 
to organise sensory information underlying behaviour. Self-Awareness is the highest level 
in the model, and involves accurate monitoring of the self and personal abilities.  
 
The second neurological model of awareness is more simplistic than that of Stuss et al. 
(2001). Based on the review of consciousness by Zeman (2001), Prigatano and Johnson 
(2003) proposed a hierarchical model of consciousness to account for deficits in self-
awareness found in traumatic brain injury. These authors, similarly to Stuss et al. (2001), 
proposed that the neural circuits underlying different types of consciousness interact. 
Vector 1 of this model represents the waking state, the second vector relates to the 
phenomenological sense of self and the third corresponds with theory of mind; insight into 
the self and an understanding of others’ mental states. Prigatano and Johnson (2003) 
identified specific structures and their interconnectivity underlying the different vectors. 
The brain stem and reticular formation and the thalamus underpin the waking state. The 
anterior and posterior cingulate, the prefrontal, posterior parietal, and lateral temporal 
cortices underlie the experience of being a ‘self’ and theory of mind. Whilst both models 
describe how neurological damage is involved in deficits of awareness, Prigatano and 
Johnson (2003) also suggested possible avenues of rehabilitation: medication can elevate 
energy levels during the waking state, thus improving engagement with tasks; teaching of 
coping strategies and performance feedback may assist those with some degree of accurate 
self-awareness; and, cognitive therapy may assist those with deficits in theory of mind.  
 
In summary, the neurological models of awareness were developed to account for evidence 
that focal brain lesions produce deficits in different types of awareness, probably due to 
disruption to neural networks. The main contribution of the neurological models is the   38 
on-line performance monitoring and are associated with the third level of the Stuss et al. 
(2001) model.   
 
 
1.4. Summary. 
 
This chapter began with a quote by Searle (1991) suggesting that if a definition of a 
process was not useful, the definition, not the existence of the process should be 
challenged. In retrospect, early philosophical approaches to consciousness and awareness 
appear ‘mystical’; however, they initiated a long tradition of debate into the nature of these 
subjective phenomena. Separation of mind and body was promoted in later years, and 
while this was based on a process of introspection and self-reflection, it effectively limited 
opportunities to develop testable definitions of consciousness and/or awareness. The 
beginnings of a testable account of awareness may be found in the Materialists’ response to 
Descartes: I am, therefore I think (Gibson, 2004).  
 
It is important to reiterate that there are no definitive definitions within the literature, 
distinguishing consciousness from awareness. A popular primary definition of 
consciousness is ‘the state of being conscious’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989), whereas 
to be aware is to have ‘knowledge or perception of a situation or fact’. In other words, 
awareness implies perhaps a greater degree of cognitive involvement than simply being 
conscious, which may be more popularly used within a medical-context. Within the 
scientific community, attempts to distinguish between consciousness and awareness have 
also proved challenging. For example, Zeman (2006) discussed different meanings of 
consciousness: the waking state; self-consciousness, including self-monitoring and theory 
of mind; narrow and broad consciousness, the former relating to awareness involved in 
self-report, the latter to the acquisition of knowledge; inner and outer consciousness, the 
former being private; and the easy and hard questions of consciousness. Some 
contemporary philosophers and scientists (e.g. Chalmers, 1996; Searle, 2000; Wheeler et 
al., 1997) take the view that awareness is an aspect of consciousness, and seek no further 
clarification. Indeed, Koch and Crick (2000) studied visual awareness in their investigation 
of neural correlates of consciousness, apparently showing greater concern to emphasise 
that visual awareness was amenable to scientific investigation and provided a starting point 
for research into the neural correlates of consciousness, than to seek to distinguish between   39 
consciousness and awareness. Based on this convention, the view taken in this thesis is that 
awareness is a feature of consciousness, that awareness is multidimensional, and that 
different aspects of awareness can be investigated through identifying and testing 
definitions of the processes underlying awareness (e.g. Stuss et al., 2001). Otherwise 
stated, rather than aim to provide new definitions of awareness or consciousness, it is the 
author’s intention to review definitions of awareness applicable and appropriate for 
empirical assessment within healthy ageing, and to select a model within which the 
interpretation of empirical data may be explored. If it is assumed that consciousness and 
awareness are to a degree synonymous, then the use of the term ‘awareness’ rather than 
‘consciousness’ becomes an arbitrary choice.  
 
The critical underlying assumption for this thesis is that awareness is a function of the 
brain (cf. Koch & Crick, 2000; Searle, 2000), meaning that assessment of brain function 
will facilitate assessment of awareness. Moreover, social and experimental psychology has 
indicated that awareness may be separated into levels or component parts, such as error 
recognition. These two conceptualisations are the foundation of contemporary models of 
awareness (e.g. Stuss et al., 2001), and the basis for the interpretation of data presented in 
this thesis. 
 
   40 
Chapter 2. Neural and Cognitive Development Across the Lifespan. 
 
“Age is simply a surrogate index of maturation and experience.” 
Mabbott, Noseworthy, Bouffet, Laughlin and Rockel (2006, p. 937). 
 
Brain development involves numerous processes that begin during the early gestational 
period and continue throughout the lifespan. There has been much focus on early 
development and later senescence, but less is known about the trajectory of brain 
development during the period between childhood and older age. The neural changes 
found in later life should not be viewed in isolation of earlier processes, as the division of 
the lifespan into distinct age bands can be misleading. Indeed, older adulthood represents 
an accumulation of the dynamic interaction between neural change and experience. It is for 
this reason that this discussion of brain and cognitive function in later life is set within the 
context of brain and cognitive development across the lifespan (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2). 
The purpose of this review is to demonstrate that any changes in awareness in older age 
occur against a background of more general brain and cognitive change. As awareness is 
defined as a multi-level brain function (Stuss et al., 2001), the extent to which change 
occurs in one or more of its component structures or functions may be explored. 
 
 
2.1. Gross Neuroanatomy of the Brain. 
 
There are five major divisions within the brain: the cerebral hemispheres; the thalamus and 
hypothalamus; the midbrain; the pons and cerebellum; and, the medulla. The latter four 
divisions collectively form the brain stem. The cerebral hemispheres are symmetrical and 
are linked by the corpus callosum, a large tract of white matter facilitating communication 
in the form of neural impulses between the hemispheres. The cerebral hemispheres are 
comprised of the cortex (outer layer), myelinated axons and subcortical structures and 
systems. The limbic system surrounds the thalamus and incorporates the cingulate cortex, 
the fornix, the hippocampus, the septum and the amygdala. The basal ganglia motor system 
is situated either side of the thalamus and includes the globus pallidus and the striatum 
which is in turn composed of the caudate and putamen (Pinel, 2003). Each hemisphere is 
subdivided into four lobes: frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital.  
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2.2. The Cortex. 
 
The gross laminar (columnar) organisation and function of the cortex is highly similar 
across individuals and is considered to be genetically determined (Rakic, 2002). The cortex 
is typically formed of six layers of cells, which provide the structure of the grey matter. 
Layer I is closest to the scalp and is mainly composed of axons and dendrites. Pyramidal 
cells form the majority of the cortex (layers II, III, V and VI) and are the output projection 
neurons to the spinal cord, brainstem and other cortical regions. Stellate cells are a second 
major group of neurons found in the cortex with shorter axons and an inhibitory function 
via neurotransmitters. There are regional variations in the cortical layers dependent on the 
function of the area. Layer V of the motor cortex is the largest, due to the pyramidal cells 
in this layer projecting from the cortex to the brain stem and spinal cord, allowing for 
motor function (Pinel, 2003). Some subcortical structures are also considered to be grey 
matter structures, due to the laminar organisation of the cell layers, for example the 
thalamus and basal ganglia (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990; Sullivan, Rosenbloom, Serventi 
& Pfefferbum, 2004; Xiao & Barbas, 2004). 
 
 
2.3. Brain Connectivity. 
 
The cortical regions do not function independently. Neural pathways allow for 
communication between the cortex and other subcortical structures including the limbic 
system, the basal ganglia, the midbrain, and the brain stem, to process sensory information, 
and store memories. This facilitates the high level of neural communication required for 
cognitive functioning and behaviour. White matter allows for the rapid transmission of 
neural impulses between brain structures. More specifically, axons provide the 
connectivity between neurons, and large numbers of myelinated axons provide the neural 
pathways between structures, as in the corpus callosum. A number of pathological and, 
more recently, neuroimaging studies has investigated brain connectivity in order to further 
the understanding of the relationship between structure and function (e.g. Alexander, 
DeLong & Strick, 1986; Behrens et al., 2003; Johansen-Berg et al., 2004; Parker et al., 
2005).  
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Alexander et al. (1986) proposed that five neural circuits connect the cortex and the basal 
ganglia. Each circuit forms a feedback loop between specific regions of the cortex through 
specific regions of the striatum, pallidum, substantia nigra and the thalamus. These circuits 
are hypothesised preferentially to subserve certain functions. The motor circuit is involved 
in movement and may be further subdivided into more specific pathways for different 
limbs. The oculomotor circuit is involved in vision and eye movement. At the time of 
Alexander et al.’ (1986) review, the functions of the prefrontal circuits were less well 
understood compared to the other circuits. However, it was suggested that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal circuit may be involved in spatial memory, whilst, based on primate lesion 
studies, the lateral orbitofrontal circuit was linked with perseveration. The anterior 
cingulate circuit includes projections from various regions of the limbic system; however, 
a function was not specified.  
 
More recent functional neuroimaging studies have further elucidated the functions of the 
prefrontal circuits. The dorsolateral pathway has been linked with working memory, and is 
activated in conditions of high cognitive demand (Rympa & D’Esposito, 2003). The 
orbitofrontal cortex has been linked with the processing of reward and punishment, and, in 
a recent review, the lateral orbitofrontal circuit was specifically associated with the 
evaluation of punishment stimuli (Kringelback & Rolls, 2004). Both imaging and 
electrophysiological studies have indicated that the anterior cingulate cortex may be 
involved in performance monitoring processes (Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinivk, Noll & 
Cohen, 1998; van Veen & Carter, 2002). The anterior cingulate cortex has been implicated 
in both cognitive and emotional processing, but isolating specific functions for this circuit 
is complicated due to its inter-connectivity with numerous other brain regions (Bush, Luu 
& Posner, 2000).  
 
 
2.4. Overview of the Human Brain across the Lifespan. 
 
At birth, the infant brain appears similar to that of an adult. However, a number of 
processes begin during gestation and continue into the postnatal period to modify the 
maturing brain: the growth of axons and dendrites (cell differentiation), the establishment 
of inter-connectivity with other cells (synaptogenesis), the pruning of redundant synapses 
and the formation of myelin along the axons (Joseph, 2000; Webb, Monk & Nelson, 2001).   47 
 
In summary, the brain continues to develop and change from gestation throughout the 
lifespan. Grey matter increases in a non-linear, regionally specific pattern until adolescence 
and then decreases. Conversely, white matter continues to increase in a linear manner and 
is maximal during middle age after which it decreases. In addition to the gross structural 
changes found in ageing, a number of neuropathologies are also features of ageing; white 
matter hyperintensities (WMH; Deary, Leaper, Murray, Staff & Whalley, 2003), neuritic 
plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Anderton, 2002; Morrison & Hof, 1997, 2003), and 
argyrophilic grains (Keller, 2005). However, the presence of neuropathologies significantly 
varies within the older adult population. Raz (2004) suggested that other neurochemical, 
hormonal and disease factors should also be considered, as the interaction between the 
various factors may contribute to the cognitive performance declines found in later life, 
particularly as the gross structural changes account for a small proportion of the variance in 
cognitive performance (Raz, 2004). More recent evidence reviewed by Raz and Rodrigue 
(2006) found that aerobic exercise had a protective effect on cognition in ageing, whereas 
estrogen which had been thought to be a protective hormone, may interact with 
inflammatory processes and lead to poorer memory functioning and smaller hippocampal 
volumes (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006). This literature is still in its infancy and time will 
undoubtedly lead to a greater clarification of the possible moderating roles of ageing 
related systemic illness (e.g. cardiovascular disease and hypertension), life style, and 
medications on neural and cognitive functioning in ageing.  
 
 
2.5. Overview of Cognitive Development over the Lifespan, and its relation to Brain 
Development. 
 
The development of cognition is accelerated in childhood, remains relatively stable 
throughout adult life, with progressive, but gradual decline with senescence (Craik & 
Bialystok, 2006). However, as with neuropathology, there is significant inter-individual 
variation in cognitive abilities, particularly in later life. Although a number of theorists 
have posited that cognitive development is closely related to the development of the brain 
in childhood (e.g. Fischer & Silvern, 1985; Hebb, 1949, Luria, 1973), the exact neural 
basis of cognition is not established, and any relationship between different brain structures 
and cognitive functions is likely to be highly complex. In older adults there is little   55 
despite age-related changes in the structure of the brain, there is evidence of greater 
functional recruitment of brain areas, which may be compensatory (cf. Cabeza, 2002).  
 
2.5.3. Summary of the Effects of Ageing on Brain and Cognition. 
 
The considerable variation in cognitive performance and neuropathologies in later life 
contributed to the development of the cognitive reserve hypothesis, the proposition that 
there is a variable ‘cognitive reserve’, and that greater reserve has a protective function 
against cognitive decline in later life (see Stern, 2003). The increases in functional 
activation in ageing have been suggested to be compensatory (Cabeza, 2002), and may 
provide the neural correlates of cognitive reserve. However, it can be problematic to 
operationalise cognitive reserve, and a number of different methods have been employed 
such as: reading ability; early life idea density; and, the National Adult Reading Test 
(Richards & Sacker, 2003; Riley, Snowdon, Desrosiers & Markesbury, 2005; Spitznagel & 
Tremont, 2004). More recent evidence has challenged the cognitive reserve hypothesis. 
Christensen et al. (2007) examined brain atrophy, WMH, levels of education, intelligence, 
creativity, and estimated cognitive decline in a sample of 446 adults aged 60-64 years. The 
study did not find any evidence that estimated cognitive decline was related to atrophy and 
WMH, nor that education, intelligence or creativity provided protection from estimated 
cognitive decline in those older adults with significant atrophy.  
 
Ageing is associated with decline in a number of cognitive domains; however, there is 
variability in the presentation and degree of such ‘deficit’. The cognitive domains that 
decline with age are those considered to rely most heavily on the frontal lobes (Moscovitch 
& Winocur, 1995; Fuster, 1989), suggesting that decline in cognition may in part be 
explained by alteration in the functional integrity of the frontal lobes (see West, 1996). The 
limited strength of the relationships between cognition and indices of frontal lobe change 
nevertheless indicate that other factors undoubtedly contribute to the deficits found in 
ageing. A decline in the integrity of white matter tracts has been linked with cognitive 
deficits (O’Sullivan et al., 2001), and WMH have been found to affect cognitive domains, 
such as processing speed and executive functioning (Gunning-Dixon & Raz, 2000). White 
matter degeneration and WMH have been found to correlate with reductions in processing 
speed, and the HAROLD model suggests that the recruitment of additional regions in task 
performance may counteract the reduction in processing speed found in older adults.   57 
explore the extent to which awareness might continue to function, despite change in one or 
more of its component processes and/or levels.   
 
 
2.6.1. Metamemory and Ageing. 
 
The metacognitive literature has predominantly focused on metamemory in ageing, as 
memory functioning is one of the cognitive domains which has been shown to decline with 
age. An extensive literature investigating metamemory and ageing has examined the 
hypothesis that age-related differences in metamemory underlie age-related changes in 
memory performance. However, there has been little empirical support for this proposition 
(see Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000, for a review), indicating that the relationship between the 
metamemory dimensions, memory functioning and ageing is complex. The literature has 
identified a number of processes involved in awareness that are less effective in ageing. 
The findings of these studies provide support for the proposition that different types of 
awareness are differentially affected with age. 
 
 
2.6.1.1. Feeling-of-Knowing and Ageing. 
 
Recent studies have employed the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) paradigm to investigate 
memory monitoring and its accuracy in ageing. The FOK paradigm requires participants to 
make a judgement about the likelihood that they will recall study stimuli prior to a 
recognition task. The accuracy of the FOK judgement is typically assessed with a gamma 
correlation; the strength of the relationship between the FOK judgement and actual 
recognition performance. The gamma correlation is an infrequently applied statistical tool, 
defined as a simple symmetric correlation that does not correct for tied ranks 
(www.nyu.edu/its/statistics/Docs/correlate.html). The greater the gamma correlation, the 
closer the judgement of recall is to actual performance. Therefore, the gamma correlation 
is also a measure of the accuracy of the FOK judgement. Studies have found that the 
accuracy of FOK judgements and actual performance was reduced in older adults (62 older 
adults aged 61-89 years, 40 younger adults, aged 20-30 years; Perrotin et al., 2005; 
Souchay & Isingrini, 2004; 41 older adults aged 60-98 years, 20 younger adults aged 20-32 
years; Souchay et al., 2000). These results indicate that older adults are less accurate in   59 
adults predicted lower recall before study, with both groups lowering their predictions after 
study. However, only older adults significantly lowered their predictions after study. 
Younger adults were more accurate in their global predictions, whilst the older adults 
overestimated their recall performance. Mean JOL ratings found that younger adults 
accurately predicted their higher proportion of correct recall. However, in Study 2, there 
were no age differences in global predictions, which may be due to the repetition of the 
word pairs in this study, in that prediction of performance may have been influenced by 
their confidence of recall. In Study 3, older adults again made initial lower global 
predictions of performance, and again lowered their predictions after study, whereas the 
younger adults provided the same predictions before and after study, but increased their 
postdictions to correspond with actual performance. The correlations between actual recall 
performance and postdiction were significant (.68, .95, .92, .92, .80 and .80, older and 
younger adults for experiments 1, 2 and 3), and did not differ between age groups. In 
summary, the findings indicate that awareness as indexed by accuracy of mean JOL ratings 
did not differ between age groups. JOL were used to indicate the correspondence between 
confidence of recall and actual recall. Simply stated, older adults were able to revise their 
predictions after study indicating an awareness of their assessment of their memory 
capabilities. Notwithstanding this generally positive outcome, some effects of ageing were 
found indicating a degree of inaccuracy in their awareness of their level of memory 
functioning.  
 
 
2.6.1.3. Memory Monitoring and Ageing. 
 
The metamemory literature has also employed predictions of performance as an index of 
memory monitoring in ageing (e.g. Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Bieman-Copland & Charness, 
1994; Hertzog, Dixon & Hultsch, 1990; Rabbitt & Abson, 1991). Bieman-Copland and 
Charness (1994) found differential age-related effects on memory monitoring in two trials 
of word recall tasks with three types of experimental cues (letter, rhyme and meaning) in a 
sample of 36 older adults aged 59-79 years and 36 younger adults aged 18-28 years. There 
were no significant age differences in the predictions for both of the trials of each of the 
cue types. However, there were age-related differences in the accuracy of the predictions: 
older adults significantly overestimated their performance with letter and rhyme cues, but 
accurately predicted their performance with meaning cues, indicating that overestimation   61 
relationships with age and with predicted and actual performance on cognitive tasks may 
be explored. Hertzog et al. (1990) investigated beliefs, performance predictions of three 
trials of word list and text recall tasks, with actual performance in a cross-section of 422 
adults aged 22 -79 years. The study found that older adults predicted lower performance 
for both word list and text recall than younger adults, and had significantly reduced 
performance, however, all groups underestimated their performance. The MIA subscales 
Change and Capacity and the Frequency of Forgetting subscale of the Memory 
Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski & Schaie, 1990) converge to form a 
memory self-efficacy factor, which was significantly related to each of the trial predictions 
for both of the tasks. The study found that age differences in predictions were mediated by 
age differences in memory self-efficacy. Importantly, all age groups changed their 
predictions towards their actual performance across the trials for the word recall task; there 
were no age related differences in the accuracy of predictions. This study showed that 
older adults were able to monitor their performance equivalently to younger adults in the 
word recall task, and therefore had an awareness of their memory performance across the 
trials. Repetition of tasks may contribute and particularly benefit older adults in the 
monitoring of their performance; improvements in predictions over trials were found in 
both Ansell and Bucks (2006) and Bieman-Copland and Charness (1994). 
 
Self-referent beliefs of memory may also be assessed by measuring subjective reports of 
memory problems. Rabbitt and Abson (1991) found in a sample aged 50-79 years that 
reports of functioning as measured by the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; 
Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald & Parkes, 1982) and MFQ were not related either to 
prediction or actual performance on a number of cognitive tasks. Older adults 
underestimated their performance on some cognitive tasks (picture recognition, digit span 
and cumulative learning), while overestimating their performance on others (free recall; 
Rabbitt & Abson, 1991). The finding of overestimation of word recall is in contrast to the 
Hertzog et al. (1990) result, but there were methodological differences between the studies. 
In the Hertzog et al. (1990) study, participants were informed of a typical, normative 
performance, which may have influenced predictions. Nevertheless, both studies included 
30 words in the free recall task, and the predicted scores were similar (12.2 and 14, Rabbitt 
& Abson, 1991, and Hertzog et al., 1990, respectively). Older adults in Rabbitt and Abson 
(1991) recalled 8.32 words, whereas the average recall performance in Hertzog et al. 
(1990) was 17 words. Again, this difference may be partly explained by methodology. In   64 
effective in older adults (Bieman-Copland & Charness, 1994). Although testing separate 
conceptualisations of awareness based on a number of models is one way of investigating 
potential age-effects on awareness, the HoP model by Stuss was selected for its potential to 
generalise to memory and performance-monitoring, and its focus on higher cognitive 
(executive) functions. Additionally, some models can be overly complex (e.g. Clare, 
2004b); include vague descriptions of awareness (e.g. Prigatano & Johnson, 2003); and/or 
do not describe interactions between different types of awareness (e.g. Cavanaugh, 1989). 
Two neuropsychological models of awareness (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Toglia & Kirk, 
2000) have been tested (see Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Graham et al., 2005; O’Keefe et al., 
2007). However, both of these models assumes the presence of clinically significant deficit 
in awareness, and are therefore better at explaining diseases of awareness (e.g. dementia) 
than normal, healthy ageing. Although the Stuss et al. (2001) model was developed to 
account for deficits in awareness in patients with brain lesions, it fundamentally differs in 
that there is no inherent presumption of impaired awareness. The HoP model also provides 
specific definitions of the processes underlying different types of awareness, and promotes 
the concept of interaction between levels of awareness. This made the HoP model 
particularly suitable for an investigation of healthy ageing.  
 
The HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001; see Figure 2.3) identified neural regions and networks 
involved in different types of awareness, with a particular focus on the fundamental role of 
the frontal lobes and their limbic system connections. The functioning of frontal lobe 
networks is proposed to underlie Consistent Consciousness and Self-Awareness, and has 
been linked with executive functions. A significant body of literature has shown that 
ageing is associated with a reduction in the volume of the frontal lobes (bilateral frontal 
grey and white matter, see Raz, 2000), and an increased number of white matter lesions 
(Gunning-Dixon & Raz, 2000), causing structural alterations and network disruptions. For 
this reason, it is plausible to assume that some aspects of awareness will be affected by 
ageing.  
 
Stuss et al. (2001) further proposed that each level of the model contained a number of 
modules whose functioning supported the processes involved in the different types of 
awareness. The processes within each level can function independently of other levels, 
however, the ability of the modules to transmit and receive input, to and from, higher and 
lower levels, provides the connectivity between the different levels (see Figure 2.3). This   65 
inter-connectivity explains how deficits at one level can be circumvented: other modules 
within that level transmit neural activity to modules at higher and lower levels. The 
description of neural pathways throughout the model accounts for the possibility of level-
specific deficits in awareness, whilst other types of awareness and their associated 
processes remain functional. However, deficits within each level may also constrain the 
functioning of processes at other levels. One important caveat to be acknowledged with the 
HoP model is that the description of the inter-connectivity of the model provides an 
explanation of how deficits may be both transmitted and circumvented. This poses a 
challenge for the empirical assessment of the model, as both null and significant results of 
relationships between the levels are explained by the model.   
 
 
Figure. 2.3. The Hierarchies of Processing Model (adapted from Stuss et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the lowest level of awareness in the model is Arousal, located 
within the brain stem (reticular formation) and relates to the dimension from coma to 
waking state. The second level, Sensorimotor Awareness, results from the processing of 
sensory and bodily information in the posterior regions (association cortices) of the brain. 
The final two levels of the model involve processing within the frontal lobes. Consistent 
Self-awareness
module module module
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Consciousness, at the third level, relies on executive functions and the ability to organise 
sensory information underlying behaviour. At the highest level, accurate monitoring of the 
self and personal abilities facilitates Self-Awareness, and is dependent on the inter-
connectivity of the frontal lobes with the limbic system. The following section will discuss 
evidence for assuming age-related impairments in Arousal, Sensorimotor functions, 
Consistent Consciousness, and Self-Awareness.  
 
The Arousal level of awareness is related to ‘basic’ consciousness, from coma to waking 
state. Between 30-50% of older adults report sleep disturbances (Ohayon, 2002). In a large 
study investigating normative sleep patterns in a community-based sample of 1026 
participants aged 60 years and over, Ohayon and Vecchierini (2005) found that 5% of the 
sample had ≤ 4½ hours sleep per 24 hour period, whilst 25% had fewer than 6 hours sleep. 
Of this 5%, only 54.2% were satisfied with their sleep, and regression analyses found 
higher levels of insomnia and excessive daytime sleepiness were linked with ≤ 4½ hours 
sleep. Poor cognitive functioning as measured by the Cognitive Difficulties Scale was 
associated with < 6 hours sleep per 24 hour period. In contrast, in another community-
based sample of 375 participants aged 75-85 years, Schmutte, Harris, Levin, Zweig, Katz 
and Lipton (2007) found that sleep onset latency (> 30mins), rather than sleep duration, 
after controlling for the effects of age, was associated with poorer performance on the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) subtests of Information, Vocabulary and Block 
Design. Converging evidence for a relationship between sleep and cognition has been 
found using polysomnography. Reduced delta activity in the PFC has been found in older 
adults, indicative of poor recovery from sleep and cortical re-organisation, and was related 
to decreased nonverbal planning and verbal fluency abilities (Anderson & Horne, 2003). 
These results indicate that sleep problems in older adults impact on daytime cognitive 
functioning, providing support for the HoP model, in that problems at lower levels can be 
transmitted to higher levels. More pertinently for the current thesis, these findings suggest 
that some aspects of awareness may be compromised in some older adults who are 
assumed to be healthy.  
 
The ‘cholinergic hypothesis’ proposes that the cognitive and behavioural symptoms of AD 
are a result of reductions in acetylcholine and basal forebrain cholinergic neurons (Muir, 
1997). Cholinergic neurons are located in the basal forebrain, and project throughout the 
cortex, the hippocampus and amygdala, and are also found in the pontomesencephalon,   67 
part of the reticular formation, projecting to the basal forebrain and thalamus (Woolf, 
1997). There has been debate regarding the function of the cholinergic system in arousal, 
attention, and consciousness, due to its prominence throughout the brain (e.g. Coull, 1998, 
Perry & Perry, 1995; Perry, Walker, Grace & Perry, 1999; Woolf, 1997). Woolf (1997) 
suggested that the vast connectivity of cholinergic and monoaminergic neurons throughout 
the brain underlies different states of arousal, from waking through to higher cognitive 
functions. In support, scopolamine, a muscarinic receptor antagonist, has been used 
temporarily to block the cholinergic system, resulting in cognitive deficits in healthy adult 
participants (Vitiello et al., 1997). Scopolamine has also been employed to induce states of 
altered consciousness (see Perry & Perry, 1995). PET studies of acetylcholinesterase 
(AChE), a marker of cholinergic uptake, in individuals with AD, have found significant 
reductions of AChE compared to controls, without significant differences in the size of the 
nucleus basalis of Meynert (Herholz et al., 2004). Significant reductions of AChE 
throughout the entire cerebral cortex, hippocampus and amygdala have also been found in 
individuals with early-onset AD (Shinotoh et al., 2000). Dournaud, Delaere, Hauw and 
Epelbaum (1995) found that reduced choline acetyltransferase (ChAT) activity in the 
middle frontal gyrus, supramarginal gyrus and the superior temporal gyrus was associated 
with lower ‘global’ cognitive function as measured by Blessed test scores. These results 
indicate that cholinergic deficits contribute to the cognitive decline found in AD. However, 
the extent of cholinergic system change with healthy ageing is not clear. Most studies do 
not demonstrate decrease in cholinergic activity with normal ageing, however, they do 
report a
 loss of cholinergic receptors (e.g. Winblad, Hardy, Backman & Nilsson, 1985). 
Nevertheless, in support of the HoP model, the evidence from individuals with AD 
indicates that impairments in the Arousal level of awareness, as measured by cholinergic 
deficits, can impact on higher cognitive processes. Of interest is the threshold over which 
losses of acetylcholine become symptomatic. 
 
In a series of studies, Falkenstein and colleagues (Kolev, Falkenstein & Yordanova, 2006; 
Falkenstein, Yordanova & Kolev, 2006; Yordanova, Kolev, Hohnsbein & Falkenstein, 
2004a) investigated age-related slowing of information processing and reaction times, with 
simple and choice-reaction speeded tasks in auditory and visual modalities, and the 
associated electrophysiological components of stimulus processing (P1, N1 and P3), 
response selection (lateralised readiness potential: LRP) and motor-related processing 
(motor-related potential: MRP). Although these studies do not directly relate to the HoP   69 
indicated by Falkenstein and his colleagues. However, Consistent Consciousness and Self-
Awareness may also be impaired with age, possibly due to the structural and functional 
changes found within the frontal lobes with increasing age. The description of the inter-
connectivity of the modules involved in each level of the model provides an explanation 
for how lower level deficits may influence higher levels, but also how impairments can be 
circumvented (see Figure 2.3). At the same time, such a description makes it hard to test 
the model empirically. For example, if deficits at one level are related to deficits at a higher 
level, support is found for inter-connectivity of the model. However, if deficits are not 
related to higher level measures, the model may also be supported because it proposes 
circumvention by unaffected intra-connected modules (i.e. not all modules within a level 
are damaged). Moreover, there is a lack evidence to relate these levels of awareness to 
brain function. Such studies are necessary to provide empirical support that the ageing 
brain is associated with alterations in awareness.  
 
The previous section has argued for the applicability of the HoP model to an investigation 
of different types of awareness in healthy ageing. Age differences in the processes 
underlying three types of awareness were assessed in this thesis. It was assumed that 
Arousal would be functional in awake participants; therefore this level was not 
experimentally assessed. The second level of awareness (Sensorimotor Awareness) was 
operationalised using a novelty auditory oddball ERP paradigm. The rationale was that this 
type of awareness involves the processing of basic sensory information. The oddball 
paradigm employed elicits ERP components shown to be sensitive to initial attentional 
capture (N1) and of later, more controlled, attentional processing (P3). These components 
are well-documented measures of sensory information processing in the brain (see Chapter 
4). Consistent Consciousness refers to the ability to organise sensory information 
underlying behaviour and relies on executive functions. The term executive functioning 
encompasses a broad range of cognitive functions including attention, working memory, 
cognitive control and conflict processing. The performance of complex tasks depends on 
the interaction and organisation of such cognitive (executive) processes and incoming 
sensory information. Therefore, electrophysiological and behavioural measures of 
performance monitoring were employed to operationalise Consistent Consciousness. von 
Cramon and Ullsperger (2002) emphasised that the performance monitoring process 
incorporates numerous subcomponents that occur at different time points. 
Electrophysiological measures of performance monitoring include pre-response conflict   70 
(N2); allocation of attention (P3b); response-conflict priming (N4); error detection (CRN-
ERN); and, error processing (Pe). In addition, behavioural measures of remedial actions 
were included: error correction and post-error slowing. Postdiction report of performance 
accuracy provided a metacognitive measure of the individual’s performance monitoring 
abilities. It is of interest to consider the possibility that ERP correlates of performance 
monitoring reflect the ‘consistent consciousness’ level of awareness, in consort with the 
lower levels. This is due to the fact that performance-monitoring requires more than simple 
stimulus-response activity, it requires the individual consciously to monitor that sensory-
input and motor-output activity and amend behaviour accordingly. It is important to 
acknowledge that the HoP model rests on philosophical and theoretical psychology 
foundations, rather than direct scientific-empirical evidence, but in this respect it does not 
differ from other psychological models that, with testing, have been widely accepted in 
mainstream cognitive neuroscience, for example, the working memory model of Alan 
Baddeley. Mapping of cognitive neuroscience techniques to a theoretical psychological 
model provides a basis for interpreting empirical data, and perhaps an indication as to how 
a model may be updated to be more useful, but does not provide definitive support for that 
model.   
 
This chapter has presented considerable evidence that the brain undergoes physical change 
in normal ageing, and there is concomitant albeit subtle change in cognitive function. 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the neural and cognitive changes found in ageing 
may have some effect on awareness. 
 
 
 
 
   71 
Chapter 3. Recruitment & Overview of Methodology. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the recruitment of younger and older adult 
participants is described. Specific consideration is given to good clinical practice in the 
assessment of older adult volunteers. Secondly, this chapter provides an overview of the 
methodologies used to study awareness. All participants were assessed using the same 
methodologies; while each chapter that follows is based on empirical data obtained using 
different awareness measures, the participants were drawn from the same cohort.   
 
 
3.1. Recruitment of Participants. 
 
Approval for the study was granted by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, 
University of Southampton, Hampshire, UK (Appendix 1). 
 
3.1.1. Participants. 
 
Thirty older adult (OA) participants aged 60 years and over were recruited from the 
‘Exploring the Mind’ Older Adult Volunteer Panel created by Dr. Romola Bucks, 
University of Southampton. Twenty-one younger adult (YA) participants were recruited 
opportunistically, and received course credits in return for their participation. It was 
decided a priori to recruit in excess of 20 participants into each age group. This number 
was determined based on a number of factors. The total testing time was approximately 4 
hours per person, across 2 sessions, therefore, participants were asked for a considerable 
time commitment. Additionally, the sample size is commensurate with published ERP 
studies with older adults, for example: Falkenstein et al. (2001) obtained data from 11 
younger and 11 older adults. Finally, power to detect an effect was considered and is 
addressed in Chapter 8. 
 
All participants were healthy at the time of testing, had no self-reported history of 
neurological or psychiatric conditions, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing 
and, if on medication, had been taking stable dosages for the preceding three months. 
Colour vision was also assessed, in order to check that the participants could differentiate 
between the red and green arrows in the 4-CRT ERP paradigm. As auditory perceptual   75 
3.4. Cognitive Screening in Older Adult Research. 
 
Memory decline is considered to be a feature of increasing age, and there has been growing 
investigation of the concept of a pre-clinical phase of AD, termed mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI). The First Key Symposium of MCI (Stockholm, Sweden, 2nd–5th 
September, 2003) considered the clinical features of MCI, and concluded that the variable 
outcome (e.g. stability in some, progression to AD in a proportion, and recovery in others) 
suggested that MCI should be considered as more than a simple ‘preclinical phase of 
dementia’ (Winblad et al., 2004). The Symposium further concluded that MCI represented 
neither dementia nor normal ageing (Winblad et al., 2004). In support, there are conflicting 
data on the prevalence of MCI in the normal population, with rates ranging from 5.3% 
(Hänninen, Hallikainen, Tuomainen, Vanhanen & Soininen, 2002) to 16.2% (Zanetti et al., 
2006). Differential diagnostic criteria for MCI may account for the variable findings. For 
example, other nomenclature related to MCI have been introduced into the literature, such 
as ‘age-associated memory impairment’ (AAMI), ‘age-associated cognitive decline’ 
(AACD), and, ‘benign senescent forgetfulness’ (Collie & Maruff, 2000), to describe the 
range and degree of impairment found in older adults. Although the exact nature and 
measurement of these diagnoses remains under debate, one of the challenges for research 
into healthy ageing is to demonstrate that any given older adult sample does not present 
with any significant, and potentially confounding, cognitive impairment.  
 
One of the most frequently used questionnaires to screen for cognitive impairment is the 
MMSE (described above: section 3.1.1), which provides a widely accepted and understood 
measure of global cognitive function. However, this questionnaire was designed to screen 
for dementia, rather than as a generalised cognitive screening instrument, and was 
developed prior to rigorous debate about MCI. Furthermore, MMSE scores may be 
influenced by level of education (Crum, Anthony, Bassett & Folstein, 1993; Tombaugh & 
McIntyre, 1992). Despite the wide acceptance of and reliance on the MMSE, other 
questionnaires focussing on the assessment of MCI have been developed, e.g. the Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005), which is proposed to have greater 
sensitivity and specificity than the MMSE (Nasreddine et al., 2005).   
 
All younger and older adult participants in this thesis were administered both the MMSE 
and the MoCA. Using the normal cut-off of ≤ 26, the MoCA detects 90% of MCI and   77 
instances, participants consented to additional blocks of the 4-CRT to compensate. The 4-
CRT was perhaps the most challenging task, so it was decided to conclude the study with 
the more familiar ‘everyday behaviour’ tasks to ensure that the session was ended with a 
positive experience.   
 
Table 3.3. Factors to be considered in the design of studies with older adult participants. 
Factor  Details 
Distress  Is testing likely to cause the participant any distress or have any 
negative consequences? 
Familiarity with 
surroundings 
Will the option of a home visit be available, if applicable to the 
study?  
Fatigue Effects  What is the length of testing? Is there a high degree of repetition? 
Physical Factors  Have physical factors, such as mobility, hearing and vision been 
taken into consideration? 
Time of Day  Does the participant have a choice regarding time of testing? 
 
 
3.6. Neuropsychological Measures of General Intellectual Function, Memory, Affect and 
Awareness of Performance. 
 
Neuropsychological measures of general non-verbal intellectual function and memory 
were administered to provide data on the functional capabilities of the YA and OA groups.  
 
 
3.6.1. Neuropsychological Measures: 
 
i) Ravens’ Standard Progessive Matrices Sets A to D (RSPM; Raven, Raven & Court, 
2000). The RSPM provides a measure of fluid (non-verbal) intelligence to compliment the 
estimated premorbid IQ provided by the NART. There is a progressive increase in 
difficulty across sets A-D
2.  
 
                                                 
2 In the present study set E was excluded as it can lead to fatigue through lengthy testing (Caffarra, 
Vezzadini, Zonato, Copelli & Venneri, 2003).   82 
 
(iv)  Performance-Monitoring in a Naturalistic Task: Four tasks were administered to 
assess the quality of performance-monitoring in naturalistic situations, potentially requiring 
planning and execution of strategies: making a cheese and lettuce sandwich; wrapping a 
gift; preparing a letter for posting (taken from Forde & Humphreys, 2000); and, the Action 
Program Test from the BADS, a test of practical problem solving that was more novel 
(using water to float a cork out of a tube without touching the apparatus). Each task was 
divided into five stages that needed to be completed sequentially to succeed on the task. 
These data are not reported, due to ceiling effects in both groups. 
 
In summary, whilst the focus of this thesis is awareness in normal ageing, a number of 
measures were administered to control for potential confounding variables such as reduced 
intellectual function, negative affect, socially desirable responding and low self-esteem. 
The measures of awareness selected enabled comparison with previously published 
literature (e.g. metamemory questionnaires). Such assessments allow inferences to be 
drawn about the quality of underlying brain function associated with awareness, but this is 
an indirect association. Thus, these assessments are useful but necessarily limited. It was 
anticipated that a more complete understanding of brain function associated with 
awareness may be obtained using imaging techniques. In particular, ERPs, derived from 
stimulus and/or response-related brain electrical activity, may allow investigation of the 
power and timing of neural correlates of ‘awareness’.  
 
 
3.7. Introduction to Event-Related Potentials. 
 
Brain imaging techniques (e.g. MRI; fMRI; DTI; and PET) focus on neural structures, and 
areas of activation with associated sensory, cognitive and motor function. Although these 
techniques have good spatial resolution, the temporal resolution is poor, due to the time 
taken to create an image. For example, the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
fMRI signal is a measure of hemodynamic response to neural changes, and this can take 
several seconds to register. However, sensory processing occurs within milliseconds (ms) 
and, as such, imaging techniques are not able to record all activity associated with this type 
of processing.  
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Electroencephalography (EEG) is a technique that records the electrical activity of the 
brain by detecting voltage changes over time and has excellent temporal resolution (within 
ms of a stimulus/event), allowing for the investigation of ‘on-line’ processing. The 
technique is non-invasive and particularly amenable with populations who may not cope 
with other brain imaging techniques (e.g. MRI), such as the very young, very old or 
particularly anxious. The following sections provide an overview of the origin and 
processes by which the electrical activity of the brain can be measured at the scalp with an 
EEG. Electrophysiological components (ERPs), which are derived from the EEG and 
related to specific events, are subsequently described. 
 
 
3.7.1. Neural Generators of the Electroencephalogram.  
 
As the cortex develops, so does the electrical activity of the brain. Each neuron has a semi-
permeable membrane. This facilitates chemical stimulation which leads to changes in the 
voltage at the cell membrane. An action potential is the term used to describe this rapid 
change in voltage (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996). Action potentials travel along the cell’s axon, 
with larger axons conducting faster potentials. The process is facilitated by the flow of 
sodium ions (depolarization) through the semi-permeable cell membrane, at the initial 
segment part of the axon and at regular intervals along the axon (nodes of Ranvier). 
Myelination facilitates conduction of the action potential. Otherwise stated, the action 
potential travels along the axon facilitated by the nodes of Ranvier which are gaps along 
the axon between each glial (myelin) cell (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996). When the action 
potential reaches the axon’s terminals (terminal bouton), neurotransmitters are released, 
and, dependent on their function (inhibitory or excitatory), the voltage of the post-synaptic 
membrane is changed (Kolb & Whishaw, 1996). A dipole is a division of voltage within 
the extracellular space, created by a change in the voltage (positive/negative) in the 
extracellular space caused by the movement of ions into the post-synaptic cell (Nelson & 
Monk, 2001). The dipole disperses through the extracellular space to the surface of the 
scalp, aided by the columnar organisation of pyramidal cells (Nelson & Monk, 2001) 
which are prevalent in the cortex.  
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3.7.2. The Electroencephalogram. 
 
When stimulated simultaneously, groups of pyramidal neurons produce a positive/negative 
pattern of activity, the direction of which is dependent on the orientation of the dipole. The 
voltage of the ions closest to the recording site (scalp) produces the deflections that are 
identifiable as an EEG trace. This trace is recorded by placing electrodes on the scalp and 
amplifying the signal so that it is readable. Therefore, the EEG records the summed 
electrical activity from neuronal populations with columnar organisation. Not all neural 
activity is recorded by the EEG; the non-columnar organisation and distance from the scalp 
of sub-cortical structures means electrical activity from these areas may not be detected 
(Coles & Rugg, 1995). 
 
An EEG signal has three dimensions: frequency, time and amplitude. The frequency of the 
EEG is measured in Hertz (Hz), which refers to the number of oscillations per second.  The 
frequency bands of the EEG are alpha, beta, theta and delta (see Figure 3.1.). Alpha band 
activity (8 – 13Hz) is found in adults in a relaxed state with their eyes closed; beta band 
activity (13 – 30Hz) is considered to be normal wakefulness; theta band activity (4 – 8Hz) 
is ‘slow activity’ and is found in wakeful children into early adolescence and in sleeping 
adults; delta band activity (0.5 – 4Hz) is the slowest frequency, found in children up to one 
year old and in sleep stages 3 and 4 (Niedermeyer, 1998a; Niedermeyer, 1998b). 
 
A number of processes may contribute to changes in frequency of electrical activity across 
the lifespan. Myelination of axons is important for efficient transmission of inter- and 
intra-hemispheric neural impulses, and this process continues into the third decade (Sowell 
et al., 2003). Studies have also suggested that the frequency of the electrical activity can 
influence the rate of myelination, although little is known about the mechanisms 
underlying this process (Demerens et al., 1996; Stevens, Tanner & Fields, 1998). The low 
frequencies found in neonates and in children may be partially accounted for by the 
continued development of cortical structures and neural circuits. For example, 
development of ‘EEG coherence’ throughout the first few years of life has been described 
(Thatcher, Krause & Hrybyk, 1986), and the development of adult patterns of sleep cycles 
has been linked to the maturation of the cortex (Joseph, 2000). Interestingly, the amplitude 
of the EEG has been found to decrease over the lifespan (Dustman, Shearer & Emmerson, 
1999), and the authors suggest that age-related changes in cortical structure are the cause.   85 
In summary, the changes in the EEG over the lifespan are considered to reflect the changes 
that occur in the CNS (Dustman et al., 1999). 
 
Figure 3.1. The Frequency Bands of the EEG. From: brain.web-us.com/ 
images/theanine.fig.1.jpg. 
 
 
 
 
3.7.3. Event-Related Potentials. 
 
An ERP is the voltage change in the EEG signal in response to an event 
(stimulus/response) that is identified in a time-locked segment of an EEG recording (Coles 
& Rugg, 1995). Such EEG segments (epochs) are isolated from the EEG for display and 
analytic purposes. Due to the conductive properties of the brain, the activity at the scalp 
may not be from the neural assemblies closest to the recording sites, resulting in low 
spatial resolution (Coles & Rugg, 1995). Nevertheless, scalp distributions of ERPs 
(topographical maps) provide an assessment of gross topographical information, such as 
lateralisation and anterior/posterior orientation. However, ERPs have excellent temporal 
resolution and, as such, can provide information about the timing of sensory, motor and 
cognitive processes involved in experimental manipulations. 
 
As ERPs are only a part of the entire EEG recording, these data have to be processed to 
extract the ERP (signal) from the EEG (noise) recording. Each time-locked segment 
(epoch) to an event (stimulus/response) within the entire EEG recording is averaged across   86 
a number of trials to provide a single measure of the activity of that type or category of 
event (Coles & Rugg, 1995). The grand average waveform represents a number of 
overlayed EEG-epochs associated with the same kind of stimulus or response, thus it does 
not provide a direct measure of on-line activity per se, but an indication of how the brain 
typically responds to a particular event (Coles & Rugg, 1995). It is important to appreciate, 
however, that there can be great variation in the amplitudes and latencies of the individual 
trials. The benefit of averaging is that it allows an ERP component to be more easily 
identified.  
 
There has been much debate about what constitutes an ERP component (Coles & Rugg, 
1995; Luck, 2005; Otten & Rugg, 2005). Any chosen peak or trough within a data set can 
provide the component of interest, which is defined by its polarity and latency. For 
example, the P300 (often abbreviated to ‘P3’) is a positive component occurring around 
300ms. The amplitude and latency of the component (measured from the grand average for 
each individual) provides the indices that are statistically examined. At present there are no 
definitive methods for identifying ERP components (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005), for example, the P300 may occur between 200 and 600ms (see Figure 
3.2). The researcher must therefore be guided by their group grand average and by 
previous literature.   
 
Figure 3.2. Example of a stimulus-locked waveform from the younger adult group 
recorded from Cz: Compatible condition (solid line) and incompatible condition (dashed 
line) elicited by the 4-CRT. 
 
 
 
In addition to the reporting of the amplitude and latency, a component may also be 
described by its topographic distribution and/or by the cognitive process it represents 
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(Coles & Rugg, 1995). For example, the P300 associated with target (expected) stimuli is 
usually largest over central-parietal regions, while the P300 associated with novel 
(unexpected) stimuli is more often detected over central-frontal regions. More generally, a 
distinction has been made between ERP components that occur within about 200ms of the 
stimulus presentation and those that occur after that time. The early (exogenous) 
components are related to the sensory aspects of a stimulus and the later (endogenous) 
components are those more related to cognitive factors, such as categorisation of that 
stimulus and memory updating (Coles & Rugg, 1995). Although a distinction has been 
drawn between the sensory and cognitive aspects of ERP components, the relationship is 
dynamic; cognitive processes can influence earlier sensory components (e.g. directed 
attention can modulate N1 amplitude; Chao & Knight, 1997a) and later cognitive 
processing can be influenced by the modality of the stimulus (e.g. in divided attention 
conditions, cognitive processing occurs later in the auditory modality; Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, Hoormann & Blanke, 1991). 
 
 
3.7.4. EEG acquisition and ERP processing in the current study. 
 
The EEG was recorded using an Easy-Cap
TM fitted with 24 electrodes positioned over 
midline and lateral sites according to the International 10-20 system (see Figure 3.3: 
Jasper, 1958). The continuous EEG was recorded at a sampling rate of 500Hz (band-pass 
of 0.05 to 70 Hz: SynAmps 2 Amplifiers, NeuroScan, UK) using a linked-mastoid 
reference with a ground lead placed on the forehead (FP1). Vertical ocular activity 
(blinks), the EOG, was recorded from bipolar leads placed at FP2 and below the right eye, 
and horizontal EOG (lateral eye movements) from bipolar leads situated at the outer canthi 
of each eye. Impedance was kept below 15k , checked at the start and end of the session.   
 
ERP processing was carried-out offline using NeuroScan and Brain Vision Analyzer 
software. The EEG recording was low-pass filtered (20Hz) and blink artefacts were 
reduced using a standard algorithm (Semlitsch, Anderer, Schuster & Presslich, 1986). The 
EEG was divided into epochs centred on stimuli or responses, baseline corrected (each 
epoch is overlaid at a fixed time interval prior to time 0 ms). Variable time intervals were 
used in this thesis according to the component of interest: please refer to Chapters 4 and 5), 
movement artefact rejected (±75 : each waveform that exceeds ±75  is excluded from   89 
sensory information. It was included as a measure of basic sensory awareness. The main 
components of interest were the stimulus-locked N1 and P3.  
 
ii) Performance-Monitoring (4-Choice Response Task): 
Participants were requested to respond to the direction of the arrows. Green and red arrow 
stimuli pointing left and right were presented randomly with equal probability. At the 
presentation of a green arrow, participants were instructed to press the mouse button 
corresponding to the direction of the arrow (compatible condition). For red arrows, 
participants were instructed to press the opposite mouse button in response to the direction 
of the arrows (complex, incompatible condition). The purpose of this paradigm was to 
examine brain activity occurring immediately after a response has been initiated: post-
response evaluation. Specifically, it was of interest to see if brain activity was different for 
trials on which an error occurred compared to correct trials. Greater magnitude of 
difference between the amplitude of error/correct response-locked components (~50-
150ms post-response) was hypothesised to reflect greater error-recognition, and subsequent 
slow wave activity (Pe: ~400ms) has been associated with awareness of having made an 
error (e.g. Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band & Kok, 2001).  
 
3.8. Procedure. 
 
A script for the procedure was followed to maintain consistency (Appendix 4). With the 
exception of one OA participant, the OA participants were visited at their homes for the 
first appointment. The YA participants and one OA participant were interviewed in the 
ERP laboratory at the University of Southampton. Written consent was obtained from each 
participant. The OA participants were requested to provide an informant and written 
consent was also obtained from the OA informants. The order of the questionnaire battery 
was constant across participants (Table 3.5). The informant was given the informant 
versions of the DEX, the MARS and the M-C 1 questionnaires to complete and at the end 
of the visit was interviewed with the Cornell Scale and the RAID. After the questionnaire 
battery was completed, the participant’s colour vision was assessed, a skin test with the 
EEG cleaning gel was conducted to test for possible reactions (e.g. redness or itching), and 
head circumference measured in order to prepare the EEG cap prior to the ERP session. At 
the next visit, preparation of the participant for the EEG recording took approximately 30 
minutes. The EEG recording commenced with a baseline EEG (2 minutes eyes closed and   90 
2 minutes eyes open) and was followed by the practice trials for the auditory oddball, and 
the novelty oddball task. Four blocks of the 4-CRT were administered after the auditory 
oddball. If necessary, in order to increase error rate, an additional one or two blocks of the 
4-CRT were administered. On completion of each block, participants were requested to 
provide an estimated percentage for their perceived accuracy of performance. The 
behavioural tasks were performed at the end of testing and were video recorded for scoring 
offline.  
 
 
Table 3.5. Order of Assessments. 
 
Telephone Screening (OA only)  TELE 
  Participant Demographic Form (OA only) 
Visit 1  Participant Demographic Form (YA only) 
  Mini Mental State Examination 
  Montreal Cognitive Assessment  
  Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
  Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale  
  Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
  National Adult Reading Test 
  Metamemory In Adulthood questionnaire 
  Pyramids and Palm Trees 
  DEX Questionnaire 
  Memory Assessment Rating Scale 
  Ravens’ Standard Progressive Matrices 
  Rating Anxiety In Dementia scale 
  Cornell Scale for Depression in Dementia 
Visit 2  Hearing Assessment 
  Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
  Baseline EEG  
  Auditory Novelty Oddball 
  4-CRT 
  Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
  Everyday Behavioural Tasks 
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3.9. Statistical Analyses. 
 
Please refer to each empirical chapter (Chapters 4-7) for details of the statistical analyses 
performed in each study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   92 
Chapter 4. Sensory Awareness and Novelty Processing. 
 
Adaptive cognitive functioning depends on the ability to detect, locate and process 
important stimuli from the ‘noise’ present in the environment at any one time. In other 
words, while many everyday events do not engage the individual, other events may be 
novel or unexpected, and therefore require further processing (Friedman, Cycowicz & 
Gaeta, 2001). Due to the potential significance of such stimuli (e.g. for learning or to signal 
danger), the early capture of attention by novel or unexpected events may be an automatic 
process (Friedman et al., 2001). Once attention is captured, it is likely to lead to further 
processing in terms of categorisation of stimulus-type and memory updating (Polich, 
1996). With increasing experience of the same stimulus, there is habituation (Courchesne, 
Hillyard & Galambos, 1975). A study was designed to assess these basic attentional 
processes in younger and older adults, with the aim of exploring the extent to which the 
power, timing and topography (pattern of activity at the scalp) of brain function associated 
with Sensorimotor Awareness, Level 2 of the Hierarchies of Processing model (HoP; Stuss 
et al., 2001, see Section 1.4.3.2. Chapter 1) is altered by the normal ageing process.  
 
 
4.1. Introduction. 
 
4.1.1. Overview of Cognitive and Neuroscience Approaches to Attention. 
 
The focusing of attention is considered to be intrinsic to self-awareness (see Section 1.3.2., 
Chapter 1), and has been described as the process controlling access to conscious 
experience (Baars, 1988). The empirical investigation of attention has distinguished 
between selective (or focused) and divided attention. Selective attention can be voluntarily 
focused on a particular stimulus type or can be automatically captured by distracting or 
novel stimuli. Divided attention refers to the processing of different streams of information 
and/or the performance of different tasks. Selective attention is typically assessed by 
presenting two or more categories of stimuli with the requirement that attention is focused 
only on one type of stimulus. In contrast, divided attention is assessed by the performance 
of two or more concurrent tasks, usually a combination of perceptual and motor tasks. 
These conceptualisations of attention have led to the development of numerous theories 
involving different processes and components underlying attention. One of the prominent   93 
early theories of selective attention suggested that all incoming sensory information was 
initially registered, and then filtered (Broadbent, 1958). The role of this filter is to prevent 
overloading of short-term memory, which has limited capacity. Specifically, the filter 
allows some information through to short-term memory, whilst holding the remainder of 
the information for later processing. In a similar, but amended version of Broadbent’s 
(1958) model, Treisman (1964) proposed that all information was processed; however, the 
processing of unattended information was attenuated. This is contrary to Broadbent’s 
(1958) view that the incoming, unattended information was held at a constant level of 
activation for later processing. However, the functional distinction between delayed and 
attenuated processing is not clear. Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) also amended the model 
proposed by Broadbent (1958). They argued that all incoming information was processed 
equivalently, however, only the most important or relevant to the goal (response) was 
transmitted to short-term memory. This suggests that there must be an executive 
mechanism exerting some ‘top-down’ control, in order to distinguish the relevant from the 
irrelevant. Consistent with this, more recent theorists have described the role of the frontal 
lobes in directing attention (e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 1996: Supervisory Attention System). 
Each of these theories incorporates the concept of an attentional bottleneck; as short-term 
memory has a limited capacity, the bottleneck functions to restrict incoming information. 
These models differ, however, in the degree of processing that unattended stimuli receive. 
 
Since Broadbent’s seminal paper in 1958, there has been a move in the literature away 
from the concept of a filter in attentional processing to a conceptualisation of automatic 
information processing. Early proponents of this view were Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) 
who proposed a distinction between controlled and automatic processes: controlled (top-
down) processes required attention and were flexible, whilst automatic (bottom-up) 
processes did not require attention and were inflexible. Norman and Shallice (1986) 
expanded on the distinction between automatic and controlled processing and argued that 
there were three types of information processing: fully automatic processing by schemas, 
which occurred with little conscious awareness; partial automatic processing, which 
resolved any conflict arising from competing automatic schemas, and which could involve 
some degree of awareness; and deliberate control by a supervisory attentional system, 
suggested to be located in the frontal lobes, which supported decision making and was 
involved in responding to novelty. The automatic processing theories also posited, similar   95 
the temporal aspects of cognitive functioning provides an opportunity to investigate the 
timing of these processes.  
 
 
4.1.2. Event Related Potential Correlates of Auditory Sensory Processing. 
 
Event related potentials (ERPs) provide electrophysiological correlates of attentional 
capture, as they permit investigation of early brain activity associated with stimulus 
processing (within a few hundred milliseconds of stimulus presentation), and with further 
processing associated with more conscious cognitive assessment of the event (e.g. 
>300ms). Two components are of particular interest in the study of auditory stimuli, which 
is the focus of this chapter: the N100 (N1) and the P300 (P3).   
 
The N1 has been associated with the monitoring of changes in auditory stimuli and, more 
generally, with attentional capture (e.g. Näätänen & Picton, 1987: Näätänen, 1988; 
Hillyard, Hink, Schwent & Picton, 1973). It appears as a negative peak between 50 and 
~150ms after stimulus onset. However, the N1 component is actually associated with a 
number of negative peaks occurring within this time frame, defined by their latency and 
topography; for example, the N1b and N1c (Näätänen & Picton, 1987). The sites of 
maximal N1 recording are over the temporal lobes and midline regions. More specifically, 
the N1b is the term sometimes used to describe the N1 that is evident over central regions, 
whereas the N1c is used to describe the N1 appearing over temporal regions (Näätänen & 
Picton, 1987). Others simply refer to the N1, prefixed by an indication of location, e.g. 
central N1 (Senkowski, Linden, Zubrägel, Bär & Gallinet, 2003), or simply to the N1 
(Jääskeläinen et al., 2004).   
 
Halgren et al. (1995) examined data obtained using depth electrodes in patients with 
epilepsy, in an attempt to localise the neural generators of ERP components associated 
with auditory processing. These authors found activation in the posterior superior temporal 
plane corresponding to the amplitude and latency of the N1. More recently, Senkowski et 
al. (2003) used dipole localisation to confirm that the neural generators of the N1 were 
within the temporal regions. They described signal propagation upward to central regions 
and laterally to the temporal regions, a finding that is consistent with earlier topographical 
descriptions of the ‘N1b’ and ‘N1c’, respectively (e.g. Näätänen & Picton, 1987).     96 
 
It has been suggested that the sensitivity of the N1 to changes in auditory stimuli reflects 
mechanisms (e.g. a ‘pre-attentive gating’) that direct novel stimuli into awareness and 
initiate the orienting of attention to that stimulus (Jääskeläinen et al., 2004). Interestingly, 
the amplitude of the N1 appears to be associated with the salience of the stimulus 
(Näätänen & Picton, 1987), such that novel stimuli elicit greater amplitudes than other 
types of stimuli. This may reflect the potential importance of such stimuli for learning, and 
indeed for survival if the stimulus indicates danger (e.g. car horn) (Friedman et al, 2001). It 
may only be inferred, however, that greater novelty N1 amplitude leads to greater capture 
of attention. Although a distinction has been made between the sensory and cognitive 
aspects of ERP components, the relationship is dynamic; this may be evidence supportive 
of the proposition that cognitive processes can influence earlier sensory processing (i.e. 
directed attention can also modulate N1 amplitude; Chao & Knight, 1997a). 
 
The second component of interest is the P3, which is linked with more intensive 
information processing; when attention is involved in updating mental representations of 
stimuli (Donchin & Coles, 1988). The P3 is a positive peak, with maximal amplitude over 
midline sites. The latency of the P3 varies between 300 and 900ms, and its magnitude has 
been related to the probability of the stimulus, with greater amplitude for rarer stimuli 
(Coles & Rugg, 1995). As the P3 is elicited in paradigms that require a response to a rare 
(target) stimulus it has been associated with controlled attention (Segalowitz & Davies, 
2004), but others have noted that it may be elicited independent of task relevance if the 
stimulus is novel (Courchesne, Kilman, Galambos & Lincoln, 1984). Like the N1, it has 
been suggested that the P3 is not a single component, rather it may represent a number of 
sub-processes reflecting the activity of inter-connected neural circuits (Coles & Rugg, 
1995). Picton (1992) reviewed the literature and described three overlapping positive 
components within the P3 time-frame: the P3a (~250ms), P3b (~350ms), and a less 
specific ‘positive slow wave’. While these subcomponents are often difficult to separate, 
they may also be considered on the basis of their eliciting stimuli. For example, the ‘P3a’ is 
elicited by rare stimuli presented in a three-stimulus task
3, and the ‘novelty P3’ is elicited 
in a novelty paradigm when a third novel stimulus is introduced but about which the 
                                                 
1 Typically in a standard oddball task, one stimulus is presented at high frequency, and the other at low 
frequency, with an instruction to respond to the low frequency or ‘target’ stimuli and ignore the high 
frequency stimuli in the active version of the task. The target stimuli elicit the P3b.   98 
ventrolateral PFC, superior temporal sulcus and the hippocampus was associated with the 
P3b.   
 
Novelty processing, in general, has been linked with the PFC and its connections with the 
limbic system, specifically the hippocampus (see e.g. Yamaguchi, Hale, D’Esposito & 
Knight, 2004). One event-related fMRI study suggested the extent of neural involvement in 
P3 generation: target processing activated bilaterally the anterior superior temporal gyrus, 
inferior and superior parietal lobules, anterior and posterior cingulate, thalamus, caudate 
and the amygdalae/hippocampal complex, whereas novel stimuli activated bilaterally the 
inferior frontal gyrus, insula, inferior parietal lobule, and the inferior, middle and superior 
temporal gyri (Kiehl, Laurens, Duty, Forster & Liddle, 2001). This suggests that there are 
differences as well as similarities in the neural pathways underpinning target (voluntary 
selective attention) and novelty (involuntary attentional capture) processing. Convergent 
information has been obtained from adults with brain injury. An ERP study using a visual 
novelty oddball paradigm in individuals with frontal lobe damage found reductions in the 
amplitude of the novelty P3 and reduced attention to novel stimuli (Daffner et al., 2000)
3. 
The authors suggested that infarctions in the PFC disrupted attentional neural networks, 
and that the reduced novelty P3 component reflected attenuated allocation of attention to 
novel stimuli. Taken together, these studies suggest that the P3 is the result of widespread 
activation of the frontal and association cortices, and that the novelty P3 may be 
particularly dependent on efficient frontal lobe functioning.  
 
Novelty processing involves both detection of novel stimuli and habituation, the process by 
which novel stimuli become familiar (learned). Electrophysiological studies have shown 
that there is greater activity over frontal regions with the first presentation of a novel 
stimulus compared to activity at this region with repetition of the same novel stimulus, 
indicating evidence for dynamic neural ‘learning’.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Auditory and visual oddball paradigms activate frontal and parietal regions with overlap (Stevens, 
Skudlarski, Gatenby & Gore, 2000).   99 
4.1.2.2. Habituation to Novelty.  
 
In one of the earliest studies investigating orienting and habituation to novel stimuli, 
Courchesne et al. (1975) found that P3 amplitude to repeated novel stimuli increased from 
frontal to parietal regions with increasing time spent on task. When novel stimuli were 
presented only once, P3 amplitude was significantly increased at frontal and central sites, 
but this amplitude decreased with increasing experience of novel stimuli.  Courchesne et 
al. (1975) interpreted the P3 elicited by single novel stimuli as representing an initial 
orienting evaluation: “what is it?” (Courchesne et al., 1975, p. 141). The authors further 
suggested that a ‘continuum of recognition’ influenced P3 amplitude, with greater 
recognition of stimuli being associated with greater novelty P3 amplitude over parietal 
regions. Cycowicz and Friedman (1997) also investigated dynamic habituation to novel 
stimuli during the course of a testing session, and found that P3 amplitudes over frontal 
regions indeed decreased with repeated exposure to novel stimuli, with step-wise 
amplitude reductions between children aged 9-11 years, adolescents and adults aged 22-28 
years. A decrease in P3 amplitude at fronto-central regions with repetition of novel stimuli 
was also found in a later study by Cycowicz and Friedman (1999), however, no P3 
amplitude decease was found at parietal sites with habituation to repeatedly presented 
novel stimuli. Based on these findings, Cycowicz and Friedman (1999) suggested that the 
novelty P3 was composed of two aspects: a frontal aspect representing initial orienting to 
novelty, and a parietal aspect associated with the categorisation of stimuli.  
 
Debener, Kranczioch, Herrmann and Engel (2002) assessed the effect of repetition on both 
the novelty P3 and the target P3 elicited by an auditory novelty oddball task in 14 adults 
aged 25-36 years, in two separate testing sessions seven days apart. In the first session, 
novelty P3 amplitude was maximal over central regions within 230-360ms, whilst the 
target P3 was maximal at parietal sites at longer latencies (400-580ms). The novelty P3 
was found to decrease between the first and second half of the first recording session, but 
did not differ between sessions (seven day interval). Conversely, the target P3 was reduced 
in the second recording session compared to the first session, but did not differ between the 
first and second blocks of either session. Debener et al. (2002) suggested that the reduction 
in the novelty P3 from the first to second half of the first session represented habituation 
and initiation of automatic bottom-up processing, as novel stimuli captured less attention 
over time. The target P3 decrease was also associated with a reduction in the allocation of   101 
in location, indicating that although some habituation was found, as evidenced by the 
reduction in target P3 amplitude with time, this was not associated with amplitude 
decreases at fronto-central sites. Of greater interest to the current study, this pattern of 
results suggests that the formation and revision of memory traces, as indexed by the target 
P3 (Polich, 1996) and perhaps also the novelty P3, requires more widespread frontal 
activity in older adults (Fabiani & Friedman, 1995). In support, studies investigating the 
effect of age on habituation to novelty have consistently found, using both auditory 
(Friedman et al., 1997; Friedman & Simpson, 1994) and visual (Weisz & Czigler, 2006) 
novelty oddball paradigms, that frontal novelty P3 amplitudes show reduced decline with 
repeated exposure of the stimuli with ageing indicating that, within the confines of ERP 
studies, older adults do not habituate to novelty as much as younger adults. It is important, 
therefore, to consider carefully the more general evidence for attentional-ERP activity in 
older adults. 
 
 
4.1.3. Event-Related Potential Correlates of Sensory Processing in Normal Ageing. 
 
The N1 and P3 components may be examined to investigate age-related cognitive changes 
(Polich, 1996), facilitating our understanding of age effects on attention, sensory 
perception and awareness. For example, older age has been associated with ERP evidence 
of orienting to irrelevant stimuli (i.e. distractibility), whilst a latency deficit has been 
discussed in terms of speech perception problems (e.g. Ostroff, McDonald, Schneider & 
Alain, 2003).   
 
Significant decline in grey matter volumes in the frontal and temporal lobes (Raz, 2000) 
and white matter degeneration in the corpus callosum and frontal regions (Salat et al., 
2005) have been associated with increasing age. It is conceivable, therefore, that this may 
affect the ability to detect and process stimuli by reducing the strength of signals along 
neural networks, slowing the speed at which these networks function, and by decreasing 
the ability of gating mechanisms in the sensory and association cortices to inhibit irrelevant 
stimuli (see Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Jääskeläinen et al., 2004; Raz, 2000; Salthouse, 1996). 
These gross brain changes may also alter the power of the underlying EEG (Dustman et al., 
1999), and therefore the ERP components elicited. Age-related differences in ERP   102 
components have been found using both standard and novelty oddball paradigms, and 
some of the findings are now discussed. 
 
4.1.3.1. Standard Two-Tone Auditory Oddball Task. 
 
The standard two-tone auditory oddball paradigm has been used to investigate age-related 
changes in attentional processes. This task may be administered passively during which 
participants ignore the standard (high probability) and deviant (low probability) tones, or 
actively where participants respond to the deviant (target) tone; the latter task is likely to 
require more top-down focusing of attention (see e.g. Debener et al., 2002). Of note is that 
the ERP components elicited by passive and active manipulations with children have been 
found to be similar in morphology, amplitude and latency (Zenker & Barajas, 1999).  To 
the author’s knowledge, a similar comparison has not been conducted with adults, but 
would be informative. 
 
There are some inconsistencies with regard to age-related changes in the amplitude of the 
N1 elicited by the two-tone oddball paradigm. Anderer, Semlitsch and Saletu (1996) 
assessed a sample of 172 participants aged 20-88 years, separated into 6 groups (20-29, 30-
39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+ years), and found that standard N1 amplitudes at midline sites 
increased with age (-0.03  V/year at Fz and Cz, and -0.02  V/year at Pz). The latency of 
the standard N1 was also found to increase with age (0.12 ms/year at Pz), indicating that 
older adults had slower, yet enhanced attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli. In support, 
Amenedo and Diaz (1998) also found that standard tones produced an increase in N1 
amplitude with ageing in a sample aged 20-86 years, separated into 3 age groups (20-39, 
40-59, 60-86 years). However, no latency differences were found between the groups, 
indicating that the timing of attentional capture did not differ with age in this study. These 
authors speculated that older adults may attend to task-irrelevant stimuli to a greater degree 
than younger adults, because older adults may experience even standard stimuli as more 
ambiguous, and thus more ‘novel’. However, neither of these studies described the target 
N1, which would have provided an interesting comparison for the standard N1 data. 
Nevertheless, in support of the proposition that older adults attend to irrelevant stimuli to a 
greater extent than younger adults, Chao and Knight (1997b), using a different ERP 
paradigm (delayed matching-to-sample task), found that N1 amplitudes to all stimuli were 
larger in older adults. This finding may be partly explained by the task requirements of the   103 
delayed matching-to-sample task, in that each stimulus required a response, whereas 
oddball paradigms only require participants to monitor and sometimes respond to target 
stimuli with a low probability of presentation. 
 
Other studies have investigated the N1 elicited by standard and target stimuli, using a 
variant of the active oddball manipulation (e.g. requiring a response to targets). Iragui, 
Kutas, Mitchiner and Hillyard (1993) did not find any age effects on either standard or 
target N1 amplitudes, in a sample of 71 participants aged 18-82 years, separated into 3 age 
groups (18-39, 40-59, 60-82 years). These authors additionally found that the topography 
of the N1 for targets and standards was similar across groups, with maximal recordings at 
central regions. In support of Anderer et al. (1996), standard N1 latency increased with 
age. However, no age differences were found on target N1 latency. In a sample of 120 
participants aged 18-80 years, separated into similar age groups as Anderer et al. (1996), 
Polich (1997) employed both visual and auditory oddball paradigms, and also did not find 
an age-effect on the target N1 amplitude. However, a main effect of group was found for 
N1 amplitude to standard tones; as actual data were not presented the degree of an age 
effect on standard N1 amplitude is not clear. No age-related differences in latency were 
found either for standard or target N1. Despite the general null finding of age effects on the 
target N1, a negative correlation between age and auditory target N1 amplitude was found, 
suggesting that initial attentional capture of auditory targets may be sensitive to increasing 
age.  
 
Behaviourally, the older adults performed the oddball tasks equivalently to younger adults 
(Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; Anderer et al., 1996; Polich, 1997). Reaction times in the oddball 
paradigm requiring a response to target stimuli were also similar across groups (Iragui et 
al., 1993; Polich, 1997). This is an important consideration, as a difference in behavioural 
performance can have implications for the interpretation of ERP data (see Hogan et al, 
2005, for a discussion). The finding of decreased behavioural target detection in one study 
of older adults (Iragui et al., 1993) cannot be explained by methodological issues, as this 
was the only study both cognitively to screen their sample with the Mini Mental State 
Examination (Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975) and assess the ability to discriminate 
between the stimulus tones. The other oddball studies reported above did not assess the 
hearing levels of their older adult participants, and Polich (1997) did not report the use of 
any cognitive screening measures. Although the lack of hearing assessments may be   104 
considered a limitation, the equivalent behavioural performance of the older and younger 
participants in the majority of studies argues against any impact impaired hearing may 
have had on performance.  
 
In summary, studies have generally found that the N1 amplitude to standard stimuli 
increases with age (Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; Anderer et al., 1996). However, the timing 
(latency) of this attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli has been found to differ between 
studies. It has been suggested that older adults are less able to discriminate between 
stimulus types requiring attention and may treat each stimulus as ‘new’ (Amenedo & Diaz, 
1998). Neither study focussing on the target N1 found any age-related differences in 
amplitude or latency (Iragui et al., 1993; Polich, 1997), suggesting that the timing and the 
degree of initial attention to target stimuli were similar across age groups. However, the 
correlation reported by Polich (1997) indicates that there may be a relationship between 
increasing age and decreasing N1 amplitude. The most conservative conclusion is that 
these data suggest that older adults may process some aspects of auditory stimuli 
differently to younger adults, and that this may be associated with normal brain changes in 
ageing. 
   
 
4.1.3.2. Novelty Auditory Oddball Task. 
 
The novelty auditory oddball is a modification of the standard oddball paradigm that 
allows for the investigation of attentional capture by unexpected, novel (e.g. potentially 
threatening) stimuli. Controlling for the probability of novel stimuli and target tones (both 
are equally infrequent compared to standard stimuli), the novelty oddball allows for the 
investigation of novel versus anticipated (e.g. target) ‘deviant’ stimuli. This type of novelty 
oddball paradigm also provides greater ecological validity as the novel stimuli (e.g. dog 
bark, car horn) may be more meaningful to the individual in terms of potential threat. 
 
Few studies have used this task to explore the ageing brain, and those data that are 
available are as variable in terms of age-related differences in amplitude and latency of 
ERP components as those obtained from the standard oddball task. In such tasks, younger 
and older adults have comparable N1 amplitudes and latencies to standard stimuli (Fabiani 
& Friedman, 1995; Friedman, Simpson & Hamberger, 1993); unfortunately, Fabiani and   107 
auditory oddball paradigm (Friedman, Kazmerski & Cycowicz, 1998), and found little 
evidence of habituation to novelty in older adults. However, the discrepancies between 
these studies with regard to age-related differences in the amplitude of the novelty P3 
overall, indicates that further investigation of habituation in ageing is warranted. Another 
reason for this is the interesting differences in P3 topography emerging from some studies. 
For example, there is evidence that novel stimuli are associated with a more frontal 
orientation in younger and older adults (e.g. Friedman et al., 1993). There are age-related 
differences in the topographical distribution of target P3 activity over the same frontal 
regions. Younger adults typically show a more parietal compared to frontal distribution of 
activity in association with target stimuli, which may represent fast habituation to a simple 
type of stimuli. In contrast, older adults have been found to show more widespread 
distribution of activity at frontal and parietal regions to the same target stimuli (Fabiani & 
Friedman, 1995). This pattern of electrical activity at the scalp suggests that older adults 
require additional neural resources to process even basic target stimuli and to support task 
performance, although this cannot be assessed with ERP components and topographical 
maps alone, and/or that they fail to habituate to stimuli as efficiently as younger adults. In 
support, a link has been hypothesised between increased P3 latency and a reduction in 
dendrites and myelin in the frontal regions (Amenedo & Diaz, 1998). The reported 
increased latency of the target P3 (e.g. Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; Chao & Knight, 1997b; 
Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993; Polich, 1997), may indicate that the 
process of initiating memory updating is constrained in ageing; in other words it is less 
likely that an individual will habituate to something that they have not had the opportunity 
fully to process
4. Alternatively, Fabiani and Friedman (1995) suggested that older adults 
are less able to inhibit processing of irrelevant stimuli and need the recruitment of frontal 
regions to help them in this task, possibly due to increased memory decay and difficulties 
in maintaining mental representations. This is also indicated by increased false alarms to 
novel stimuli (Friedman et al, 1993; Weisz & Czigler, 2006). Such hypotheses may only be 
tested by analysis of the degree to which older adults, compared to younger adults, 
habituate to novel stimuli during the course of the task, and by investigating topographic 
alongside amplitude data. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Polich (1996) suggested that P3 latency was associated with the timing of stimulus evaluation.   108 
4.1.4. Aims of the Study. 
 
With regard to the Stuss et al. (2001) HoP model, deficits in Sensorimotor Awareness may 
exist, with potential to impact on higher levels of awareness, associated with frontal lobe 
(executive) functioning. One of the aims of the study was to investigate how the N1 and P3 
components associated with basic auditory stimuli may clarify the degree to which this 
level of awareness is affected by the ageing process. Specifically, it was considered that 
any significant behavioural or ERP difference between younger and older adults, 
associated with the processing of basic auditory stimuli, may indicate a deficit in 
Sensorimotor Awareness, with potentially adverse consequences for higher levels of 
awareness. The novelty auditory oddball paradigm was administered to allow for 
simultaneous investigation of online habituation to novel stimuli, a function potentially 
reflective of the importance of interacting sensorimotor and executive function levels of 
awareness (Levels 2 and 3 in the Stuss et al., 2001 HoP model). In order to address these 
aims, the following hypotheses were tested. 
 
1. Novel stimuli would elicit a larger N1 and P3 response compared to both standard and 
target stimuli. 
 
2. Older adults would have attenuated and delayed ERP components compared to younger 
adults.  
 
3. Older adults would show more widespread orientation (pattern) of activity compared to 
younger adults. 
 
4. Younger adults would show reduced frontal activation with repeated exposure to novel 
stimuli, but this pattern of activity would be reduced or absent in older adults.  
 
5. Higher level of anxiety would be associated with higher N1 and P3 amplitudes to target 
and novel stimuli. 
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Figure 4.4. Topographical maps of the effect of habituation on scalp distribution of electrical activity for younger and older adults.
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4.7. Discussion. 
 
The present study investigated Sensorimotor Awareness in ageing. It was hypothesised that a 
novelty auditory oddball paradigm would provide a means to explore the effects of ageing on 
Sensorimotor Awareness, the second level of awareness in the HoP model described by Stuss 
et al. (2001). As predicted, the amplitude of the N1 and P3 were greatest for novel stimuli 
irrespective of age, but only the P3 significantly distinguished novel from infrequent target 
tones. Additionally, and as predicted, longer N1 and P3 latencies were found for novel than for 
target and standard stimuli. Although this study did not find consistent amplitude attenuation 
and delayed latency in the older adult group, some subtle age-related effects were evident: 
central N1 amplitude was attenuated in the older adults, in particular for target stimuli; N1 
latency to standard stimuli was shorter; standard P3 amplitude was increased; and, the latency 
was shorter in OA compared to YA. It was also hypothesised that OA would show more 
widespread distribution of electrical activity compared to YA, and this was partly confirmed 
by an increased frontal orientation of activity in relation to target stimuli, and in relation to 
novel stimuli in the novelty habituation analysis. Finally, this study tested the hypothesis that 
habituation to novelty would be altered by the normal ageing process, and this was indeed the 
case. Importantly, these results were not confounded by possible decline in hearing thresholds, 
level of anxiety, or by reduced intellectual function, evident in the comparable Raven’s SPM 
scores. The implications of these findings are that the ageing brain is able to distinguish 
between stimuli, and may thus be considered to have basic sensory awareness compatible with 
intact Sensorimotor Awareness, but subtle differences, particularly in latency and topography, 
suggest that more widespread neural networks are required to facilitate this processing (e.g. 
Cabeza, 2002). This conclusion is now discussed in greater detail. 
 
The behavioural performance of the older adults in the current study replicated earlier, 
consistent findings of equivalent target detection across age-groups (Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; 
Anderer et al., 1996; Fabiani & Friedman et al., 1995; Friedman et al., 1993; Polich, 1997; 
Weisz and Czigler, 2006). Previous studies have generally found that reaction times in oddball 
paradigms do not differ between age groups (Fabiani & Friedman et al., 1995; Friedman et al., 
1993; Iragui et al., 1993; Polich, 1997), and this was also found in the present study. Critically,   125 
this suggests that ERP latency differences occur in the absence of increased behavioural 
response times. One possibility is that as the response time for both groups typically exceeded 
400ms and the N1-P3 complex amplitude maximums occurred prior to 400ms, there was time 
to compensate for any early sensory processing discrepancy between groups allowing normal 
initiation of the motor response.   
 
The findings from the current study replicate and extend knowledge about attentional 
processing in younger and older adults. In line with previous studies (Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; 
Friedman et al., 1993; Iragui et al., 1993), the topographical distribution of the N1 was similar 
across groups, with maximal recordings at central regions for each stimulus type; this was 
despite the overall reduced N1 amplitude in older adults. In contrast to the previously reported 
finding that older adults have increased N1 amplitude to standard stimuli in standard oddball 
tasks (Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; Anderer et al., 1996), and a lack of age-related standard N1 
amplitude differences in the novelty auditory oddball (Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et 
al., 1993), the present study found that older adults had reduced N1 amplitudes to all stimuli. 
Increased, standard N1 amplitude in older adults in the standard oddball was interpreted to 
indicate attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli (Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; Anderer et al., 
1996), and it was proposed that older adults may have a tendency to treat all stimuli as ‘new’ 
(Amenedo & Diaz, 1998; Friedman & Simpson, 1994). The lack of age-related differences in 
the standard N1 in the novelty paradigm (Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993) 
may indicate that both younger and older adults disregard standard stimuli to an equal extent, 
when presented in the context of additional novel stimuli that demand greater capture of 
attention. Thus, the differences between the present study and that of Amenedo and Diaz 
(1998) may be more methodological than real. However, the N1 for target and novel stimuli 
(note Amendo and Diaz administered a standard oddball not a novelty oddball task) was not 
reported in any of these studies limiting any more meaningful comparison with the present 
study. It may simply be concluded that the overall reduction in N1 amplitude presented herein 
suggests that automatic attentional processing of all stimulus types in an auditory novelty 
oddball task is attenuated in older adults.  
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The current study did not find any age differences in the novelty P3 amplitude, contrary to the 
findings of Fabiani and Friedman (1995), but similarly to the findings of Weisz and Czigler 
(2006), indicating that immediate controlled attention to stimuli, as indexed by the novelty P3 
(Friedman et al., 2001; Segalowitz & Davies, 2004), was equivalent across groups. The 
standard P3 is not typically reported in the literature, possibly because a specific higher 
cognitive function has not been assigned to this component. However, if it is assumed that 
even frequent, background stimuli may elicit some degree of attentional processing, then it is 
possible to conclude that older adults attend to standard stimuli to a greater extent than 
younger adults. The current study indeed found significantly increased P3 amplitudes to 
standard stimuli in older adults, suggesting that there is increased allocation of attentional 
resources to updating mental representations of such stimuli. In other words, older adults 
appear to be working harder just to process basic stimuli. 
 
A significant delay of the target P3 in older adults has been consistently reported (Amenedo & 
Diaz, 1998; Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993; Iragui et al., 1993; Polich, 
1997; Weisz & Czigler, 2006), indicating that the timing of controlled attention for the 
formation and maintenance of memory traces of targets is slower in older compared to 
younger adults. Contrary to previous studies, the current study found that the latency of the 
target P3 did not differ between older and younger groups, such that memory updating 
occurred within a similar time frame. The present study also found a strong trend for the 
timing of the novelty P3 to be faster than the target P3, and this is in line with previous studies 
(Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993). Moreover, this is consistent with 
interpretations of the functional significance of the novelty P3, namely immediate attention to 
the stimulus, but not memory updating per se (Friedman et al., 2001; Segalowitz & Davies, 
2004). Of particular interest here, however, was the finding that older adults attended to 
standard stimuli more quickly than younger adults. This may be interpreted as further evidence 
of a selection bias for standard stimuli, and/or slower immediate controlled attention to novel 
stimuli compared to younger adults. Only two previous studies (Friedman et al., 1993; Weisz 
& Czigler, 2006) found that older adults gave significantly more false alarms to novel stimuli, 
interpreted as more impulsive responding and/or less inhibition. The current study did not find 
any age-related differences in false alarms to novel stimuli. Nevertheless, false alarms to   128 
standard stimuli were increased in the older adults, a finding shared with Friedman et al. 
(1993). Alongside evidence already described that the older adults in the current sample might 
have a bias towards standard stimuli, this suggests a deficit in the inhibition of attention and 
responses to standard stimuli. The longer novelty P3 latency in older adults may also represent 
impaired disengagement of attention to irrelevant, novel stimuli (Weisz & Czigler, 2006). This 
finding is of importance, as novel stimuli can represent potential danger requiring an 
immediate response. One implication of this finding is that older adults are slower to process 
and respond to these novel types of stimuli, for example, a delay in processing a warning car 
horn may result in an accident. 
 
In summary, the current and previous studies have found an attenuation of the target P3 in 
older adults, suggesting that the allocation of attentional processing, and updating of memory 
traces of target stimuli is reduced. Taken together, the equivalent target detection and reaction 
times of older adults, suggests that this attentional impairment did not have an impact on 
behavioural performance. An alternative interpretation is that reduced attentional capabilities 
in older adults do not negatively impact on performance, due to the simple requirements of the 
task, and the potential for older adults to compensate for longer processing latencies before the 
response is executed. A more difficult oddball paradigm with increased attentional load, for 
example, by including a fourth category of stimuli (e.g. stimuli with a similar tone to targets), 
may make the discrimination of targets harder, facilitating the exploration of possible effects 
of age-related attentional impairments on target detection, but this would also make greater 
demands on working memory and thus be less focussed on attentional processing per se. 
Perhaps more pertinent, it may not be assumed that these ERP findings reflect the quality of 
cognitive functioning in everyday life, and few studies have attempted to validate such claims 
by looking for associations between ERP components and, for example, behavioural indices of 
memory and awareness. 
 
The current study also investigated habituation of the novelty P3 in younger and older adults 
and found, in line with previous studies (Cycowicz & Friedman, 1997; 1999; Friedman et al., 
1997; Friedman & Simpson, 1994; Weisz & Czigler, 2006), that younger adults had a 
reduction in novelty P3 amplitude at frontal regions with repeated exposure to novel stimuli.   129 
Novelty P3 amplitude at parietal regions did not differ with time in younger adults, in line 
with Cycowicz and Friedman (1997; 1999). Older adults showed a different pattern of activity 
over time. Specifically, there was no evidence of habituation of the novelty P3, rather an 
increase in frontal orientation was found with increasing time spent on task. Although there 
are already consistent findings for a lack of habituation to novelty in older adults (Friedman et 
al., 1997; Friedman & Simpson, 1994; Weisz & Czigler, 2006), the present study also makes 
some new observations.  For example, the increase in frontal activity with time contrasts with 
the report of Weisz and Czigler (2006), who found that novelty P3 amplitude in older adults 
did not significantly change with time at any location. The differentiation of activity at frontal 
and parietal regions in the younger adults is compatible with the proposition that the novelty 
P3 is composed of two aspects: a frontal aspect representing initial orienting to novelty, and a 
parietal aspect associated with the categorisation of stimuli (Cycowicz & Friedman, 1999). 
Indeed, Courchesne et al. (1975) suggested that the shift from frontal to parietal orientation 
with repeated novel stimuli was influenced by recognition and learning. The results of the 
present study therefore suggest that younger adults rapidly habituate to novel stimuli, 
providing evidence of learning in this group. The contrasting increase in frontal novelty P3 
amplitude and orientation in older adults, together with the findings of their selective bias for 
attending to frequent stimuli, suggest instead that there is a failure to inhibit the processing of 
all types of irrelevant stimuli, and that each stimulus is treated more as ‘new’ than as ‘familiar’ 
(cf. Amenedo & Diaz, 1998). Thus, this may reduce older adults’ capacity for habituation and 
learning to which Courchesne and colleagues referred. Importantly, the increase in frontal 
activity to novel stimuli in older adults is also unlikely to be explained by an increase in their 
startle response, as there were equivalent, low rates of false alarm responding to novel stimuli 
across groups (YA = 4.3%; OA = 6.0%). As novel stimuli may also represent a threat, the 
perception and awareness of such stimuli may be influenced by emotional factors, such as 
anxiety. However, there were no significant associations between anxiety, as measured by the 
HADS, and the N1 and the P3 amplitude in either group. While this suggests that the current 
findings are unlikely to be due to an exaggerated startle response in older adults, it would be of 
considerable interest to investigate this possibility more methodologically, perhaps using other 
autonomic nervous system measures of startle such as eye-blink.  
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further elucidated by the inclusion of a more rigorous frontal-lobe targeted neuropsychological 
test battery. 
 
4.7.1. Summary. 
 
Sensorimotor Awareness is at the second level of the Stuss et al. (2001) HoP model, and is 
proposed to result from the processing of sensory information in the posterior regions of the 
brain. The current study found differential effects of age on Sensorimotor Awareness; there 
were no consistent reductions in amplitude or delays in latencies of the N1 and P3 
components. Initial attentional capture (indexed by the early N1 component) by all types of 
stimuli was reduced in older adults, with evidence found of a selective bias for standard 
stimuli, and topographical data suggested deficits in the maintenance of memory for targets. 
The reduction of frontal lobe habituation in the older adults also suggested that their ability for 
dynamic learning was altered. Later, controlled top-down processes may compensate for 
earlier (e.g. N1) deficits in sensory perception (e.g. Alain, McDonald, Ostroff & Schneider, 
2004), and the increase in the frontal orientation of target and novel P3 found in the older 
adults provided support for this proposition, particularly as there were no behavioural 
differences in target detection or reaction times.  
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Chapter 5. Performance Monitoring. 
 
The ability to monitor behaviour, recognise errors and take remedial actions when necessary is 
fundamental to effective and adaptive cognitive and behavioural performance. These skills are 
described as components of performance monitoring (e.g. Rabbitt, 1966). A fundamental 
assumption of this chapter is that performance-monitoring requires the ability to hold 
information on-line (in working memory) about the rules for correct task performance, to 
focus and switch attention, initiate and co-ordinate physical responses to compatible and 
incompatible stimuli, and have awareness about the quality of performance in order to make 
moment-by-moment adjustments to behaviour. There are similarities between these functions 
and those proposed by Stuss et al. (2001) to comprise the third level of the HoP model, namely 
executive function; a function necessary for organisation of sensory information. 
 
In earlier research into performance monitoring, error correction and post-error slowing 
provided behavioural measures of error detection and compensatory actions (Rabbitt, 1966). 
More recently, electrophysiological (ERP) correlates of performance monitoring have 
indicated the existence of an error monitoring mechanism in the brain. The discovery of an 
ERP component associated with the occurrence of an error has been particularly important to 
this field of study: the error related negativity (originally called the ‘Ne’: Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, Hoorman & Blanke, 1991, but more widely known as the ERN: Gehring, Coles, 
Meyer & Donchin, 1993). The ERN is a negative deflection that occurs after an erroneous 
response, and has been interpreted as a response-monitoring mechanism (Falkenstein et al., 
1991; Gehring et al., 1993). Error processing involves the detection of errors through the 
comparison of the actual response with the on-line representation of the correct response; 
more specifically, the ERN reflects this comparison process (Falkenstein et al., 1991; 
Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ & Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring et al., 1993). The study presented 
in this chapter was designed to assess performance monitoring and its associated ERP and 
behavioural correlates in normal ageing.  
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5.1. Introduction. 
 
5.1.1. The Error Related Negativity. 
 
The ERN occurs at the same time or very soon after an erroneous response, and is maximal at 
fronto-central sites (Falkenstein, Hoorman, Christ & Hohnsbein, 2000). The onset of the ERN 
is concurrent with electromyographic (EMG) activity associated with the execution of an 
incorrect response (Coles, Smid, Scheffers & Otten, 1995). Source localisation and fMRI 
studies have indicated that an important neural generator of the ERN is the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC: Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinivk, Noll & Cohen, 1998; Gehring & Knight, 
2000; Herrman, Rommler, Ehlis, Heidrich & Fallgater, 2004; Yeung, Botvinivck & Cohen, 
2004). However, patient lesion studies have also implicated the lateral PFC in the generation 
of the ERN signal (Gehring & Knight, 2000; Ullsperger, von Cramon & Muller, 2002). More 
recently, evidence from patients with frontal lobe white matter damage, but with intact ACC 
and lateral PFC grey matter, suggested that the combined functioning of these two regions is 
important to the generation and propagation of the ERN (Hogan, Vargha-Khadem, Saunders, 
Kirkham & Baldeweg, 2006). 
 
The ERN is typically elicited in speeded choice response tasks, but may represent a neural 
error detection signal that is similar across a wide range of paradigms (Gehring et al., 1993). 
There has been much debate about the functional significance of the ERN. Early opinion 
sought to categorise published evidence into that supporting an ‘error-detection’ interpretation, 
and that supporting a ‘conflict-monitoring’ view. This division appears to have outlived its 
usefulness, as more recent studies have investigated how functions associated with each model 
may be examined within one paradigm (e.g. Hogan et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it is important 
briefly to consider the theoretical assumptions underlying each approach. The error-detection 
model states that the ERN represents a monitoring process: if there is a mismatch between the 
actual and the intended correct response then an error signal will be produced (Coles, 
Scheffers & Holroyd, 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 
1993; Scheffers & Coles, 2000; Scheffers, Coles, Bernstein, Gehring & Donchin, 1996). The 
conflict-monitoring model states that the ERN is a reflection of increased stimulus-response   136 
More importantly for the study of awareness, the Pe has been suggested to represent conscious 
awareness of an error (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Vidal et al., 2000). This hypothesis is 
contentious. For example, Falkenstein et al. (2000), arguing strongly against this 
interpretation, have suggested instead that the Pe reflects later error-processing activity that is 
independent of the processing linked to the ERN. In support, Herrmann et al. (2004) reported 
different generators for each component, concluding that they represented different features of 
error processing. In a review of the functional significance of the Pe, Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis 
and Ridderinkhof (2005) outlined three hypotheses: the affective-processing hypothesis; the 
behaviour-adaptation hypothesis; and the error-awareness hypothesis. The affective-
processing hypothesis posited that error monitoring included an emotional component, 
evidenced by modulations of the ERN and Pe with negative affect (e.g. Hajcak et al., 2004). 
The behaviour-adaptation hypothesis stated that remedial actions were dependent on the 
amplitude of the Pe (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), whilst the error-awareness hypothesis posited 
that the Pe was modulated by awareness that an error has occurred (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). 
With regard to the behaviour-adaptation hypothesis, there is inconsistent evidence for a 
relationship between the ERN/Pe and compensatory behaviours (e.g. Falkenstein et al., 2000; 
2001; Gehring et al., 1993; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001); although Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) 
found that longer post-error slowing was associated with increased Pe amplitudes, this result 
was interpreted as evidence for the error-awareness hypothesis. 
 
 
5.1.4. Experimental Manipulations of Response Monitoring Components. 
 
Numerous experimental paradigms have elicited the ERN: Stroop, Flanker, choice reaction-
time tasks, Go/No Go, picture-name matching, source memory, antisaccade and mental 
rotation (reviewed in Overbeek et al., 2005; see also Falkenstein et al., 2000), indicating that 
the ERN may represent a generic feature of internal error detection.  
 
In one of the original studies, Gehring et al. (1993) employed a flanker task with three 
conditions emphasising speed or accuracy or both, with financial rewards and losses for speed 
and errors, respectively. The sample was composed of 6 students aged 18-26 years. ERN   137 
amplitude was greatest for the accuracy-emphasised condition, indicating that the ERN may 
be modulated by motivational factors, such as performance accuracy and/or financial gain. 
Interestingly, the greater the amplitude of the ERN, the greater the likelihood the error would 
be corrected. Larger ERN amplitudes were also associated with post-error slowing (response 
slowing on the next trial). This suggests an intriguing relationship between error detection and 
compensatory actions. Similar to Gehring et al. (1993), Hajcak, Moser, Yeung and Simons 
(2005) also found that the ERN amplitude was associated with motivational significance; the 
amplitude of the ERN was greater when the monetary value of errors was high and also when 
participants believed that their performance was being evaluated. 
 
There has also been a focus on different types of errors, e.g. those that are committed 
deliberately compared to those that result from true behavioural ‘slips’. Stemmer, Witzke and 
Schönle (2001) found that deliberate errors did not elicit an ERN or Pe, indicating that the 
ERN is an internal measure of an unintended error response, or a momentary lapse in 
attention. In support, Gehring and Fencsik (2001), using a paradigm with hand/foot responses, 
found that ERN amplitudes were greater when the error and correct responses were similar, 
for example, using the incorrect hand when a hand response was required. In addition, whilst 
post-error slowing was found in the analysis of reaction time (RT) data, this was not related to 
ERN amplitude. This is in contrast to the results of Gehring’s earlier study (Gehring et al., 
1993), but the authors suggest that contradictory results were due to the use of a hand-foot 
manipulation in the later study.  
 
An important caveat was provided by Herrmann et al. (2004) who found that ERN amplitudes 
were reduced with a greater number of errors. This suggests that as the individual experiences 
greater ambiguity about the accuracy of their performance (reflected in an increased error 
response) the ERN decreases. The ERN may be dependent on the individual being aware of 
task rules, and if that level of awareness declines, either through poor understanding of the 
task initially, poor working memory, and/or lapses in attention, then the magnitude of the ERN 
will decrease, but that this decrease may not necessarily be due to a failure of the error-
detection system per se. An alternative, but not inconsistent interpretation could be that the 
ERN is modulated by habituation to making errors, in other words, the individual may become   139 
rather than the ERN, was more related to awareness. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) investigated 
awareness in a sample of 15 students aged 18-23 years and found that ERN amplitude did not 
differ with degree of error awareness in an antisaccade task. This task required participants to 
direct their gaze to the opposite direction to a cue. On completion of each trial, subjective 
ratings of error performance were made. In contrast to the lack of a relationship between ERN 
amplitude and awareness, Pe amplitude was greater for recognised errors. Moreover, contrary 
to the report of Gehring et al. (1993), post error slowing was found only for perceived errors. 
Post-error slowing may reflect a conscious decision to slow down in order to prevent the 
occurrence of further errors; the individual may purposefully attempt to improve performance 
on subsequent trials. It follows that if an error is not perceived then the individual may not 
know to slow down. This, however, remains speculative. All that may currently be concluded 
is that there is likely to be a complex relationship between the ERN and compensatory 
behaviour, particularly as there were no ERN amplitude differences between perceived and 
unperceived errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). Error correction also provides an indirect 
measure of error awareness, but this occurs very quickly after the error (typically <800ms) and 
may reflect concomitant activation of the correct response hand at the same time as the 
incorrect response hand, rather than a true correction of an error
3. Indeed, Falkenstein et al. 
(2000) investigated individual ERN and Pe amplitudes for errors that were subsequently 
corrected and those that were not. They found similar ERN and Pe amplitudes for corrected 
and uncorrected errors. This finding suggests that error correction may not solely be dependent 
on either error detection or error processing as indexed by the ERN and Pe. 
 
Whether or not an error is compensated for in terms of immediate correction or post-error 
slowing, it has the potential to elicit an emotional response. Few studies, however, have 
considered a relationship between performance-monitoring ERPs and autonomic nervous 
system activity, which is also regulated by the ACC. Hajcak, McDonald and Simons (2003) 
found that ERN amplitude did not correlate with heart rate change, skin conductance response 
or post-error slowing. In contrast there were correlations between Pe amplitude and skin 
                                                 
3 De Jong, Coles, Logan and Gratton (1990) found that there was a point between the motor cortex and the hand 
before which the original incorrect response signal may be intercepted and changed (in which case the response 
will look like a normal correct one), however, if the corrective signal intercepts at a point after the threshold, then 
the incorrect response will be immediately followed by the correct response, but it is not an error correction per 
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choice response (4CR) and flanker task. Falkenstein et al. (2000) failed to find consistent 
amplitude reductions in stimulus-locked components (P3; the N2 and N4 were not measured), 
indicating that the ERN and Pe amplitude reductions were not simply reflective of a global 
power reduction in the underlying EEG. Moreover, as comparable error rates were found 
between the groups, the reduction in ERN and Pe amplitudes was unlikely to be due to 
increased error rates in older adults (cf. Herrmann et al., 2004). Similar findings were found 
by Mathewson, Dywan and Segalowitz (2005) in that ERN and Pe amplitudes elicited by both 
a flanker and source memory task were reduced in their older adults, and also by Band and 
Kok (2000) using a mental rotation task. The sample reported by Mathewson and colleagues 
consisted of 16 younger adults aged 19-26 years and 16 older adults aged 61-85 years. In 
support of Falkenstein et al. (2000), older adults were slower to respond in both tasks, but, 
conversely, the older adults had a greater number of errors in the flanker task and a greater 
number of false positives in the source memory task. Mathewson et al. (2005) also 
investigated the effect of RT variability on the amplitude of the ERN and Pe, and found that 
although older adults had significantly increased RT variability compared to younger adults, 
no relationships were found with the amplitude measures for either group. Moreover, ERN 
amplitude was also not related to error-rate in either task. However, after controlling for age, 
higher Pe amplitudes were associated with fewer errors. An alternative interpretation of this 
finding is that individuals with higher error rates may become habituated to making errors. 
 
In a later study with 11 younger participants aged 19-25 years and 11 older adults aged 54-65 
years, Falkenstein, Hoormann and Hohnsbein (2001) again found ERN amplitude reductions 
in older adults in 4CR and flanker tasks. However, no effect of age was found on CRN 
amplitude. To the author’s knowledge this is the only published study that has conducted 
systematic, single-trial analyses on the younger and older adult data to investigate the possible 
effects of latency jitter. The single-trial analyses found that older adults had generally lower 
ERN amplitudes and longer latencies, and greater standard deviation (SD) of ERN amplitude 
and latency. These findings, nevertheless, further indicate that error detection is both 
attenuated and delayed in older adults. The significant contribution of the study by Falkenstein 
and colleagues is that ERN amplitude reduction found in older adults is not purely an artefact 
of the averaging process; although increased latency SD suggests some amplitude reduction by   143 
impact on self-awareness at the highest level of the model (Stuss et al., 2001). The term 
executive functioning encompasses a broad range of cognitive functions, including attention, 
working memory, cognitive control and conflict processing. The performance of complex 
tasks depends on the interaction and organisation of such cognitive (executive) processes and 
incoming sensory information. There are consistent findings within the literature of subtle, but 
specific, executive function deficits in older adults (see Section 2.5, Chapter 2). More 
specifically, increased RTs and intra-individual variability in performance of cognitively 
demanding tasks are related to age (Mathewson et al., 2005; Salthouse, Nesselroade & Berish, 
2006; Shammi, Bosman & Stuss, 1998). Little is known, however, about specific alterations in 
brain activity that potentially underlie such changes. The aim of the present study was to 
investigate performance monitoring in healthy ageing, as a means of exploring the integrity of 
Stuss et al.’ (2001) third level of awareness in older adults. A secondary aim was to explore 
the possibility that brain function changes with ageing, perhaps in relation to underlying 
structural changes.   
 
The performance monitoring ERP paradigm employed in this study (Hogan et al., 2005) has 
two equally probable conditions: compatible and incompatible stimulus-response. The 
incompatible condition manipulates task complexity/response conflict, henceforward ‘task 
complexity’. The paradigm provides measures associated with performance monitoring at the 
level of stimulus-processing: pre-response conflict (N2); allocation of attention (P3b and SW
4) 
and response-conflict priming (N4); response-monitoring: error detection (CRN-ERN); and, 
error processing (Pe). In addition, behaviour was investigated in terms of error rate and RT, 
and remedial actions: error correction and post-error slowing. The inclusion of postdiction 
report of performance accuracy provided a metacognitive measure of the individual’s 
performance monitoring abilities.  
 
                                                 
4 The positive slow wave (SW) was described by Picton (1992) see p. 96, Chapter 4. However, a specific function 
has not been assigned to this component. Hogan et al. (2006) also measured two positive peaks (P3a and P3b), 
however different nomenclature was used in the current study, due to the debate over the functional significance 
of the P3a and P3b (see p. 96, Chapter 4). 
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estimated percentage of their perceived accuracy of performance. 
 
ii) The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) (described 
in Chapter 3).  
 
i) anxiety subscale 
ii) depression subscale, with higher scores reflective of more negative affect. 
 
iii) The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
The PANAS is a 20 item self-report measure of positive and negative affect using a five point 
rating scale. The PANAS was used to assess the effect of testing and was administered pre and 
post ERP testing. Higher scores indicate higher levels of affect. Positive discrepancy scores 
indicate an increase in positive or negative affect, negative discrepancy scores indicate a 
decrease in positive or negative affect. 
 
 
5.2.3. ERP Acquisition and Processing (see Section 3.7.4, Chapter 3 for detailed description). 
 
This task was administered in the same session as the novelty auditory oddball paradigm 
(Chapter 4). In all cases, the 4-CRT was administered after the Novelty Auditory Oddball. 
Thus, the EEG recording was similar to that reported in Chapter 4. Briefly, the EEG was 
recorded using NeuroScan SynAmps
TM amplifiers at a sampling rate of 500Hz (band-pass 
0.05-70Hz) from 22 leads located over lateral and midline sites, using a ground lead situated at 
Fp1, and referenced to linked mastoids. Impedance was maintained at less than 15K . 
Vertical (right eye) and lateral ocular electrodes enabled offline blink reduction according to a 
standard algorithm (Semlitsch et al., 1986).  
 
For stimulus-locked waveforms (N2, P3b, N4, SW), EEG data were epoched at -200 to 1000 
ms centred on presentation of arrow stimuli, and baseline corrected at -200 to 0 ms. For 
response-locked waveforms, EEG data (CRN, ERN, Pe) were epoched at  -500 to 500 ms, and 
baseline corrected at  -200 to -100 ms. Epochs were averaged by stimulus type (green and red   147 
arrows), correct trial status (correct green arrows, error green arrows, correct red arrows and 
error red arrows) and response type (green arrow error, red arrow error, green arrow correct 
and red arrow correct). The components were identified as the maximum peak within the 
specified time frames: N2 at Fz (190 – 310 ms: most negative), P3b at Pz (250 – 450 ms: most 
positive), N4 at Fz (380 - 520ms: most negative), SW (450 – 800 ms: most positive), and Pe 
(250 – 450 ms: most positive). The ERN and CRN components were calculated from the peak 
preceding the response (-100 to 0 ms) to the highest negative peak after the response (0 – 200 
ms) to provide a measure of the magnitude of each component (a ‘peak-to-peak’ measure).  
 
 
5.2.3.1. Woody Filter. 
 
The Woody Filter was applied to examine the potential confound of latency jitter (re: 
Hypothesis 6). Each single trial is composed of a number of data points which correspond with 
the sampling rate of the EEG recording. In the EEG studies reported herein, the sampling rate 
was 500Hz. Each data point is an amplitude measurement with the position of the data point 
providing the latency measurement. In the conventional averaging process the data points in 
each single trail are averaged to create the final waveform. One of the potential concerns with 
the conventional method is that the latency of the peaks of interest may vary considerably 
between trials. The averaging process results in a smaller and broader component and may not 
accurately represent that component as it is found in the single trials. Woody (1967) proposed 
an adaptive filter based on a cross-correlation process. The Woody filter averages the single 
trials by aligning the signals (peaks) found in the trials, rather than by a time-locked stimulus 
or response code. Each single trial provides a row of data points, with the columns providing 
the amplitude measurement at that time point. The Woody filter uses a template of the data 
points to which each trial is aligned; each trial is shifted until the waveforms are most highly 
correlated. A matrix is created containing the cross-correlations for each of the combinations 
of data in the columns. Once these data points are correlated a plot of the waveform is created 
(see Figure 5.1). 
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incompatible) and group (x2: younger, older) for the N2, P3b, N4, SW and Pe. ANOVA 
models for amplitude and latency were conducted to assess the CRN-ERN simultaneously (to 
assess the magnitude of the CRN-ERN difference; cf. Falkenstein, 2004): condition (x2: 
compatible, incompatible), component (x2: CRN, ERN) and group (x2: younger, older). 
Planned t-tests were also conducted for each of these amplitude and latency measures. The 
Woody filtered, response-locked ERP data (CRN, ERN and Pe) were also analysed with 
ANOVA models as described previously. Mixed-design ANOVA models were employed to 
investigate the magnitude of the amplitude difference between conventional and Woody filter 
analyses: analysis (x2: Woody, conventional) and group (x2: younger, older). 
 
Finally, planned, within-group correlations were conducted to assess relationships between the 
response-locked components and variables found in the literature to be related to the ERN and 
Pe amplitude: affect, compensatory actions and perceived accuracy. Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
values were not calculated, since a priori predictions between the variables had been specified. 
Discrepancy scores for postdiction accuracy were calculated by subtracting postdiction 
accuracy percentages from the percentage of correct responses for each block of 4-CRT trials. 
These values were then averaged to produce a mean discrepancy score expressed as a 
percentage. Speed-accuracy trade-off was also explored with correlations between error rate 
and correct and error RT. 
 
 
5.3. Results. 
 
5.3.1. Behavioural Responses. 
 
Mean scores and standard deviations of the behavioural measures are presented in Table 5.1, 
with the results of the ANOVA models presented in Table 5.2. The error rates were 
comparable between groups. The OA, however, responded significantly more slowly 
compared to the YA for both correct and error responses. The rates of error correction and 
post-error slowing were also equivalent, indicating that both groups undertook similar 
compensatory actions. However, the OA displayed additional within trial responding in both   153 
5.3.2. Stimulus-locked components.  
 
The stimulus-locked waveforms can be viewed in Figure 5.2. Amplitude and latency means 
and standard deviations are presented in Table 5.4. The results from the ANOVA models are 
given in Table 5.5 and 5.6.  
 
5.3.2.1. P3b Component. 
 
As shown in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, there was a significant effect of group on the amplitude 
and the latency of the P3b, indicating that OA have attenuated and delayed P3b peaks for both 
compatible and incompatible conditions. Task complexity did not affect the P3b, indicating 
that the age effect was not influenced by the complexity manipulation (Table 5.5: lack of 
condition X group interactions for amplitude and latency)  
 
5.3.2.2. SW Component. 
 
Only the latency of the SW component was delayed in OA (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6), consistent 
with the significant slowing of the immediately preceding P3b. The lack of condition effects, 
again, indicates that the later processing of compatible and incompatible stimuli was of 
equivalent power and timing.  
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5.3.2.3.2. P3b Component. 
 
The P3b was attenuated and slower in the OA, regardless of condition. There were no effects 
of condition, indicating that this component was not sensitive to stimulus-response 
compatibility. 
 
5.3.2.3.3. N4 Component. 
 
The N4 component was significantly reduced and delayed in OA. There were no effects of 
condition, indicating that this component was not sensitive to stimulus-response compatibility.    
 
5.3.2.3.4. SW Component. 
 
The SW component was significantly delayed in the OA. The lack of condition effects 
indicates that this component was also not sensitive to stimulus-response compatibility.   
 
Figure 5.3. Stimulus-locked waveforms recorded from Cz: Compatible condition (solid line) 
and incompatible condition (dashed line) group grand averages.   
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5.3.7. Summary of Results. 
 
With the exception of reaction time and number of missed trials, there were no behavioural 
differences between the YA and OA groups. Both groups managed the increase in task 
complexity equivalently, with older adults performing better over time. The incompatible 
condition elicited greater N2 amplitudes, associated with conflict detection, which were 
similar across groups. However, group differences were found for subsequent stimulus-locked 
components. The P3b and N4 were both attenuated and delayed in the older adults, and the 
SW was significantly delayed. In both conventional and Woody filter analyses of response-
locked components, there were age-related reductions in the ERN and the Pe, indicating an 
impoverished error detection system. However, the integrity of the error detection system may 
also be judged by the presence of a significant difference between the CRN and ERN. There 
was no significant interaction between component (CRN-ERN) and group in the conventional 
analysis, suggesting that irrespective of reduced ERN power in OA, the error detection system 
was operational. However, a component by group interaction was revealed in the Woody filter 
analysis, due mainly to the filtering process improving YA amplitudes, and this provided 
further evidence of an age-related reduction in the error detection system. The study did not 
find any relationships between the ERN/Pe and affect in either group, nor with remedial 
actions in the younger adults. However, greater error detection in the incompatible condition 
was associated with increased post-error slowing in the older adults, suggesting a link between 
internal performance monitoring and compensatory behaviour. Moreover, more accurate 
perception of performance was associated with greater ERN amplitudes in both conditions in 
the younger adults, suggesting a link between the ERN and awareness of performance in this 
group.  
 
 
5.4. Discussion. 
 
The current study investigated Consistent Consciousness, a type of awareness involving 
executive functioning and its ability to organise sensory information underlying behaviour 
(Stuss et al., 2001) in healthy older and younger participants. It was hypothesised that an   174 
investigation of performance monitoring would provide a means to assess this type of 
awareness. As predicted, and in line with previous studies (Band & Kok, 2000; Falkenstein et 
al., 2000; Falkenstein et al., 2001; Mathalon et al., 2003; Mathewson et al., 2005), older adults 
had reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes. While this did not affect the CRN-ERN difference, a 
marker of the integrity of the error-detection system, using conventional analysis, there was a 
significant interaction when data were corrected for latency jitter (Woody filter). Specifically, 
this correction amplified the younger adult waveforms such that the smaller CRN-ERN 
difference in the older adults became, by comparison, significantly smaller than the CRN-ERN 
difference in younger adults. Importantly, there were no behavioural differences between the 
groups with regard to the most influential factor on the ERN and Pe, namely error rate. 
Remedial actions (error correction and post-error slowing) were equivalent between groups, 
and both groups managed the increase in task complexity (compatible to incompatible stimuli) 
equivalently. However, the older adults had significantly slower responses, failed to respond 
to more trials and made additional unnecessary responses (altering correct responses to errors). 
As performance monitoring also involves the sub-process of response competition (Ullsperger 
& von Cramon, 2001), the study investigated conflict and found, in line with Kopp et al. 
(1996), that the N2 amplitude was influenced by stimulus-response compatibility. Of note is 
that the detection and timing of this marker of pre-response conflict was equivalent across 
groups. The N4, however, did not differ with level of conflict, contrary to Hogan et al. 
(2006)
7, but was both attenuated and delayed in older adults suggesting that response priming 
was altered with age.  
 
ERP components provide an on-line measurement of the processes underlying cognition and 
behaviour. In the current study, Consistent Consciousness was conceptualised by performance 
monitoring which requires the integration of numerous processes: conflict detection; allocation 
of attention; response priming; error detection; and error processing. The results indicated that 
age was associated with differential effects on brain processes underlying performance 
monitoring. Whilst markers of conflict detection did not differ with age, the N4 was attenuated 
and delayed. As early stimulus processing (N2) was normal it is possible that older adults 
                                                 
7 Hogan et al. (2006) included 3 groups of participants aged 11-23.7 years (sickle cell with frontal lobe 
infarctions), 13.6-25.0 years (sickle cell without infarcts), and 12.2-21.0 years (sibling controls). Therefore, there 
is some overlap in age ranges between Hogan et al. (2006) study and the younger adult group in the current study.   175 
begin to process information similarly to younger adults, but that this ability declines as a 
response is initiated. Interestingly, the former process reflects activity of the association 
cortices and the latter the additional involvement of the frontal lobe (Hogan et al, 2006). 
Compatible with this, response-locked error components occurring very shortly after the 
P3b/N4/SW complex in real time, and probably overlapping to a degree, were also affected in 
the older adults. These results are, therefore, consistent with the view that the ageing process 
exerts its greatest effect on frontal lobe networks (e.g. Moscovitch & Winocur, 1995; Raz 
2000; 2004; West, 1996). 
 
Only two previous studies (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Mathalon et al., 2003) have investigated 
age effects on stimulus-locked components in performance monitoring. However, these 
studies differed with regard to P3 amplitude; Falkenstein et al. (2000) found reductions with 
age, whilst Mathalon et al. (2003) did not. In support of Falkenstein et al. (2000), in this study 
P3b amplitude was significantly reduced in the older adults, perhaps indicating that attentional 
allocation to stimulus processing was altered in this group. It would be of interest to 
investigate, on a trial-by-trial basis, fluctuations in P3b component amplitude, alongside 
fluctuation in other stimulus-locked components, in order to explore possible dynamic changes 
in attention allocation during the course of the task. Fluctuations in online stimulus-processing 
between younger and older adult groups may offer further insight into altered performance-
monitoring components. To the author’s knowledge, no such study has yet been undertaken to 
explore performance-monitoring in ageing. 
 
One of the prominent caveats in the literature regarding factors that modulate the ERN 
amplitude was provided by Hajcak et al. (2003) and Herrmann et al. (2004).  Namely, that 
ERN amplitude was reduced with increased error rate. The current study found equivalent 
rates of error performance between groups, and within-group correlations failed to find any 
relationships between error rate and ERN and Pe amplitudes. These findings are of particular 
importance to interpretations that follow with regard to the attenuated ERN and Pe in the older 
adults.  
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regions supporting cognitive control. As predicted, the study found age-related deficits in 
decision-making accuracy, and this was associated with increased activation in the ACC. 
However, contrary to this interpretation is the possible reduction in underlying EEG power 
suggested by the fact that most, but not all, components were attenuated in older adults. It 
would be of interest to investigate the effect of underlying EEG power in alpha, beta, theta and 
delta ranges on ERP components in order to address this hypothesis further. However, spectral 
analyses are conducted on EEG data recorded during a period of time (e.g. 2 minutes) with 
eyes open and eyes closed rather than during performance of a task. Moreover, the epochs for 
spectral analyses are longer than in ERP analyses (e.g. 8 seconds vs. 1 second), with ERP 
epochs specified by an event (stimulus/response) rather than a segment of time. Therefore, it 
can be problematic to extrapolate to the relationship between the EEG and ERP components, 
as the challenge is in linking voltage changes to events to underlying oscillations in electrical 
activity. However, there has been recent development of techniques that permit an 
investigation of the underlying spectral power alongside conventional ERP analyses (see 
Hanslmayr et al. 2008; Yordanova, Falkenstein, Hohnsbein & Kolev, 2004). 
 
Despite performance monitoring deficits indicated by the ERP components, the behavioural 
adaptations (e.g. post-error slowing) of the older adults to errors were equivalent to those of 
the younger adults. The implications of these findings are that ageing is associated with 
impairments in some aspects of the ability to organise sensory information as it initiates 
executive functions. This may be interpreted as consistent with a deficit in Consistent 
Consciousness, as defined by Stuss et al. (2001), but such a relationship is not confirmed. 
Importantly, a positive interpretation may also be offered: effective and adaptive remedial 
actions and response strategies were found; suggesting that performance monitoring was 
functional albeit attenuated in the older adults, and that residual function and as yet unknown 
compensatory mechanisms may supersede deficits that occur earlier in the monitoring process.  
 
The investigation of compensatory behaviours precedes ERP studies of performance 
monitoring (e.g. Rabbitt, 1966). Error correction and post-error slowing are immediate 
remedial actions, occurring within a few seconds of the error, and relationships with the ERN 
and Pe have been explored with mixed results. Although Gehring et al. (1993) found that ERN   178 
amplitude increased with the probability of error correction and post-error slowing, these 
results have not been consistently replicated (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Falkenstein et al., 2001; 
Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Hajcak et al., 2003). Pe amplitude elicited by a flanker task has 
been statistically associated with post-error slowing (Hajcak et al., 2003), in that higher Pe 
amplitudes were associated with increased post-error slowing, but did not differ between 
errors corrected and those uncorrected (Falkenstein et al., 2000). Using an antisaccade task to 
investigate perceived and unperceived error performance, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) only 
found post-error slowing for perceived errors. ERN amplitude did not differ between 
perceived and unperceived errors; however, the Pe amplitude was significantly greater for 
perceived errors. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2001) argued that the covariation of the post-error 
slowing and Pe amplitude results (see also Hajcak et al., 2003) supported the view that the Pe 
represented further conscious error processing and response adjustment. However, no 
statistical analyses were reported investigating the relationship between Pe amplitude and 
post-error slowing. With regard to the relationship between the ERN, Pe and compensatory 
behaviours in ageing, Falkenstein and colleagues (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Falkenstein et al., 
2001) found greater post-error slowing in older adults, but similar rates of error correction to 
younger adults (although numerically lower in the older adults). One possible explanation for 
the contradictory results between these studies may be due to statistical analyses employed. 
Gehring et al. (1993) calculated quartiles of ERN size based on the probability of an error 
being present in a random subset of correct and error trials. Other studies have separated and 
subsequently averaged trials on the basis of the variable of interest: errors corrected and errors 
uncorrected (Falkenstein et al., 2000); trials with and without post-error slowing (Gehring and 
Fencsik, 2001); post-error slowing for perceived and unperceived errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2001); post-error slowing calculated from error trials and a subset of correct trials matched to 
equivalent number and RT in error trials (Hajcak et al., 2003). The analyses conducted by 
Gehring et al. (1993) differed from other studies in that the ERN amplitudes were calculated 
by error probability in a subset of trials rather than error trials separated by error correction or 
post-error slowing. The findings of relationships with error correction and post-error slowing 
to ERN amplitude may be due to these behaviours not being performed in correct trials, and 
the lack of consideration of these behaviours in all error trials.  
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The current study found equivalent rates of error correction and post-error slowing between 
older and younger adults. Both measures were calculated from behavioural data. The rates of 
error correction in the current study (YA = 27.6% and 24.4%; OA = 39.6% and 31.1%, 
compatible and incompatible conditions, respectively) were lower than those reported by 
Falkenstein et al. (2001): 65% and 59%, younger and older adults, respectively for the 4CR 
task; and 63% and 43%, younger and older adults, respectively for the flanker task. However, 
the interstimulus-interval (ISI) in the Falkenstein et al. (2001) study was greater than in the 
current study (1800ms vs. 1500ms); the increased ISI may have provided a greater opportunity 
for error correction, even with only a 300ms difference. The current study also failed to find 
any relationships between corrective measures and ERN and Pe amplitudes in the younger 
adults. However, an association between increased ERN amplitudes in the incompatible 
condition and longer post-error slowing in older adults was found, indicating a link between 
internal error detection and compensatory behaviour as a function of increased task 
complexity. Increased task-complexity is associated with up-regulation of frontal lobe activity 
(Hogan et al., 2006).  This further suggests that the frontal lobes are of critical interest in the 
investigation of attenuated performance-monitoring in normal ageing. It would be of 
considerable interest to conduct functional imaging studies based on the performance-
monitoring ERP paradigms to confirm this theory. The CRN-ERN magnitude difference was 
also calculated to provide a measure of the functional integrity of the error detection system. 
Again, within-group correlations with remedial actions were not significant.  
 
In summary, these findings suggest that neither ERN nor Pe amplitudes, nor the CRN-ERN 
difference are related to immediate corrective behaviours in younger adults. Despite different 
statistical analyses, the findings in the younger adults are in line with previous results of a lack 
of relationships between ERN and Pe amplitudes and post-error slowing and error correction 
(Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Falkenstein et al., 2001). Falkenstein et al. 
(2001) suggested that the reduction in the ERN in older adults may not have been sufficient 
significantly to influence error correction. Nevertheless, the finding of a relationship between 
ERN amplitude and post-error slowing in older adults in the present study extends existing 
evidence of relationships between the ERN, Pe and corrective behaviours (Gehring et al., 
1993; Hajcak et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). Further investigation is required to   181 
with experience. The underestimation of performance was not influenced by affect in either 
group, and previous metamemory studies (e.g. Ansell & Bucks, 2006; Bieman-Copland & 
Charness, 1994) utilised tasks with fewer stimuli to monitor, suggesting that monitoring of 
performance in the current study, may have been more difficult due to the greater length of 
task performance.  
 
Scheffers and Coles (2000) included a postdiction measure of performance accuracy, a five-
point rating scale from sure correct to sure incorrect, after each trial and found that greater 
ERN amplitudes were related to greater perceived inaccuracy. Interestingly, in support of 
Scheffers and Coles (2000), ERN amplitudes were associated with awareness of performance 
accuracy; more accurate perception of performance was linked with increased ERN 
amplitudes in both compatible and incompatible conditions, but only in the younger adults. 
The current study differed from Scheffers and Coles (2000) in that postdictions were required 
after each block of 100 trials rather than after each trial. Furthermore, discrepancy scores, the 
difference between perceptions of performance and actual performance, were calculated and 
correlated with ERN amplitudes. However the present study, and that of Scheffers and Coles 
(2000), provides limited but converging evidence, albeit using different methodologies, that 
the ERN is associated with awareness of performance in younger adults. No relationships were 
found between discrepancy scores and corrective measures, indicating that these different 
measures of awareness may not be related, but this may need to be confirmed in studies with 
larger sample sizes. The results also indicate that prediction of accuracy of performance, as 
indexed by larger discrepancy scores, is associated with reduced ERN amplitudes, providing 
support for Pailing and Segalowitz (2004), who found an attenuation of the ERN amplitude 
with uncertainty of performance in younger adults. Gehring and Fencsik (2001) concluded that 
the ERN may represent an evaluative process, and the results from the younger adults in the 
current study provide some support for this proposition. Data obtained from the older adults 
are not easily explained and argue against a relationship between the ERN and awareness of 
performance, as there were no group differences in discrepancy scores or postdictions, 
indicating that awareness of performance did not differ with age. However, the standard 
deviation of the older adult discrepancy scores is almost double that of the younger adults,   182 
indicating that the discrepancy scores were more variable in the older adults, which may 
account for the lack of a relationship between ERN amplitude and awareness of performance.  
 
This study was unique in the application of the Woody filter to explore possible effects of 
latency jitter on response-locked components. To the author’s knowledge there is only one 
published study conducting single trial analyses on older adult electrophysiological ERN data 
(Falkenstein et al., 2001). The results of those analyses suggested some amplitude reduction 
by single-trial latency jitter in the increased latency standard deviation. More recently, 
Walhovd, Rosquist and Fjell (2008) employed the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
correction technique to assess latency jitter in the P3a and P3b elicited in a three-stimuli visual 
oddball paradigm in a sample of 133 adults, aged 20-88 years. The study found that P3a and 
P3b amplitudes were significantly increased with the MLE technique compared to 
conventional analyses. The authors correlated age with the amplitudes and latencies of the P3a 
and the P3b, and found that the correlations from conventional analyses and the MLE 
technique were not significantly different. These results indicate that adjusting for latency 
jitter in stimulus-locked waveforms does not alter the findings of reduced amplitudes and 
longer latencies in the P3a and P3b in ageing. Similarly to Walhovd et al. (2008), the results of 
the Woody filter in the current study replicated the findings of the conventional analyses, in 
that older adults had significantly reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes compared to younger 
adults. Moreover, group interactions with component and condition found that the magnitude 
of the difference between the CRN and ERN was greater in the younger adults compared to 
the older adults, and that older adults had attenuated CRN and ERN amplitudes elicited by the 
incompatible condition compared to the compatible condition. The Woody filter increased the 
amplitude in response-locked components in both groups, which indicated that latency jitter 
occurred in both younger and older adult waveforms from the conventional averaging process. 
Contrary to the expectation that variability in older adult trials would lead to greater latency 
jitter in the averaged waveforms compared to younger adults, the study found that latency 
jitter was greater in the younger adults. Despite different paradigms, ERP components 
investigated and latency jitter techniques, both the current study and that of Walhovd et al. 
(2008) have shown that latency jitter is present in both younger and older adult waveforms. 
Taken together, the results from these studies suggest that latency jitter influences the   183 
amplitudes of components in all age groups. However, this difference does not impact on the 
results from both types of analysis. In summary, using the Woody filter to account for latency 
jitter yielded an interaction between component and group that was not present in the 
conventional analysis, but this was due to the correction of greater ‘jitter’ in the younger 
compared to older adults. These analyses, which are highly novel, address the concern that 
age-related amplitude reductions in response-locked components are artefacts of the 
conventional averaging process. The current study indicates that the attenuated error 
processing components in older adults, consistent with previous studies (Band & Kok, 2000; 
Falkenstein et al., 2000; Falkenstein et al., 2001; Mathalon et al, 2003; Mathewson et al., 
2005), are genuine age-related reductions, rather than artefacts of the averaging process.  
 
The four choice reaction time paradigm utilised in the current study provided both sufficient 
error rates and facilitated an investigation of two predominant theories of the functional 
significance of the ERN. The error-detection model (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 
1993) posits that the ERN is a signal elicited by a mismatch between the representation of the 
correct response and the actual (erroneous) response. Whereas the conflict-detection model 
(Carter et al., 1998; van Veen & Carter, 2002) contends that the ERN represents a measure of 
increased stimulus-response conflict. The incompatible condition in the current study provided 
an opportunity to measure response conflict. ERN amplitude did not differ between conditions 
in either group, indicating that the incompatible condition did not elicit greater amplitudes, 
supporting the view that the ERN is a generic error detection signal. That the N2 was 
modulated by pre-response conflict, but without any concurrent effect on the ERN, suggests 
that conflict detection was less influential on the ERN than previous studies suggest (e.g. van 
Veen & Carter (2002). The current study was unable to contribute to the debate over the 
functional significance of the Pe. Specifically, the study failed to find any relationships 
between Pe amplitude and corrective behaviours, awareness of performance, or affect in either 
group. Studies have suggested that the Pe represents conscious recognition of error 
performance and is related to remedial post error slowing (Hajcak et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2001). The null results in the current study may have been due to the methodology for 
assessing awareness of performance; a postdiction measure of the perception of performance. 
A more valid measure of awareness may be recorded by requesting the participants to report   186 
accounted for by factors influencing signal propagation: myelin degeneration (Bartzokis, 
2004); cell shrinkage (Raz, 2004); or increases in cerebrospinal spaces (Good et al., 2001; 
Raz, 2000). However, the lack of structural data limits such conclusions, as it is not known 
whether the older adult sample had any significant neural change. That there were no 
consistent relationships between the ERN, Pe and remedial actions in both groups, suggests 
that other processes are involved in signalling the necessitation of immediate corrective 
behaviours. The current study also found some evidence of response strategies in older adults; 
reducing response speed and responding to fewer trials (‘taking small breaks’). Of interest, the 
improvement in performance over time in the older adults indicated that their response 
strategy was effective.   
 
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest an alteration of neural activity underlying 
performance-monitoring, but this does not reach a threshold for functional impairment.  
Assuming that there is a relationship between awareness (internalised unconscious and/or 
overtly conscious) and ERP correlates of performance-monitoring, it may therefore be 
concluded that there is also evidence of altered Level 3 – Consistent Consciousness in normal 
ageing. Importantly, the slower response strategy adopted by older adults may be viewed as 
compensatory; different but not necessarily abnormal. In other words: slower may facilitate 
surer. 
 
 
5.4.1. Summary. 
 
The current study investigated Consistent Consciousness (Stuss et al., 2001), a type of 
awareness dependent on the ability to organise sensory information and executive functioning 
underlying effective and adaptive cognition and behaviour. Performance monitoring was 
proposed to provide a conceptualisation of this type of awareness. Ageing was associated with 
some deficits in Consistent Consciousness: attention (stimulus processing), error detection and 
error processing. A possible explanation for similar performance is that age-related 
attenuations in ERP correlates of performance monitoring are not sufficient negatively to 
impact on functioning (Falkenstein et al., 2001). However, effective and adaptive remedial   187 
actions and response strategies were found, providing evidence of compensatory mechanisms 
for impaired underlying processes in older adults. 
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Chapter 6. Awareness Assessed by Measures of Metamemory and Self-Report of Functioning. 
 
Metacognition is the study of self-reflected aspects of cognition; the reasoning and 
consideration of one’s own thinking and memory, as well as the executive processes that 
facilitate the selection of strategies and control the allocation of processing resources 
(Wellman, 1983). Metacognitive research has traditionally focused on three methods of 
measurement: self-evaluation of memory functioning off-line; self-evaluation of memory 
functioning during task performance (on-line); and, monitoring of memory performance 
(Kausler, 1991). Off-line, self-evaluation of memory includes the participant’s perceptions of 
the efficiency and general functioning of their memory abilities and is typically assessed using 
questionnaires. This includes assessment of metamemory beliefs. This type of metacognitive 
performance is closely related to awareness; indeed, Hertzog and Dixon (1994) argue that they 
are analogous - that evaluation of performance is likely to involve the focussing of attention 
combined with awareness of one’s abilities. In this regard, this type of metacognitive ability is 
similar to Self-Awareness, the highest level of the Hierarchies of Processing (HoP) model 
defined by Stuss et al. (2001). A number of studies has reported changes in self-perceptions of 
memory abilities with age. Older adults reportedly perceive reduced memory capabilities, 
more decline and less internalised control over their memory (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983; 
Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg & Hultsch, 1987; Hultsch, Hertzog & Dixon, 1987).  
 
The aim of this study was to assess Self-Awareness (cf. Level 4 of the HoP model, Stuss et al., 
2001), and to extend current knowledge of metamemory beliefs in ageing by using multiple 
self-report measures of abilities, focusing on memory knowledge and capabilities, memory 
functioning in demanding situations, and cognitive and behavioural changes. Awareness and 
reporting of personal abilities may be influenced by level of cognition, socially desirable 
responding, and/or affect (e.g. Derouesné et al., 1999; Kashiwa et al., 2005; Rabbitt & Abson, 
1991), and the current study examined the effect of these potentially confounding variables.  
 
6.1. Introduction. 
 
6.1.1. Assessment of Metamemory in Ageing.   189 
 
The measurement of metamemory beliefs has a long history in the metacognitive literature, 
and typically takes the form of questionnaires. The Metamemory In Adulthood questionnaire 
(MIA; Dixon et al., 1988) was designed as a multidimensional measure of self-referent beliefs 
about memory functioning and knowledge of memory processes (see Table 6.1). There are 
consistent findings of age-related differences in some of the MIA subscales: Capacity, 
Change, and Locus (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983; Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg & Hultsch, 1987; 
Hultsch, Hertzog & Dixon, 1987), indicating that older adults perceive that they have reduced 
memory capabilities, more memory decline over time, and less internalised control over their 
memory. However, there are mixed results with regard to the Strategy subscale. Only Hultsch 
et al. (1987), for example, found that older adults reported employing more strategies to 
support their memory performance than younger adults. Dixon and Hultsch (1983) identified 
two subcomponents of the Strategy subscale: Retrieval (internal mnemonic strategies) and 
Physical Reminders (external memory aids), and observed numerical differences in that older 
adults used Physical Reminders to a greater extent and Retrieval to a lesser extent compared to 
younger adults. However, McDonald-Miszczak et al. (1995), who also split the Strategy 
subscale into its subcomponents, did not find any age differences in either component. 
Although Hultsch et al. (1987) found that older adults employed more strategies to support 
their memory, the Strategy subscale was not separated into its subcomponents, limiting 
knowledge about specific strategy use in older adults. The authors suggested that further 
investigation of strategy use in older adults was warranted.  
 
Despite the work described above, there has been little further investigation of metamemory 
beliefs in ageing in the last decade (however see Verhaeghen, Geraerts & Marcoen, 2000). 
Arguably, these beliefs might have changed given that engagement in cognitively demanding 
activities has been shown to protect against cognitive decline in older age (Coyle, 2003; 
Hultsch, Hertzog, Small & Dixon, 1999), and there has been increased public awareness of the 
benefits of a healthy lifestyle. Increased knowledge of protective factors may influence 
general beliefs about cognition and ageing, termed implicit theories (Hertzog & Hultsch, 
2000), which may impact on metamemory beliefs. It was, therefore, of interest to examine 
whether self-perceptions of memory have changed since the MIA studies reported by Hultsch   192 
identify age-related trends. The results from the Annville sample replicated the previous 
findings from the Victoria sample, in that older adults perceived reduced memory capacity and 
more decline, with a trend for older adults to perceive reduced control over their memory. 
Although there were no group differences in education, vocabulary or self-reported health in 
either sample, the younger adults in the Annville sample were recruited from the community 
and did not have a University education, indicating that age differences in Capacity, Change 
and Locus perceptions were not driven by educational status. Hultsch and colleagues 
concluded that the greatest age-related metamemory differences were between younger 
University students and older community-based adults. There were generally no significant 
differences between the older age groups in the Victoria sample, but linear age-related trends 
were found in the Annville sample. To explore this difference in greater detail, the authors 
conducted a similar, hierarchal regression analysis with year of birth from the older adults 
aged 55-78 years in the Victoria sample. This analysis failed to find any linear trends in 
metamemory beliefs, indicating that findings of significant metamemory differences in this 
age range may be variable. A possible interpretation is that metamemory perceptions do not 
differ between the young-old and old-old, suggesting that these perceptions become 
entrenched at a relatively early age (~ 55 yrs) and may remain stable over time (see also 
McDonald- Miszczak et al., 1995). In support, McDougall (1994) did not find any 
relationships between age and metamemory beliefs in a community-based sample of 169 
adults aged 55 years and over. However, older adults aged 65-79 years reported greater use of 
strategies to support their memory performance compared to the older adults aged 55-65 years 
(McDougall, 1994). 
 
 
6.1.2. Confounding factors. 
 
Differences in metamemory perceptions in ageing have consistently been found (e.g. Dixon & 
Hultsch, 1983; Hertzog et al., 1987; Hultsch et al., 1987), but there has been little 
consideration of potentially confounding factors which may contribute to self-assessment of 
cognitive functioning. A notable exception is the study by Verhaeghen et al. (2000), which 
found that anxiety about memory, as measured by the MIA Anxiety subscale, mediated the   194 
interpreted as indicating awareness deficits in the patient. Discrepancy scores can either be 
positive or negative: positive discrepancies may be obtained when the informant reports 
greater impairment than the patient (anosognosia), whereas negative discrepancies reflect the 
converse - the patient reporting greater deficit than their informant (“hypergnosia”: Michon, 
Deweer, Pillon, Agid & Dubois, 1994, p. 807). Informant reports can be influenced by factors 
such as carer burden (DeBettingnies, Mahurin & Pirozzolo, 1990; Seltzer, Vasterling, Yoder 
& Thompson, 1997), tolerance and understanding of the effects of illness; and patients’ 
overestimation of impairments may be related to depression (Michon et al., 1994). In addition, 
it may not always be assumed that limited awareness is a sign of deficit, as an individual may 
adopt limited awareness as a coping mechanism that prevents them from having to contend 
with something they would rather avoid. Indeed, Clare (2004a) indicated that impairments in 
awareness may serve a protective function to the self-esteem of the patient and found that 
denial of deficits was common in individuals with AD. Self-esteem was not described with 
regard to the biopsychosocial model that Clare (2004b) developed, rather it was presented as a 
possible explanation for why patients may deny impairments in awareness. Clare (2004b) 
suggested that denial of deficits may serve to protect self-esteem; that is, there would be no 
need for the individual to adjust their self-perceptions if they had not acknowledged that they 
were experiencing any problems. Although impairments in awareness are found in individuals 
with diseases of ageing (e.g. AD and Parkinson’s disease), and with brain injury (Section 
1.3.4., Chapter 1), it is not clear the proportion of ‘deficit’ in awareness that is related to 
ageing, level of cognitive function, and the individual’s own coping strategy. It may also be 
considered that these factors are inter-related and that it is not helpful to try and separate them. 
Perhaps of greater importance is the lack of studies with appropriate control groups. Few 
studies employ older adult control samples (however, see e.g. Eslinger et al., 2005); therefore, 
there is a lack of evidence identifying patterns of discrepancy scores on measures of awareness 
in healthy ageing.  
 
6.1.4. Aims of the Study. 
 
The study aimed to investigate Level 4 – Self-Awareness of the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) 
and explored age-related changes in awareness in three complementary ways. Using the MIA   195 
as a measure of metamemory beliefs, the study aimed to replicate previous findings of age-
related differences in the Capacity, Change, Locus and Strategy subscales. As the Strategy 
subscale of the MIA can be separated into two subcomponents, and there is some evidence to 
suggest that there are age-related differences in types of strategies used to support memory, 
internal strategies and external aids were also investigated. Furthermore, two additional self-
report measures of awareness of functioning were administered. The Memory Awareness 
Rating Scale (MARS; Clare, Wilson, Carter, Roth & Hodges, 2002) assesses awareness of the 
functioning of memory in demanding situations. The DEX questionnaire from the Behavioural 
Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome battery (BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, 
Emslie & Evans, 1996), addresses both cognitive and behavioural changes. Both the MARS 
and the DEX have informant versions. The aim was to determine whether changes in 
metamemory were related to awareness of changes in memory more generally, and to changes 
in general cognitive and behavioural functioning, and to explore how these related to 
informant reports in older adults.  
 
The literature suggests that awareness of function is related to anxiety, depression and self-
esteem (Clare 2004a; Rabbitt & Abson, 1991), and relationships between these variables and 
the awareness questionnaires were explored in greater detail. The potentially confounding 
variables of cognitive function, self-esteem and socially desirable responding were also 
considered. Discrepancy scores between the older adults and their informants were calculated 
for the DEX and the MARS to examine patterns of awareness of functioning in healthy older 
adults. In order to assess Self-Awareness (cf. Level 4 of the HoP model; Stuss et al., 2001), 
which is supported by the monitoring of personal abilities, age-effects on awareness of 
functioning were examined. Specifically, the following hypothesis was tested:  
  
1. Older and younger adults differ in awareness functioning as assessed by MIA subscales, and 
by the MARS and DEX, and this may be related to differences in anxiety, self-esteem and/or 
level of cognitive function. 
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6.4. Discussion. 
 
The present study investigated Self-Awareness, the highest level of the HoP model (Stuss et 
al., 2001), in healthy older and younger adults using multiple measures of awareness of 
functioning. Awareness was assessed using self-report measures of memory knowledge and 
abilities (MIA), awareness of memory in demanding situations (MARS) and awareness of 
cognitive and behavioural changes (DEX). As predicted, differences were found in the 
Change, Locus and Strategy subscales of the MIA, supporting previous studies indicating that 
older adults perceive more memory decline over time, less internalised control over their 
memory and report utilising more strategies to support memory performance (Dixon & 
Hultsch, 1983; Hertzog et al., 1987; Hultsch et al., 1987). Furthermore, the current study 
found that older adults relied upon external memory aids to a greater extent than younger 
adults, providing support for the numerical trend indicated by Dixon and Hultsch (1983). 
Although perceptions of Capacity and Change were positively correlated in the older adults, in 
that greater self-reported memory capabilities were related to greater reported stability of 
memory functioning, the study failed to find an age-related difference in perceptions of 
memory capacity. It was expected that a perception of greater change in memory abilities over 
time would be related to increased use of strategies to help memory functioning in older 
adults. Although the correlation was not significant, possibly due to the small sample size, the 
relationship was modest and accounted for 14% of the variance. The G* Power 3 calculation 
program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) revealed that 12 additional participants, to 
provide a sample size of 41 older adults, would have been needed to find a relationship with 
an alpha level of .05, power .80.  
 
Similar to Hultsch et al. (1987) and McDougall (1994), the current study failed to find any 
age-related differences in metamemory perceptions within the older adult sample. Despite 
equivalent awareness of cognitive and behavioural functioning to younger adults, the study 
found evidence of hypergnosia in the older adults, as they reported more cognitive and 
behavioural problems than were reported by their informants. This discrepancy between 
participant and informant was not related to depression in the older adults, or to socially 
desirable responding in the older adult informants. By contrast, the age group difference in   209 
perceptions of control over memory could be accounted for by the higher levels of depression 
in the older than in younger adults. Additionally, general anxiety and depression, as measured 
by the HADS, were related to increased anxiety and stress over memory, reduced memory 
capabilities and more perceived change over time in memory functioning. Higher anxiety and 
stress about memory and greater perceptions of change in memory functioning were highly 
significant and positively correlated in both the older and younger adults. Modest correlations 
were also found in both groups between anxiety about memory and perceptions of memory 
capacity, such that lower perceptions of capacity were associated with greater anxieties about 
memory. In summary, these convergent findings indicate that there is an emotional component 
to awareness of memory functioning, providing support for Abson and Rabbitt (1990; 1991) 
and McDougall (1995).  
 
Despite the relationship between affect (anxiety and depression) and metamemory beliefs, 
self-esteem and social desirability were not related to awareness of functioning in the current 
study. There were, however, modest correlations between greater fluid intelligence in the older 
adults and strategy use, and with fewer reported problems with cognition and behaviour, 
suggesting that level of cognition is related to the use of strategies to support memory 
functioning and awareness of cognitive and behavioural functioning. This is consistent with 
Verhaeghen et al. (2000) who found that anxiety and stress over memory mediated coping 
behaviours. 
 
The present investigation extends our knowledge of metamemory in ageing in three important 
ways. Firstly, this study is one of the first to provide empirical evidence of the use of different 
memory strategies in healthy older adults; Hultsch et al. (1983) only found numerical trends 
for different types of strategy use with age. Secondly, although the older adults perceived 
greater memory decline with time, they reported similar memory capabilities as the younger 
adults. Thirdly, the age-related difference in perceived control over memory was explained by 
increased depression in the older adults.  
 
The current study replicated the finding that older adults report utilising memory strategies to 
a greater extent than younger adults, and extended knowledge by providing evidence that older   210 
adults rely on external memory aids more than younger adults. Dixon and Hultsch (1983) 
observed a trend for younger adults to utilise internal mnemonic strategies more than older 
adults. However, this finding was not supported with the present data, as the scores on this 
subcomponent were similar between groups. The expectation that the perception of memory 
decline over time would be related to increased use of strategies in older adults was supported 
by a moderate correlation. Further investigation of the Strategy subcomponents found that the 
perception of stability in memory abilities over time in older adults was related to the 
increased use of internal mnemonic strategies and not to external memory aids. These results 
indicated a relationship between a belief in memory stability with age and mental techniques, 
for example elaboration and rehearsal, to support memory functioning in older adults. This 
association warrants further investigation as it suggests, despite the greater reliance of the 
older adults on external memory aids compared to younger adults, that the use of mnemonic 
(internalised) techniques was related to positive perceptions of memory abilities over time. 
One implication of this finding is that the teaching of mnemonic strategies to older adults may 
contribute to more optimistic perceptions of memory functioning. It would also be of interest 
to assess whether the teaching of such skills influenced perceptions of control in older adults.  
 
The replication of previous findings on the Change subscale suggests that perceptions of 
memory decline with age are prevalent in older adults. The current study also supports the 
proposition that perceptions of change in memory functioning may become entrenched at a 
relatively early age and may remain stable over time (e.g. Hultsch et al., 1987: Annville 
sample; McDonald-Miszczak et al., 1995; McDougall, 1994). However, contrasting results 
have been found by Hawley, Cherry, Su, Chiu and Jazwinski (2006). These authors, using the 
Knowledge of Memory Aging Questionnaire (KMAQ), found that older adults aged 80+ 
years, endorsed stereotyped views of normal memory ageing more often than did middle age 
adults (40-59 years), and young-old adults (60-79 years). However, the discrepant results may 
be methodological and could have arisen from differences between the focus of the 
questionnaires; stereotypical beliefs in the KMAQ and assessment of memory knowledge and 
abilities in the MIA. It would be of interest to explore any relationships between the two 
questionnaires, to assess potential overlap or whether the factors are complementary.   212 
of accounting for the possible confounding effects of more than just psychological factors on 
metamemory beliefs.  
 
There were no age differences in any of the awareness measures specifically focusing on 
current functioning and abilities (Capacity, DEX and MARS), suggesting that awareness of 
abilities does not alter as a function of healthy ageing. As little is known about deficits in 
awareness in healthy ageing, the present study also contributes to this body of knowledge. 
This finding was not due to the groups failing to report any difficulties on any measure as both 
groups reported some problems with cognitive and/or behavioural functioning; suggesting that 
both younger and older adults were aware of limitations in their abilities. Furthermore, no 
positive discrepancies, presumed to reflect impaired awareness, were found between the older 
adults’ reports and the assessments provided by their informants. In fact, the converse was 
found on the DEX questionnaire, in that the informants reported that the older adults presented 
with fewer problems with cognition and behaviour than the older adults perceived in 
themselves. This finding is not easily explained. Initially it was thought that socially desirable 
responding by the informants influenced their assessments; perhaps also a degree of denial 
that there might be any problem with their relative. However, social desirability was assessed 
within this group and these scores were not indicative of socially desirable response bias. It 
would be of interest to assess the prevalence of hypergnosia in normal ageing, particularly as 
studies have found that older adults underestimated their performance (Abson & Rabbitt, 
1991; Ansell & Bucks, 2006). However, given that awareness in the current study was 
measured by self-report questionnaires, future studies would benefit from determining the 
accuracy of these perceptions by measuring prediction and postdiction of objective task 
performance. It would be of particular importance to involve informants in such predictions so 
as to be able to determine the degree to which any deficits in prediction accuracy might be a 
general function of poor judgement rather than a specific age-related deficit in self-awareness 
(Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996). 
 
Hertzog and Hultsch (2000) suggested that metamemory beliefs in older adults may be related 
to “subjective well-being” (p. 459). Awareness, as indexed by metamemory perceptions, may 
contain an emotional component, and the present study has provided evidence for this   213 
proposition. Firstly, depression in the older adults accounted for the age-related difference in 
perceived control over memory functioning. Previous studies using the MIA have rarely 
investigated the possible influence of affect on beliefs (however, see McDougall, 1995); 
therefore the current study extends knowledge regarding the variables that may contribute to 
metamemory perceptions in ageing. The study also offers support for Rabbitt and Abson 
(1990; 1991) who found that depression was related to perceptions of cognitive problems in 
older adults. Secondly, anxiety, as measured by the HADS, was related to increased levels of 
anxiety and stress about memory, the perception of more decline over time, and reduced 
memory capacities. Clare (2004a), based on an exhaustive review of anosognosia in AD, 
suggested that impairments in awareness may serve a protective function for self-esteem, in 
that patients may deny the existence or extent of problems to avoid having to accept and/or 
acknowledge decline. The present study found similar ratings of self-esteem between the 
groups, and that self-esteem was not related to the measures of awareness. However, the study 
was not designed to assess the protective effect of self-esteem, and an exploration of the 
relationship between self-esteem and awareness is restricted within the current study as ageing 
was not found to be associated with deficits in awareness of functioning, as measured by 
participant-informant discrepancy scores.  
 
 
6.4.1. Summary. 
 
The current study investigated Self-Awareness (Stuss et al., 2001), a type of awareness 
dependent on the ability to monitor the self and personal abilities. These data suggest that 
ageing is not associated with significant impairments in awareness of functioning and level of 
ability, despite the older adults’ perception of decline in memory function over time, which 
may be related more to societal expectation than based on significant levels of actual decline. 
Perhaps as may have been expected, the study has also shown that expressions of awareness 
have an emotional component. More generally, these findings contribute to the documentation 
of awareness in healthy normal ageing. 
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Each of the studies presented thus far in this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) has investigated 
different types of awareness in ageing. Tests were used that were operationalised to be related 
to the different levels of awareness in Stuss and colleagues’ model. Although evidence was 
found of subtle differences between age groups (Table 7.1), results were interpreted to suggest 
intra-connectivity (within-level functioning) in the HoP model was generally similar in 
healthy younger and older adults. Importantly, this does not preclude statistical exploration of 
the inter-connectivity between Levels 2-4 of the HoP model within the two age-groups. Given 
that the participants were awake and interacting normally during testing, it was assumed that 
Level 1 – Arousal (a dimension from coma to waking state) was functional such that 
relationships with Level 1 were not explored. Simply stated, it was of additional interest to 
consider the possibility that the inter-connectivity between HoP levels differs between 
younger and older adults.   
 
 
7.1. Introduction. 
 
The previous three chapters investigated Levels 2-4 of the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001). The 
excellent temporal resolution, and sensitivity to experimental manipulations, of event-related 
potentials (ERPs) provided on-line measurement of the timing of cognitive processes. 
Although the spatial resolution of ERPs is poor, due to the volume conductance properties of 
the brain, intra-cranial recording of electrical activity using depth electrodes (e.g. Halgren et 
al., 1995), and dipole localisation (e.g. Senkowski et al., 2003; van Veen & Carter, 2002) 
studies have identified neural generators of the components measured at the surface of the 
scalp. Stuss and colleagues (2001) specified the neural candidature, and the cognitive 
processes involved in different types of awareness. The experimental ERP paradigms utilised 
to operationalise Levels 2 and 3 of the model, were considered to provide behavioural data 
corresponding to the processes within each level, and review of the literature indicated that the 
selected ERP components were associated with neural generators located in regions specified 
by the model for these levels.   
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Sensorimotor Awareness, at Level 2, relies on sensory processing within posterior regions 
(association cortices) of the brain, and was operationalised by the N1 (Chapter 4). More 
specifically, the N1 has been linked to initial, attentional capture of stimuli, and its neural 
generator has been located in the superior temporal plane (Halgren et al., 1995). The P3 
component has been associated with the allocation of attention to the updating of pre-existing 
mental representations (Polich, 1996) and is generated by more widespread activity in the 
temporal lobes and prefrontal cortex (Halgren et al., 1995; Halgren et al., 1998). The novelty 
auditory oddball paradigm provided measurements of the degree and timing of attentional 
processing of sensory (auditory) information, including target recognition and novelty 
processing.  
 
Consistent Consciousness, at Level 3, involves the ability to organise sensory information 
underlying behaviour and executive functioning, and was operationalised by assessing 
performance monitoring (Chapter 5). The ERP correlates of performance monitoring were the 
N2, ERN, CRN and Pe components, the neural generators of which are located within the 
frontal lobes: anterior cingulate cortex (van Veen & Carter, 2002), pre-supplementary motor 
area (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006), lateral prefrontal cortex (Gehring & Knight, 2000; 
Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006), and white matter tracts connecting these regions (Hogan et 
al, 2006). Stimulus processing in the context of performance monitoring was also investigated 
using the P3b, generated by the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus and 
the hippocampus (Halgren et al., 1995; Halgren et al., 1998); due to the presence of ‘Stroop-
like’ conflicting information in the 4-CRT paradigm, this P3 component represents more 
complex cognitive activity than that reflected in the novelty auditory oddball P3 component. 
In addition, the performance monitoring paradigm provided behavioural measures of reaction 
time, correct and error performance, and the remedial actions of error correction and post-error 
slowing.  
 
The highest level of the model, Self-Awareness, Level 4, arises from the monitoring of the self 
and personal abilities (Chapter 6). This was assessed using self-report measures of awareness 
of cognitive and behavioural functioning, and metamemory perceptions. Chapter 6 also 
examined the influence of affect on metamemory perceptions. Interestingly, the HoP model    218 
proposed that Self-Awareness is supported by the inter-connectivity between the frontal lobes 
and limbic system. The limbic system is the term used to describe a number of structures lying 
at the border of the cerebral cortex and hypothalamus, including the cingulate, 
parahippocampal gyri, hippocampal formation, amygdalae, and anterior thalamic nucleus 
(Snell 2006), and although tracts arising from the cingulate cortex predominantly connect with 
the hippocampus (Snell 2006), the amygdala is also connected with these structures, and plays 
an important role in emotion processing (Gallagher & Chiba, 1996). In summary, connectivity 
between the frontal cortex and limbic system is proposed to facilitate interaction between 
cognitive and emotional aspects of Self-Awareness. As shown in Table 7.1, there were 
differential age-related effects on the measures of awareness at each level. 
 
 
7.1.1. Aims of the Study. 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate if the different types of awareness (HoP levels) were 
similarly correlated with each other in younger and older age groups. Significant correlations 
between measures associated with the different levels would provide support for the 
proposition that each level is inter-connected. A different pattern of correlation in younger and 
older adults would suggest functional differences at the level of interconnectivity of awareness 
in normal ageing. 
 
These aims were addressed using correlation analyses. In addition, given that affect was found 
to influence metamemory perceptions, but was not related to any of the ERP components (see 
Chapters 4 and 5), separate partial correlations, controlling for anxiety and depression, were 
conducted (Level 3 – Consistent Consciousness and Level 4 – Self-Awareness). The following 
hypotheses were explored. 
 
1. Operationalisations of Sensorimotor Awareness and Consistent Consciousness (Levels 2 
and 3) would be related to each other within each age group.  
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7.2.2. Variables Included in Analyses. 
 
1) Novelty Auditory Oddball Paradigm (described in Chapter 4). 
 
i) N1 amplitude from standard stimuli at Fz/Cz/Pz 
ii) N1 amplitude from target stimuli at Fz/Cz/Pz 
iii) N1 amplitude from novel stimuli at Fz/Cz/Pz 
iv) P3 amplitude from standard stimuli at Fz/Cz/Pz 
v) P3 amplitude from target stimuli at Fz/Cz/Pz 
vi) P3 amplitude from novel stimuli at Fz/Cz/Pz 
 
2) 4-Choice Response ERP Task (Hogan et al., 2005) (described in Chapter 5). 
 
i) N2 amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
ii) P3b amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
iii) N4 amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
iv) SW amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
v) CRN amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
vi) ERN amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
vii) Pe amplitude (compatible and incompatible conditions) 
 
3) Metamemory In Adulthood (MIA; Dixon, Hultsch & Hertzog, 1988) (described in Chapters 
3 and 6).  
 
i) Achievement (perception of a good memory and its importance) 
ii) Anxiety (anxiety over memory performance 
iii) Capacity (perception of memory capabilities) 
iv) Change (belief regarding memory abilities over time) 
v) Locus (perception of control over memory) 
vi) Strategy (use of strategies for memory performance); divided into External and Internal 
(external memory aids and internal mnemonic) strategies   223 
younger adults allocate a similar amount of attention to stimuli requiring a response in a 
simple sensory processing paradigm and to stimuli with greater stimulus-response 
incompatibility in the 4-CRT.  
 
Contrary to the prediction that there would be group differences in the pattern of correlations 
between groups in each level comparison, there were no significant differences between 
groups in the magnitude of any of the correlations. These results indicate that, despite the 
correlations suggesting a different pattern of relationships between measures of awareness in 
each group, the groups were not significantly different in the magnitude of any of the 
associations. 
 
 
7.3.2. Comparison between Level 3 - Consistent Consciousness and Level 4 – Self-Awareness. 
 
As indicated in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, older and younger adults, respectively, measures of 
awareness at Level 3 were related to measures at Level 4 in both groups. In the older adults, 
better conflict monitoring of incompatible stimuli, as indexed by higher N2 amplitude, was 
related to increased perceptions of memory capabilities (Capacity). Error detection in the 
compatible condition of the 4-CRT was also related to perceptions of control over memory 
functioning (Locus). In addition, better error processing in the compatible condition, as 
indexed by Pe amplitude, was associated with strategy use (Strategy), and mnemonic internal 
strategies (Internal Strategy). Relationships between remedial actions after errors and 
measures of Self-Awareness were also found in the older adults. Higher rate of error 
correction in the incompatible condition was associated with greater knowledge of memory 
processes (Task). Longer post-error slowing after errors in the compatible condition was 
linked with perceptions of greater memory capabilities (Capacity), more control over memory 
(Locus) and fewer problems in memory demanding situations. Longer post-error slowing in 
the incompatible condition was related to the perception of greater stability in memory over 
time (MIA Change). With regard to relationships with affect in the older adults, higher level of 
depression, as measured by the HADS, was related to increased feelings of stress and anxiety   224 
over memory functioning (Anxiety), the perception of reduced memory capabilities 
(Capacity), and a belief in greater decline in memory over time (Change).  
 
In the younger adults, increased conflict monitoring in the incompatible condition, again 
measured by N2 amplitude, was associated with perceptions of more control over memory 
(Locus), and fewer reports of cognitive and behavioural problems, as measured by the DEX. 
In addition, the increased allocation of attentional processing of both compatible and 
incompatible stimuli, as indexed by P3b amplitudes, was related to perceptions of better 
memory capabilities (Capacity), more control over memory functioning (Locus), and fewer 
reported problems in memory demanding situations, as measured by the MARS. The P3b 
amplitude in the incompatible condition was also associated with the perception of greater 
memory stability over time (Change). Similarly to the older adults, better error detection in the 
compatible condition was related to perceptions of greater control over memory functioning 
(Locus), greater internal strategy use (Internal Strategy), and knowledge of memory processes 
(Task). Increased error detection in the incompatible condition was also related to strategy use 
(Strategy), particularly internal mnemonic strategies (Internal Strategy), and reduced feelings 
of stress and anxiety over memory functioning (Anxiety). Better error processing, as indexed 
by Pe amplitude, in the compatible condition was related to the use of external aids to support 
memory performance (External Strategy). Relationships between remedial behaviours and 
metamemory perceptions were also found in the younger adults. Higher rate of error 
correction in the compatible condition was associated with perceptions of better memory 
capabilities (Capacity). Whilst longer post-error slowing in the compatible condition was 
linked to greater strategy use to support memory functioning (Strategy), the use of internal 
strategies (Internal Strategy), and more knowledge of memory processes (Task). As with the 
older adults, relationships were found with affect and measures of Self-Awareness. Increased 
level of anxiety, as measured by the HADS, was related to greater feelings of anxiety and 
stress over memory (Anxiety), reduced perceptions of memory capabilities (Capacity), belief 
in greater change in memory over time (Change), and more reported cognitive and behavioural 
problems, as measured by the DEX. Higher level of depression, also measured by the HADS, 
was associated with more feelings of stress and anxiety over memory functioning (Anxiety), 
and more reported cognitive and behavioural problems.    230 
7.4. Discussion. 
 
The aim of this study was to explore whether there were relationships between the measures of 
awareness operationalising the different levels of the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001), and to 
investigate if the pattern of correlations differed between younger and older participants. The 
study found evidence of relationships between measures at each level comparison within each 
group, in support of the inter-connectivity proposed by Stuss and colleagues. Despite different 
patterns of correlations within each group in each level comparison, there were few 
differences between the groups, which indicated that the magnitude of the associations 
between measures of awareness related in one group, but not another, were similar. The 
implication of these findings were that there were few age-related differences in the inter-
connectivity of the levels of awareness, and where there were age differences, this was 
because associations were significant in younger adults, not older adults. The relationship 
between Levels 2 and 3 of the HoP model are considered first.  
 
Significant associations were found between measures at Level 2 – Sensorimotor Awareness 
and Level 3 – Consistent Consciousness in both groups. Target P3 amplitude elicited in the 
novelty auditory oddball was related to P3b amplitudes in both conditions of the 4-CRT, and 
between the initial attentional capture of novel stimuli and conflict monitoring, as indexed by 
the N2, in the older adults. In the younger adults, significant relationships were found between 
novelty P3 amplitude and P3b amplitude in both conditions. Similar to the younger adults, 
moderate correlations, albeit not significant, were found in the older adults between novelty 
P3 amplitude and P3b amplitudes in both conditions. These findings suggest that the 
processing of sensory information underlying Level 2 may also be relevant to the organising 
of sensory information underlying behaviour at Level 3, therefore, the processing involved in 
these levels may overlap to some degree. Although these P3 relationships have indicated that 
attentional processing is similar in a simple sensory paradigm and a more complex executive 
task, the associations do not inform on the inter-connectivity of the HoP model. More 
specifically, in the current study, the target P3 and P3b are similar components, in terms of 
function, time frame for peak detection, and neural generators. One of the inherent challenges 
in comparing stimulus-locked components associated with attentional processing in two   231 
separate paradigms is the overlap in the cognitive processes. However, one of the issues with 
the definitions of the different types of awareness in the HoP model is the distinction between 
sensory processing at Level 2 and the organisation of sensory information at Level 3, which 
have been operationalised using the P3 component. Although, this is a limitation to the 
investigation of the inter-connectivity of the HoP model, it is important to acknowledge that 
this issue of component overlap is not relevant in the testing of the individual levels of 
awareness. Assessing attentional processing is fundamental to an investigation of performance 
monitoring, and particularly as the definition of Consistent Consciousness states that this type 
of awareness involves the organisation of sensory information. 
 
Significant associations were also found in each group between measures at Level 3 – 
Consistent Consciousness and Level 4 – Self-Awareness. Better error detection in the 
compatible condition was significantly associated with increased perceptions of control over 
memory functioning in the older adults. There were also significant relationships between 
longer post-error slowing in the compatible condition and the perception of greater memory 
capabilities, and greater post-error slowing in the incompatible condition and the belief of 
greater stability in memory functioning over time. Moderate associations were found between 
longer post-error slowing in the compatible condition and with perceptions of more control 
over memory and fewer reported problems with memory demanding situations. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that older adults’ self-reported awareness of memory 
functioning and abilities were related to the degree of the detection of mistakes in a rapidly 
presented four choice reaction time task, as well as the degree to which they slowed down 
after making such errors. These findings are consistent with the proposed inter-connectivity in 
the HoP model.  
 
In the younger adults, better error detection and longer post-error slowing in the compatible 
condition were linked to better knowledge of memory processes. Additionally, increased 
allocation of attentional processing of stimuli (both compatible and incompatible) was 
associated with fewer reported problems with memory demanding situations. Attentional 
processing of compatible stimuli in the younger adults was also significantly related to the 
perception of increased memory capabilities. Moderate and strong correlations, however, not   232 
significant, were again identified between the measures of awareness. Similarly to the older 
adults, a strong positive correlation between error detection in the compatible condition and 
perception of control over memory functioning was found. Despite some subtle differences 
between the age groups, these findings also fit well with the HoP model in that individuals 
who reported fewer problems, and individuals who felt knowledgeable about the functioning 
of their memory were those better able to detect they had made errors, who adjusted their 
speed post errors to compensate, and who were better able to allocate attentional resources to 
stimuli. 
 
Whilst better error detection in the incompatible condition was strongly related to strategy use 
in the younger adults, the use of strategies and, in particular, internal mnemonic strategies 
were also strongly associated with longer post-error slowing. Moreover, error detection in both 
conditions in the younger adults was moderately associated with the use of internal mnemonic 
strategies to support memory functioning. Higher rates of error correction in the compatible 
condition in the younger adults were moderately related to perceptions of increased memory 
capabilities. In contrast, increased strategy use and, in particular, internal strategies were 
moderately related to error processing in the compatible condition in older adults, whilst in the 
younger adults, error processing in the compatible condition was strongly associated with the 
use of external memory aids. These associations suggest that better performance monitoring 
abilities were linked with more positive beliefs about memory abilities and the utilisation of 
strategies to support memory functioning.  
 
The relationship between affect and Self-Awareness was further investigated, and higher 
levels of anxiety and depression, as measured by the HADS, were significantly associated 
with greater feelings of stress and anxiety over memory in both groups. Moreover, those who 
reported more anxiety generally, whether older or younger, also reported a greater number of 
cognitive and behavioural problems, as measured by the DEX. Additionally, in the older 
adults, individuals reporting more depression generally also reported reduced memory 
capabilities and believed in greater change in memory functioning over time. By contrast, in 
younger adults, greater general anxiety rather than depression was related to greater   233 
perceptions that memory capabilities were worse, and that memory functioning had changed 
more over time.  
 
These findings are consistent with the discriminant validity analyses reported by Dixon et al. 
(1988), who found that the MIA Anxiety subscale was related to state and trait anxiety, 
however, the relationship with depression was in contrast to Dixon et al. (1988) who found 
that depression did not correlate with the Anxiety subscale. Dixon et al. (1988) employed a 
different range of mood scales which may account for the different findings in this study. 
Nevertheless, both groups’ scores on the HADS subscales were in the normal range (0-7; 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), which suggests that increased anxiety and depression, indicated by 
even subtle differences within the normal range, influenced metamemory perceptions. These 
findings suggest that there is an emotional component to Self-Awareness, providing further 
support for previous studies linking metamemory beliefs with affect (e.g. Abson & Rabbitt, 
1990; 1991; McDougall, 1995; Verheagen et al., 2000).  
 
The inter-connectivity of the levels in the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) described how the 
processes underlying the different types of awareness could interact, and the potential for 
deficits at one level to be transmitted to the next level. The current study also found some 
evidence of relationships between measures at different levels that had age-related reductions. 
Older adults had lower target P3 amplitudes (Level 2 – Sensorimotor Awareness, see Chapter 
4), and lower P3b amplitudes in both conditions of the 4-CRT (Level 3 – Consistent 
Consciousness, see Chapter 5) compared to younger adults. These measures were also 
significantly associated, indicating that the older adults with lower target P3 amplitudes in the 
Level 2 measures also had lower P3b amplitudes in the Level 3 measures. Significantly lower 
Pe amplitude in the compatible condition (Level 3 – Consistent Consciousness, see Chapter 5) 
was found in the older adults, yet this group reported increased use of strategies to support 
memory functioning (Level 4 – Self-Awareness, see Chapter 6). Of note, is the relationship 
between these measures; attenuated Pe amplitude was associated with the use of fewer 
strategies. These findings offer some support for the proposition that impairments at one level 
may be connected to deficits at a higher level. However, support was also found for the 
proposition that impairments at lower levels can be circumvented by processes at higher   234 
levels, as there were no behavioural performance differences between younger and older 
adults in the novelty auditory oddball or the 4-CRT; measures indexing Level 2 and 3 
performance.  
 
It is possible, however, that relationships between ERP measures may be more related to a 
global reduction in the power of ERP components than to a relationship between levels of 
awareness of functioning. In other words, the relationship between the P3 elicited by target 
stimuli in the novelty auditory oddball (Level 2) and the P3b elicited by the Level 3 4-CRT 
measure in older adults may simply reflect generalised loss of power, rather than a causal 
relationship between these measures of awareness. However, a generalised reduction in power 
would be expected to involve all ERP components studied, and this was not the case: not all 
ERP components were correlated in either group.  
 
The current study has provided two sources of evidence in the assessment of the HoP model 
(Stuss et al., 2001). The first is the within-level (intra-connectivity) age group differences 
detailed in Chapters 4-6. The second is the correlational analysis of inter-connectivity detailed 
in the present study. As noted in the Introduction, Stuss et al. (2001) described how the inter-
connectivity of the HoP model was supported by the functioning of numerous modules within 
each level. The current data are based on an extrapolation of this theory rather than a test of 
Stuss et al.’s (2001) specific modules, the operationalisations of which have not been provided 
by Stuss or his colleagues. However, based on the presence of correlations between measures 
operationalising the HoP levels, it may be concluded that the current findings are compatible 
with the inter-connectivity view specified within the model (Stuss et al., 2001). The presence 
of null findings also suggests the possibility that the measures selected were not fully 
representative of Stuss et al.’ (2001) levels of awareness, or that only some modules within a 
level facilitate inter-connectivity with other modules. Moreover, caution must be taken in 
interpreting the correlations reported herein due to the small sample sizes. Clearly, replication 
with larger samples is warranted. 
 
However, despite the relatively small samples reported, this studies offers novel findings. 
Only one previous study (O’Keefe et al., 2007) has utilised a multidimensional assessment of   235 
different types of awareness in individuals with traumatic brain injury. This study investigated 
metacognitive awareness, associated with knowledge about the self, and on-line emergent and 
anticipatory awareness; the awareness that a problem exists, and the understanding that the 
impairment was causing a problem. O’Keefe et al. (2007) correlated composite scores 
representing the different types of awareness and found that on-line emergent and anticipatory 
awareness were highly related, and were operationalised by error monitoring on a sustained 
attention task, and by discrepancy scores between predicted and actual performance on two 
subtests of the Wechsler memory scale. However, the relationship between these types of 
awareness may have been due to the measures tapping into different aspects of performance 
monitoring; better error monitoring was associated with more accurate assessment of abilities. 
In support of the separation of metacognitive knowledge and on-line awareness described by 
Toglia and Kirk (2000, see Section 1.3.4.1.2, Chapter 1), O’Keefe et al. (2007) found that 
metacognitive knowledge, as measured by an awareness interview and discrepancy between 
predicted neuropsychological test performance and actual performance, and patient-proxy 
discrepancies on three questionnaires regarding functioning, was not related either to emergent 
or to anticipatory awareness. This suggests a separation between knowledge and awareness of 
the self and on-line awareness of performance. The former relating to self-awareness and 
knowledge about personal abilities and level of functioning, the latter referring to immediate 
awareness of the environment and behaviour and experience of activity. Evidence for self-
awareness can be found in the self-report of functioning in this thesis and from 
prediction/performance discrepancies in O’Keefe et al. (2007), whilst error monitoring is an 
example of on-line awareness of performance (see Chapter 5 and O’Keefe et al., 2007). 
 
There are similarities in the operationalisations employed to assess the HoP model (Stuss et 
al., 2001), the concepts of metacognitive knowledge and on-line awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000), and the operationalisation of emergent anticipatory awareness (O’Keefe et al., 2007). 
The current study operationalised Self-Awareness with the assessment of metamemory 
perceptions and self-reports of cognitive abilities, which is similar to the self knowledge 
component of metacognitive knowledge described by Toglia and Kirk (2000). Furthermore, 
Sensorimotor Awareness and Consistent Consciousness were assessed by ERP components 
which measure brain functioning underlying the processing of sensory information and   236 
cognitive functions in ‘real’ time, and correspond to situational, on-line awareness (Toglia & 
Kirk, 2000). Performance monitoring was used to operationalise Consistent Consciousness, 
and is comparable to the self-monitoring aspect of on-line awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000), 
whilst the error monitoring paradigm employed by O’Keefe et al. (2007) is an alternative 
measure of on-line performance monitoring. Importantly, and in contrast to the null finding of 
a relationship between metacognitive knowledge and on-line awareness in O’Keefe et al. 
(2007), the current study found that metamemory perceptions and self-report of abilities were 
related to neural and behavioural aspects of performance monitoring. Despite the difference in 
results of relationships between metacognition and on-line monitoring abilities in the present 
study and in O’Keefe et al. (2007), the corresponding concepts in the different models suggest 
the existence of two types of awareness (cf. Toglia & Kirk, 2000); metacognitive self-
awareness and on-line performance monitoring. The contribution of the HoP model (Stuss et 
al., 2001) is in the separation of on-line awareness into the component aspects of the initial 
processing of sensory and bodily information (Sensorimotor Awareness), and the ability to 
organise sensory input which underlies effective and adaptive behaviour (Consistent 
Consciousness).  
 
The current study found some indirect evidence of the hierarchical structure of the HoP model, 
as correlations were found in both groups between Levels 2-4 of the model. Furthermore, 
evidence was found of deficits in the older adults at one level, being associated with deficits at 
a higher level. Reduced error processing in the older adults was also associated with the use of 
fewer strategies to support memory functioning, supporting the proposition that deficits at one 
level can be transmitted to higher levels. The operationalisations of the levels of awareness did 
not facilitate testing of the concept that higher levels could exert compensatory influence over 
lower levels. However, it is possible that the neuronal firing involved in less positive 
metamemory beliefs may be associated with the firing underlying reduced amplitude and 
longer latency ERP components. However, this is purely speculative as the neurophysiology 
underlying metacognition is not known. This conceptualisation of higher levels exerting 
compensatory influence on reduced functioning at lower levels is another example of 
descriptions being included into the HoP model to explain every possible outcome. This poses 
significant challenges to empirical investigation, and means that the model cannot be fully   237 
tested. Future research could include functional imaging data and measures of white matter 
integrity, as it is not known from the current data whether there are any structural differences 
in the older adults which may have contributed to the differences found in the ERP 
components. Following the assumption that brain function underlies each type of awareness, 
provision for the measurement of how the regions involved in each type of awareness 
communicate would be helpful. Without such data, it is not possible to assess the concept of 
inter-connectivity, nor is it possible fully to test the HoP model. For example, a relationship 
was found between the N1 and the N2, the former ERP component is generated in the superior 
temporal plane, whereas the N2 is generated in the ACC. This relationship may be a product 
of the statistical analysis undertaken in this study, or there may be an association between the 
neural generators and/or the cognitions of attentional capture and conflict monitoring. Further 
studies could clarify such propositions. Nonetheless, the current study provides early and 
exciting indirect evidence for relationships between each type of awareness.  
 
 
7.4.1. Summary. 
 
The value of the current study was that significant relationships were identified and provided 
statistical evidence for the inter-connectivity of the HoP model. The study found that 
reductions in attentional processing were similar across two different paradigms. The 
independent and significant impact of affect on perceptions of memory functioning and 
abilities was replicated in the current study. Most significantly, the study found, irrespective of 
age group, that neural error detection signals were associated with perceptions of control over 
memory abilities, and error processing with the use of internal mnemonic strategies and 
external memory aids, suggesting a link between brain functioning and Self-Awareness. 
Although the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) was developed to account for deficits in 
awareness in patients with brain lesions, the studies presented in this thesis have indicated that 
the model is also applicable to an investigation of different types of awareness in a healthy 
ageing population.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate awareness in a healthy ageing population. Despite the 
historical development of awareness as a concept amenable to empirical investigation, and the 
incidence of deficits in awareness in diseases of ageing, the degree of change in awareness 
with normal ageing is not well established. Deficits in awareness are also found in 
neurological conditions (e.g. acquired and traumatic brain injury), lending validity to the close 
association between awareness and brain functioning.  
Experimental psychology has proposed that awareness may be separated into levels or 
component parts, such as error monitoring. Further, contemporary neurological models of 
awareness (e.g. Stuss et al., 2001) have described specific processes underlying different 
forms of awareness. Any changes in awareness in older adulthood occur against a background 
of more general brain and cognitive change, and it may not be assumed that such changes 
influence all forms of awareness equally. The HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) provided a 
theoretical framework for the investigation of different levels of awareness in healthy ageing. 
Cognitive neuroscience techniques were employed alongside more traditional measures of 
awareness to operationalise the conceptualisations of awareness described by Stuss et al. 
(2001).  
 
This thesis has contributed to, and extended knowledge of awareness in ageing in four 
important ways. Firstly, this thesis has provided evidence of age-related differences in the 
measures chosen to represent the levels of awareness described by Stuss et al. (2001). 
Secondly, by utilising a multi-method approach to assessing awareness it was possible to 
demonstrate subtle effects of ageing (e.g. attenuation of selected ERP components), in the 
absence of any effect on other measures (e.g. neuropsychological tests). Thirdly, the thesis 
was unique in providing empirical support for inter-connectivity proposed in the HoP model, 
although this finding requires replication with larger numbers of participants. Fourthly, it was 
intended to demonstrate the efficacy of combining theoretical (HoP model) and neuroscientific 
(ERP) approaches in order to investigate a psychological concept considered by many to be 
too nebulous for scientific study. It was not the purpose of this thesis to confirm the definition   239 
of awareness as described by Stuss and colleagues (2001), but to explore the feasibility of this 
model as a basis for interpreting multiple sources of data proposed to test awareness function 
in normal healthy ageing. As stated in the first chapter, the aim of this thesis was not to 
redefine awareness, but to operationalise conceptualisations of awareness to investigate 
different types of awareness in ageing. Despite the lack of empirical evidence currently 
available to support the theoretical basis for the inter-connectivity of the HoP model, the 
model provided specific definitions of awareness that were amenable to empirical 
investigation in healthy ageing. Although a multitude of awareness models has been 
developed, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there were difficulties with all of the models.  
 
The HoP model provided four descriptions of awareness, of which three were operationalised 
and assessed in the current thesis. It was assumed that the Arousal level of awareness was 
functional as all participants were awake when tested. This thesis investigated Sensorimotor 
Awareness through an investigation of auditory attentional processing; Consistent 
Consciousness was operationalised by performance monitoring, of which there are multiple 
aspects; and Self-Awareness was measured by self-report of current functioning and 
metamemory perceptions. The evidence provided within this thesis for each type of awareness 
can be found in Chapters 4-6.  
 
Both younger and older adults similarly processed novel stimuli indicating that their 
awareness of their environment was functioning (see Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, the ERN 
component associated with the internal detection of errors in performance was found in both 
younger and older adults (albeit attenuated in the older adults), alongside equivalent 
behavioural performance of a complex executive task, and similar postdiction reports of 
performance indicating that both groups were able to monitor and were aware of their 
performance. As shown in Chapter 6, both younger and older adults reported some problems 
with their current functioning, indicating awareness of their personal abilities. The conclusion 
of this thesis is that awareness is a multidimensional construct, that includes (but not 
exclusively) on-line awareness which relates to immediate awareness of the environment and 
performance of tasks, and self-awareness which involves metacognitions and assessment of 
functions and abilities.    241 
by investigating ERP components associated with target and novel stimuli in older and 
younger adults.  
 
Target P3 amplitude at parietal regions, representing the amount of attention allocated to 
processing stimuli, was attenuated in older adults supporting earlier studies (Amenedo & Diaz, 
1998; Chao & Knight, 1997b; Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993; Iragui et al., 
1993; Polich, 1997; Weisz & Czigler, 2006). An increase in the frontal orientation of target P3 
activity was also found in the older adults, consistent with previous studies (Amenedo & Diaz, 
1998; Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993; Iragui et al., 1993). This frontal 
aspect of the target P3 in older adults has been suggested to represent an impairment in the 
ability to construct and sustain mental representations of stimuli (Fabiani & Friedman, 1995). 
Frontal-dominant topography of activity is also similar to that found for novel stimuli in both 
younger and older adults (Fabiani & Friedman, 1995; Friedman et al., 1993). Therefore, and 
consistent with Fabiani and Friedman (1995), even target stimuli may have been treated as 
‘novel’ by the older adults, and/or target stimuli required greater levels of attention in older 
adults.  
 
The latency of the novelty P3 was significantly delayed in the older adults, indicating a longer 
time to process novel stimuli, and possibly longer disengagement from processing such stimuli 
(Weisz and Czigler, 2006). Previous studies have not reported the P3 to standard stimuli, and 
the current study found that older adults had significantly increased P3 amplitude and shorter 
latency to standard stimuli compared to younger adults; suggesting a greater amount of 
attention is more quickly allocated to processing frequent, but irrelevant stimuli. Alongside the 
increase in frontal novelty P3 amplitude with novel stimuli repetition in older adults, this 
suggests that there is reduced ability to inhibit the processing of irrelevant stimuli. In other 
words, each stimulus may be treated more as ‘new’ than ‘familiar’ (cf. Amenedo & Diaz, 
1998), but it is not confirmed if this is due to a failure of memory or an increased allocation of 
attention, or both. 
 
The current study supported previous findings of a lack of habituation to novelty with 
increasing age (Friedman et al., 1997; Friedman & Simpson, 1994; Weisz & Czigler, 2006),   244 
differences in the electrophysiological correlates of performance monitoring, there were few 
behavioural differences between younger and older adults. This suggests that any underlying 
‘deficit’ or ‘strategy-difference’ was not sufficient to impair the behavioural performance of 
the task, and provides further evidence that altered ERP components in older adults may 
reflect adaptation to normal changes in brain structure and function, not necessarily deficit.  
 
In summary, subtle age-related differences were found in electrophysiological aspects of 
performance monitoring, which may indicate altered Consistent Consciousness in older adults. 
However, effective remedial actions and response strategies were found, suggesting that 
performance monitoring was functional in the older adults, and that compensatory 
mechanisms may supersede challenges that occur earlier in the monitoring process. This 
presents a number of fascinating possibilities. Importantly, this is consistent with the 
possibility, as presented by Stuss and colleagues (2001), that other modules within an 
awareness ‘level’ may permit both continued functioning of that type of awareness, and 
continued inter-connectivity with other levels of awareness. In this respect the HoP model 
(Stuss et al., 2001) must be viewed as dynamic, as Stuss and colleagues appear to have 
intended. It would be of interest to investigate the development of awareness in childhood 
within the HoP model framework, in order further to understand changes in the processes 
underlying different types of awareness during ageing. For example, investigating whether 
children form each level sequentially, achieving Level 4 only after all other levels have 
developed. Indeed, Stuss and Alexander (2004) considered congenital and acquired brain 
injury in children, and suggested that frontal lobe damage particularly influenced development 
of Self-Awareness and theory of mind. The implications for ageing are that awareness may 
begin to ‘deconstruct’ at the higher levels first, as these levels rely on the functional integrity 
of the frontal lobes, but that the capacity of other modules within each level may permit 
adaptation to such changes in the brain. 
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8.1.3. Self-Awareness (Level 4: HoP Model). 
 
Self-Awareness involves accurate monitoring of the self and personal abilities, and relies upon 
the functional integrity of the frontal lobes and inter-connectivity with the limbic system 
(Stuss et al., 2001). This study used multiple self-report measures, which focused on memory 
knowledge and capabilities, memory functioning in demanding situations, and cognitive and 
behavioural changes. The relationship between affect and measures of Self-Awareness was 
also investigated. 
 
There were no age differences in any of the awareness measures specifically focusing on 
current functioning and abilities (MIA Capacity, DEX and MARS), which suggested that 
awareness of abilities did not alter as a function of age. Both groups reported some problems 
with cognitive or behavioural functioning, suggesting that both younger and older adults were 
aware of limitations in their abilities. However, age-related differences were found in the 
Change, Locus and Strategy subscales of the MIA, supporting previous studies indicating that 
older adults perceive more memory decline over time, less internalised control over their 
memory and report utilising more strategies to support memory performance (Dixon & 
Hultsch, 1983; Hertzog et al., 1987; Hultsch et al., 1987); the latter finding being consistent 
with the interpretation of Level 3 performance-monitoring results (see above, Section 8.1.2), 
that older adults had a different response strategy. The study additionally found that the age-
related difference in perceived control over memory was explained by increased depression in 
the older adults. Furthermore, the current study found that older adults relied upon external 
memory aids to a greater extent than younger adults, providing empirical support for the 
numerical trend indicated by Dixon and Hultsch (1983).  
 
The study extended knowledge regarding the influence of affect on metamemory perceptions 
in ageing. Anxiety and depression, as measured by the HADS, were related to increased 
anxiety and stress over memory, reduced memory capabilities, and more perceived change 
over time in memory functioning. These findings indicated that there was an emotional 
component to awareness of memory functioning, providing support for Abson and Rabbitt 
(1990; 1991) and McDougall (1995). One interpretation of these data is that awareness   246 
function in ageing is influenced by the pre-conceptions that a particular society holds about 
ageing. For example, if it is assumed that ageing is associated with poorer memory function, 
irrespective of dementia, then ageing may be associated with the attribution of more 
significance to occasional memory lapses. It is conceivable that this could simultaneously lead 
to greater utilisation of memory strategies, and increased anxiety. ‘Reduced’ awareness may, 
therefore, result from a reaction to a belief as well as from normal brain changes with ageing. 
It would be of considerable interest to investigate changes in awareness with normal ageing in 
relation to personality characteristics (e.g. optimism), and in other societies where ageing is 
perhaps viewed more positively. 
 
In summary, despite age-related differences in perceptions of change in memory functioning 
over time and the use of strategies to support memory performance, there were no differences 
in the self-report measures of Self-Awareness between younger and older adults. These 
findings suggest that increasing age has little effect on self-reports of Self-Awareness using 
traditional questionnaires. The study also suggested the importance of accounting for the role 
of emotion on self-report measures. 
 
 
8.2. Multi-method Assessment of the Hierarchies of Processing Model.  
 
As awareness is a multidimensional construct, the use of multiple measures of awareness is 
advantageous, as indicated by O’Keefe et al. (2007). This approach was particularly beneficial 
to investigating awareness in ageing, as consistent age-related differences in each measure of 
awareness within the levels of the HoP model were not found (see Chapters 4-6). Stuss et al. 
(2001) described each level of awareness as modular, which provided the inter-connectivity 
between the levels; this modular structure also explains how deficits at one level can be 
circumvented (as detailed in Chapters 2 and 7). However, this description also posed a 
challenge for testing the model, as it explained both findings and lack of findings of 
relationships between the levels in the HoP model. Therefore, it may only be assumed that 
lower level functioning supports higher level processes. The final empirical study (Chapter 7)   247 
statistically explored the inter-connectivity between Levels 2-4 of the HoP model using 
correlation analyses.  
 
The study found relationships in both groups between the measures of awareness at different 
levels, providing indirect support for the inter-connectivity of the HoP model. More 
specifically, increased attentional processing of auditory stimuli, operationalised to measure 
the processing of sensory information (Level 2 - Sensorimotor Awareness), was related to the 
similar processing of sensory stimuli in the more executive 4-CRT paradigm (Level 3 - 
Consistent Consciousness). This finding was consistent across groups, suggesting that sensory 
information was processed similarly in younger and older adults, irrespective of whether it 
was simplistic (Level 2: Sensorimotor Awareness) or more complex (Level 3: Consistent 
Consciousness). Relationships between electrophysiological and behavioural correlates of 
performance monitoring (Level 3 - Consistent Consciousness) and measures of Self-
Awareness (Level 4 - Self-Awareness) were also found in both groups. Improved error 
detection, irrespective of group, was related to perceptions of increased control over memory 
functioning, whilst error detection, error processing and post-error slowing were related to the 
use of strategies to support memory performance.   
 
This study was unique in assessing the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) in a healthy ageing 
population, but it was considered critical to do so in order to interpret altered awareness in 
diseases of ageing. Some evidence was found that changes in older adults at one level are 
related to changes at higher levels. For example, attenuated Pe amplitude was associated with 
the use of fewer strategies in the older adults. However, there were no consistent relationships 
across levels between those measures showing age-related differences within levels. This 
suggests support for the proposition that any altered awareness at lower levels can be 
circumvented by processes at higher levels. Furthermore, there were no behavioural 
performance differences between younger and older adults in the novelty auditory oddball, the 
4-CRT, or in any of the cognitive measures (Levels 2 and 3). Moreover, this is the first study, 
to the author’s knowledge, to identify that error detection (indexed by ERN amplitude) is 
related to perceived control over memory functioning. It also indicated that aspects of 
performance monitoring in general, such as error processing, may have influenced the use of   248 
strategies to support memory functioning. Given the relatively small number of participants 
who on whom data were available across all the measures, however, it would be better to view 
these results as preliminary. Nonetheless, the current study provided evidence for relationships 
between measures operationalising different types of awareness, and indirect support for the 
inter-connectivity of the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) which is certainly worth replicating in 
a properly powered study. 
 
 
8.3. Limitations of the Study. 
 
The limitations of the thesis can be separated into issues relating to the lack of assessment of 
all Levels of the HoP model, operationalisations of the types of awareness, and 
methodological issues relating to power and representativeness of the older adult sample. 
These issues are discussed in turn. 
 
8.3.1. Lack of Formal Assessment of Level 1 of the HoP Model. 
 
The lack of formal assessment of the Arousal level of awareness (Level 1) in the HoP model 
(Stuss et al., 2001) may be considered a limitation particularly in the inter-correlational 
analyses (Chapter 7). However, this type of awareness relates to the dimension from coma to 
waking state, and was assumed to be functional as the participants were wide awake at time of 
testing. Nevertheless, evidence discussed in Chapter 1 indicated that sleep disturbances are 
related to cognitive deficits, and this suggests the potential for problems in this type of 
awareness (e.g. daytime sleepiness) to influence processing at higher levels. The inclusion of a 
rigorous sleep questionnaire, for example the Functional Outcomes of Sleep Questionnaire 
(Weaver et al., 1997) and polysomnography (the gold standard of sleep quality assessment) 
would have provided multiple measures of quality of sleep with implications for daytime 
sleepiness. Such a study, if undertaken, would indicate the potential impact of sleep quality on 
higher levels of processing and functioning during the daytime, and provide data perhaps of 
interest to those working with older patients with altered awareness, for example, those with 
AD. Of note, it has already been reported that snoring, which limits sleep quality, is twice as   250 
generalisability of the findings from the older adult sample is also questionable because of the 
sample size, but moreover, the sample was recruited from the Older Adult Volunteer Panel 
managed by Dr. Romola Bucks at the School of Psychology. These older adults may represent 
a select group within the older adult population. Nevertheless, this is the first study to attempt 
to investigate the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) in this manner, so sample sizes could not be 
accurately predicted a priori. Importantly, it is hoped that these pilot data will permit future 
studies to be powered adequately to investigate relationships between levels of awareness, as 
described by Stuss et al. (2001), in normal ageing. 
 
 
8.4. General Conclusions. 
 
The HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001) provided the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
Although the model was developed to account for deficits in awareness in patients with brain 
lesions, and has not, to the author’s knowledge, been empirically tested, the studies presented 
in this thesis have indicated that the model is applicable to an investigation of different types 
of awareness in a healthy ageing population. Moreover, the conceptualisations employed to 
assess the HoP model may be considered to be useful and practical measures of awareness in 
younger and older adults. 
 
The studies presented herein, have shown that ageing is associated with altered attentional 
capture, attenuated allocation of attention to stimuli in both a simple auditory oddball 
paradigm and in a more complex choice response task. Older adults have slower processing of 
novel stimuli, in addition to topographical evidence of reduced frontal lobe activity, and 
altered learning of novel stimuli. Slower attentional processing and response priming were 
additionally found in the 4-CRT. Both error detection and processing were reduced in the 
older adults, and this was related to their perceptions of control over memory functioning and 
the reported use of internal and external strategies to support current memory functioning. 
Although older adults perceived more change in their memory functioning over time, they did 
not report more difficulties with memory, or cognitive and behavioural functioning, compared 
to younger adults. The value of the theoretical framework provided by Stuss et al. (2001) may   252 
performance across groups, suggest that altered functioning, as indexed by the ERP 
components, did not have a significant negative impact on performance. However, behaviour 
in computer-based ERP tasks may not be representative of everyday functioning (Hogan et al., 
2006). The results, therefore, may not be suggestive of deficit but may be consistent with the 
conclusion that alteration in function is a means of adaptation to underlying brain and 
cognitive changes occurring during later life. 
 
 
8.5. Implications for Diseases of Ageing. 
 
A range of neuropsychological and neurological models of awareness (see Sections 1.3.4.1 
and 1.3.4.2, Chapter 1) has been developed to account for deficits in awareness found in 
patient populations, and has provided a multitude of definitions of different types of 
awareness. As such, clinical assessment of awareness has focused on deficits in awareness of 
specific functions rather than as part of a dynamic and potentially compensating system as 
promoted by the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001). Several methods have been employed, 
including questionnaires, discrepancies between patient and carer ratings of functioning of 
various cognitive and behavioural domains and discrepancies between prediction and actual 
performance of neuropsychological tests and other experimental tasks (see Clare 2004b, for a 
review). Each of these types of assessments is dependent on assessment by the self 
(introspection) and/or others, and has the potential for influence by psychological factors such 
as affect, self-esteem and carer burden. Other factors may also impact on self-assessments, for 
example, current stress levels and fatigue. ERPs may provide a more objective measure that is 
complementary to the traditional subjective approach.  
 
Another limitation of the clinical literature is that few studies have included healthy older 
adult populations as controls, restricting conclusions about the effects of disease pathology on 
awareness over and above any normal age-related changes. In other words, if the effects of 
normal ageing on awareness are not known, then it is not possible fully to understand deficits 
in awareness in diseases of ageing. Clinical awareness questionnaires were included in 
Chapter 6, and the study found that healthy younger and older adults reported some problems   253 
with cognitive and behavioural functioning, and therefore had awareness of their limitations. 
Moreover, these results indicated that the awareness questionnaires were also appropriate for 
use with healthy populations, and that the inclusion of healthy older adults in clinical 
questionnaire studies of awareness would be feasible. 
 
The ERP studies of Sensorimotor Awareness and Consistent Consciousness provided a more 
novel approach to the assessment of awareness, and are proposed to be complementary to the 
original questionnaire studies. The EEG technique is not reliant on self and/or informant 
reports, efficient memory recall, or, to a degree, cognitive capacity of the individual. Age-
related differences in brain activity were found without associated performance deficits, 
suggesting that ERP components may also be less subject to the potential influence of 
psychological factors, such as affect and social desirability. Moreover, it was found that the 
measurement of electrical brain activity was acceptable to older adults, and, may be a 
valuable, non-invasive technique applicable for use in older adult patient populations. 
 
ERP methodology may be particularly informative with regard to predicting decline in 
longitudinal studies of ageing. In this respect, it is interesting that age-related differences in 
the ERN and Pe were driven by differences between younger adults and the oldest older adults 
aged 70+ years (Chapter 5; and Appendix 6). If these components are confirmed as 
particularly sensitive to maturational change they may be candidate variables to track 
progression from mild cognitive impairment to AD, and from mild to moderate brain 
dysfunction in older adults with dementia. However, additional benefit of the ERP approach 
may derive from its combination with structural imaging data and neuropsychological 
assessments, rather than in isolation.  
 
Older adulthood has been shown to be a time of neural and cognitive change (Sections 2.4 and 
2.5, Chapter 2), and this thesis has shown that that there are subtle changes in brain function 
underlying processes of awareness with ageing. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that any 
changes in awareness with diseases of ageing are occurring against a static background, rather, 
there are dynamic changes in organisation of neural networks underlying awareness. Normal 
ageing may be associated with compensatory mechanisms (Cabeza, 2002), and diseases of   254 
ageing may become symptomatic only when the functions of these mechanisms are 
significantly disrupted by neuropathology.  
 
The processes of plasticity may provide a neural explanation for such compensation, and the 
continued function of awareness in later life (cf. Arendt, 2001). In other words, there may be a 
neural explanation for why compensation is possible in normal ageing, but fails in diseases of 
ageing. Scheff and Price (2003) found that synaptic density was significantly reduced in layers 
III and V of the frontal and temporal lobes in individuals with AD. Synaptogenesis, facilitating 
the development or strengthening of alternative ‘awareness’ neural pathways, may be a 
compensatory mechanism that is deficient in AD (cf. Lassmann, 1996), as a reduction in 
synaptic density is not a typical feature of normal aging (Lassmann, 1996; Scheff, Price & 
Sparks, 2001). Mesulam (1999) suggested that failure of the mechanisms involved in plasticity 
(i.e. synaptogenesis) underlie AD and the relationship between the clinical and 
neuropathological characteristics of AD. Arendt (2001; 2004) further hypothesised that the 
effects of plasticity lie along a continuum, with beneficial cortical reorganisation at one end 
and neurodegeneration at the other.  
 
 
8.6. Awareness.  
 
A range of models of awareness was described in Chapter 1 and, despite the different 
approaches and definitions of awareness, there is much commonality. In Chapter 7, the 
conceptualisation of a separation of awareness into two broad types was discussed: 
metacognitive self-awareness which relates to knowledge held about the self, and on-line 
situational awareness, which arises from experience of activity. This separation can be found 
in several of the models in Chapter 1. Awareness arising from knowledge held about the self is 
similar to: systemic awareness (Cavanaugh, 1989; Section 1.3.3, Chapter 1); the personal 
knowledge base (PKB: Agnew & Morris, 1998; Section 1.3.4.1.1, Chapter 1); metacognitive 
knowledge (Toglia and Kirk, 2000; Section 1.3.4.1.2, Chapter 1); Self-Awareness, at the 
highest level of the HoP model (Stuss et al., 2001; Section 1.3.4.2, Chapter 1); and, insight 
into the self in Vector 3 (Prigatano & Johnson, 2003). Awareness involving self-knowledge   255 
also features in objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Section 1.3.2, 
Chapter 1), which states that objective self-awareness arises from self-focused attention. The 
conceptualisation of on-line awareness arising from experience of activity and performance 
monitoring is found within the metacognitive literature, in which this type of awareness is 
analogous to: memory monitoring (Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; Section 1.3.1, Chapter 1); 
subjective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Section 1.3.2, Chapter 1); on-line 
awareness (Cavanaugh, 1989; Section 1.3.3, Chapter 1); situational awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000; Section 1.3.4.1.2, Chapter 1); Consistent Consciousness in the HoP model (Stuss et al., 
2001). This concept also features in the Agnew and Morris (1998; Section 1.3.4.1.1, Chapter 
1) model, as performance monitoring is the process which underlies mnemonic and executive 
anosognosia, the detection of a mismatch concerning functioning, and of errors. The 
commonalities in these concepts and definitions may be interpreted to indicate support for the 
separation of awareness into awareness about the self and on-line experiential awareness. 
However, such a conclusion is restricted by the lack of empirical investigation, nevertheless, 
the current thesis and the study by O’Keefe et al. (2007) offer some support for this 
proposition.  
 
Defining the multi-dimensional nature of awareness has posed a significant challenge for 
research. Whilst there has been consideration for the concept of awareness as a process 
dependent on brain function (Prigatano & Johnson, 2003; Stuss et al., 2001), there has been 
little consideration of the complexity of awareness and its relationship with the brain, as this 
complexity is difficult to assess empirically. An alternative view is that awareness can be 
presumed as a factor that underlies the ability to perform everyday tasks, but that is not 
interesting in itself. In this view, the question of what constitutes awareness only becomes 
pertinent when problems with awareness develop, as is the case found in individuals with 
dementia. This thesis may not claim to have made a substantial contribution to age-old debates 
about awareness, but it has, perhaps, contributed to the view that awareness may be assessed 
by testing brain function, and that awareness is a multi-dimensional construct. The former is 
supported by evidence of alteration in brain ERP components with normal ageing, and the 
latter by evidence of selectivity in that alteration.    
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Appendix 1. Sponsorship Letter from the University of Southampton. 
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consent, we would also like to ask someone with whom you are close to complete 
some questionnaires about your abilities. The second visit will take place in the ERP 
room at the University of Southampton. In order to measure the electrical activity of 
your brain, a cap with holes in it will be placed on your head and leads will be placed 
on your scalp with a watery gel. The leads transmit the brain’s electrical activity to the 
computer where it is recorded.  
 
There is no risk involved; it is not possible for the leads to send electrical activity back 
to the brain. The leads can be removed in less than a minute if you decide you want 
to stop. Once the leads have been placed, you will be asked to complete some 
attention tasks on the computer. A short questionnaire about how you are feeling will 
be given at the beginning and at the end of the computer tasks. You will also be 
asked to complete four practical tasks; three everyday and one novel task. The 
second visit will also be videotaped.  
 
I will endeavour to remove as much of the gel as possible at the end of the second 
visit, and you may wish to wash your hair when you get home. If you would prefer, 
there is a hairdresser on campus and we can arrange for you to have a wash and 
blow dry.  
 
What do I have to do? 
 
There are no special requirements of you. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
There are no significant disadvantages or risks involved in taking part in this study. 
Many people find the tasks fun if a little tiring. 
 
The gel is salt based. It is harmless. However, to be certain, we will conduct a skin 
test to check that you do not react to it. This involves putting a tiny amount of gel on 
your hand to look for redness or itching. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
There are no direct benefits to you from taking part in the study.  
 
What if something goes wrong? 
 
It is very unlikely that any part of this study will cause you harm. The study is entirely 
non invasive. However, if any aspect of the way you have been approached or 
treated in the course of the study causes you concern, please write to the project 
supervisor Dr. Romola Bucks at the School of Psychology, University of 
Southampton, Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ.  
 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
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All information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential.  Personal information will not be released to or viewed by anyone 
other than researchers involved in this project. All of the data collected will be coded 
so that it is anonymous and will be stored securely. Results of this study will not 
include your name or any other identifying characteristics. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results from the study will provide us with data that we intend to present within 
the School of Psychology, University of Southampton and an article will be submitted 
for publication. You will not be identified in any presentation of the data. A copy of the 
study findings can be provided by Cassie Richardson, on request. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The Economic and Social Research Council, Gerald Kerkut Charitable Trust and The 
Alzheimer’s Research Trust are funding the research and it is managed by the 
University of Southampton.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Southampton School 
of Psychology Ethics Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a 
participant in this research, or if you feel that you have been placed at risk, you may 
contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, Department of Psychology, University of 
Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ.  
Phone:  (023) 8059 3995. 
 
Contact for Further Information:  
 
Miss Cassie Richardson, BSc., MSc., 
Postgraduate Research Student, 
School of Psychology, 
University of Southampton, 
Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ 
 
Office number: 023 8059 5108  
Email: cr2@soton.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 